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ABSTRACT 
 
 Since 9/11, counterterrorism policies have been one of the crucial policy issues facing the 
United States. After the attacks on the United States, counterterrorism in this country 
transformed. Fifteen years later, counterterrorism is typically organized as a one-size fits all 
approach. This approach generalizes all terrorist threats, trying to target terrorism as a whole. 
This thesis explains how this is an improper approach to counterterrorism. Instead, policies 
should be case-specific and created in regards to the specific characteristics embodied by each 
terrorist organization. These characteristics include history and ideology, organizational and 
leadership structure, finances, and tactics and targets. These characteristics have been proven to 
comprise the composition of a one-of-a-kind terrorist organization. Each group expresses these 
characteristics differently, even if they share the same geographical location or religious 
background. Through research utilizing academic journal articles, current events, government 
publications, and published books, it is discovered how the unique characteristics displayed by 
Islamic Fundamentalist groups have counterterrorism policy implications. In order to portray 
this, this thesis analyzed characteristics of Al Qaeda, ISIS, and the Taliban. Through these case-
studies, it was shown how distinct these groups are from one another and how these differences 
should be accounted for in counterterrorism policies. Once these differences are implemented 
into individualist counterterrorism policies, the United States can provide effective policies that 
target specific aspects of each terrorist organization instead of trying to combat terrorism as a 
whole.  
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I. Introduction 
 
The issue of terrorism has been on the forefront of political elections, government 
decisions, and the safety of the American public. This has caused the United States government 
to keep terrorism as one of the main aspects of American policies, especially foreign affairs. In 
order to do this, the United States develops counterterrorism policies. International 
counterterrorism policies, according to the U.S. Department of State, promotes “U.S. national 
security by taking a leading role in developing coordinated strategies and approaches to defeat 
terrorism abroad” (U.S. Department of State). Typically, the United States government creates a 
broad counterterrorism policy that incorporates aspects from multiple terrorist organizations in 
different regions around the world. Or, the U.S. focuses on one specific attribute of a terrorist 
group (like their finances) and fails to recognize multiple characteristics in their policies. By 
combing these two types of counterterrorism policies, the United States can create a more 
successful and preventative counterterrorism plan. Each individual policy will focus on each 
terrorist group that is a threat to the United States. The unique characteristics of each terrorist 
group will be incorporated into these individualized counterterrorism policies.  
This information and prior research contributed to the main research question presented 
in this thesis: How do characteristics of Islamic Fundamentalist groups affect U.S. 
counterterrorism policies? This leads to the following hypothesis: If an Islamic Fundamentalist 
group is comprised of a unique set of characteristics, then United States should incorporate these 
characteristics into individualistic counterterrorism policies. Therefore, each terrorist group (in 
this case, Islamic Fundamentalist group) will have their own policy directed at the vulnerabilities 
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apparent according to their characteristics. Using this approach, counterterrorism policies will 
hopefully become increasingly effective since they are targeting certain aspects of a group. 
The independent variables in this thesis are the different characteristics in the case studies 
of the three Islamic Fundamentalist Groups. These characteristics are the group’s history and the 
development of their ideology, their leadership and organizational structure, their targets and 
tactics, and their finances. The dependent variable is United States counterterrorism policies. 
There are also two control variables that were kept consistent and influenced which case studies 
were chosen. The first control variable was the underlying religion of these organizations. The 
three case studies that were chosen are all Islamic Fundamentalist groups, meaning their 
underling religion is Islam. Islamic fundamentalism focuses on the fundamentals of Islam and 
adheres strictly to the Quran. This adherence is often considered ‘real Islam’ and is accompanied 
by violence and intolerance (Kte’pi). The reason Islamic Fundamentalist terrorism was chosen 
was because these groups have had immense effects on the United States, through attempted and 
successful attacks on this country. This not only includes the devastating 9/11 attacks that 
occurred 15 years ago, but recent attacks as well. This includes the Boston Marathon Bombings 
in 2013 (Cooper et al). There was also an intentional focus on Islamic Fundamentalist groups 
that were based on Sunni Islam, which is why the case studies of ISIS, Al Qaeda, and The 
Taliban were selected. By narrowing the belief system, it made it easy to compare each group’s 
specific ideological foundation. Differences in religion or even the schism of Islam could 
possibly impact certain characteristics of the terrorist group, especially history and ideology. 
This is why each ease study was a Sunni Islamic Fundamentalist group.   
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The second control variable is the region of the world these groups are located, which is 
the Persian Gulf region of the Middle East. By limiting the region of the world, the scope of each 
fundamentalist group was able to be narrowed down to the specific geographical region they 
inhibit. This means that any geographical influences were able to be controlled. For example, if a 
terrorist group was established in Russia, they might act differently than a terrorist group based 
in Iraq. This control variable was also able to show how Middle Eastern countries are interrelated 
with one another. This includes Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. By using these two control 
variables, two key characteristics were kept consistent regardless of the case study. Since the 
thesis was already centered on four varying characteristics, it was necessary to have at least two 
characteristics consistent for the basis of comparison  
Throughout my research, it was shown how vital it is to understand how certain 
characteristics of Islamic Fundamentalist groups can affect U.S. counterterrorism policies. This 
shows that the relationship between the independent and dependent variables is strong. Some 
characteristics of Islamic Fundamentalist groups do affect and shape counterterrorism policies 
more than others. For example, the finances of terrorist groups have direct implications on how 
to approach counterterrorism. Al Qaeda’s main source of revenue is through financial 
facilitators. Therefore, Al Qaeda counterterrorism policies should focus on these facilitators 
(Roth et al 20). On the other hand, ISIS raises funds through their control of oil reserves. This 
means the main focus of this group needs to be on their selling of smuggled oil to Middle Eastern 
countries (Stergiou 193). Although Al Qaeda and ISIS are both Islamic Fundamentalist groups, it 
is shown that there needs to be different approaches in counterterrorism based on a certain 
characteristic, such as their main sources of revenue.  
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Methodology and Research Design 
 
In order to suggest meaningful counterterrorism policies and to accurately describe the 
characteristics that should impact counterterrorism, any research must be properly organized and 
conducted. The primary method utilized throughout this research was an analyzation of a 
culmination of peer-reviewed academic journals, unbiased newspaper articles about current 
events, published books, and government publications. This information was then analyzed 
objectivity, with the objective being to link characteristics to counterterrorism implications. The 
research and the findings were also going to be qualitative, focused on descriptions and 
explanations, not numbers. Since this research came from many different sources and there was 
an abundance of information and examples collected, the next focus was how to organize all of 
this data. This is when the research design was developed. 
The first section in this thesis is an introduction to both the research and the background 
of Islamic Fundamentalism. The purpose of this section is to decipher between the differences 
between traditional Islamic beliefs and how Islamic Fundamentalists tend to interpret these 
beliefs. In order to accomplish this, there is research regarding the Quran, which is the holy book 
of Islam, as well as specific Islamic beliefs, like the 5 pillars of Islam (Johnson). Then, how these 
Islamic Fundamentalist groups take those traditional Islamic beliefs and interpret them according 
to their ideology is explained. Within the introduction, the funnel method is incorporated as a 
representation of how Islamic Fundamentalism/Jihadism is just one division of Islam. The 
general concept, Islam, is narrowed down to Islamic Fundamentalism. Islam is the overlying 
religion. Within this religion, there is a major struggle between Sunni and Shia Muslims (Moore 
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229). The Islamic Fundamentalist groups in my research are all Sunni Fundamentalist groups, 
and within the Sunni population, they are known as Salafists. Within Salafism, there are 
Jihadists, which are what the three case studies identify as (Wiktorowicz and Kaltner 77). 
Overall, the introduction shows the progression of Islam to Jihadism and provides an overview 
of the characteristics of a Jihadist. In addition to the background knowledge, the introduction 
discusses the fundamentals of this thesis. This not only includes the hypothesis, but the research 
design, methodology, research significance, and literature review. These sections are necessary 
in order to show that this is a proper and valid research project that can be verified by fellow 
researchers.   
After this introduction to Islam and some of the major differences between 
Fundamentalism and traditional Islamic beliefs, three main sections follow based on the 3 case 
studies. These case studies center around three different Islamic Fundamentalist groups: Al 
Qaeda, ISIS (more recently referred to as the Islamic State), and The Taliban. Within these case 
studies, specific characteristics of these 3 Islamic Fundamentalist groups are discussed. The first 
of these characteristics is the history and ideology of each group. This not only is necessary for 
the counterterrorism aspect, but in order to learn the foundations of the group. These ideologies 
also have similarities with the beliefs discussed in the introduction. The other sections within 
these case studies include leadership and organizational structure, finances, and the tactics and 
targets the group utilizes. After each characteristic of that Islamic Fundamentalist group is 
explained, the basic counterterrorist implications this certain characteristic has towards United 
States policies is formed. In the conclusion, these United States policy implications are explained 
more in-depth. 
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The reason these four characteristics were chosen was because throughout the research 
process, it was revealed that these characteristics affect the counterterrorist policies the United 
States should implement. These characteristics also had enough information from various 
sources so substantial policies could be formed. Instead of taking a broad approach to 
counterterrorism and having one general policy (a one size fits all approach), the U.S. needs to 
take the specifics of each individual terrorist threat and create a policy for each. This would be 
known as case-specific counterterrorism policies. By replacing general policies, case-specific 
policies can be more effective by utilizing this approach. This is because policies will be 
individually shaped and targeted towards each terrorist organization. More evaluative research 
will need to be done in the future to determine how much more effective U.S. counterterrorism 
polices are when they take this case-specific approach.  
It was also necessary to explain the differences between the various beliefs of Islam first 
in the introductory chapter because it is important to realize that there are differences between 
traditional Muslims and Islamic Fundamentalists (Jihadists). Counterterrorist experts need to 
understand these differences when they are creating policies because they cannot discriminate 
against all Muslims when implementing any counterterrorism efforts. They also have to 
understand Islamic Fundamentalism beliefs in order to have an idea as to why Islamic 
Fundamentalist groups behave the way they do. Experts must also understand what their 
underlying grievances are. Once they have an idea of the motives behind an Islamic 
Fundamentalist group, counterterrorist experts will be able to get to the root of the terrorist 
behavior and try to prevent or remedy it. This will create a proactive way to solve the ‘War on 
Terror’ and the fight against terrorism. This is compared to the more reactive plan currently in 
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place. This reactive plan can only discuss options and implement policies after an attack has 
already occurred. By combining case-specific counterterrorism policies with policies that focus 
on Islamic Fundamentalist (not necessarily Islamic) beliefs, the United States will have a solid 
counterterrorism plan that does not discriminate against all Muslims and is effective towards the 
specific group each policy focuses on.  
After discussing the 3 case studies, the conclusion chapter explains the importance of 
having case-specific counterterrorist policies and the next steps for United States 
counterterrorism. A comprehensive U.S. counterterrorism plan is also laid out in the conclusion 
that contains policies based upon the characteristics of the three case studies. After the 
explanations of these counterterrorist policies, the thesis ends with research questions that have 
developed throughout this research. This includes ways the research can be taken further. This 
thesis is just the first step into creating case-specific counterterrorism policies. Additional 
research can be done regarding different terrorist groups, different regions of the world, and 
different characteristics.  
 
Literature Review 
 
 The key to proper research is utilizing past research that influences the formulation of 
new research questions, hypotheses, and policy. Therefore, in order to conduct the research 
needed for this thesis, a variety of sources needed to be utilized in order to see where this 
research fits in with past literature and how it differs from those sources. Older, historical 
sources were used, especially those that described the history of each Islamic Fundamentalist 
group and Islam as a whole. These sources were needed to get an accurate description of history 
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and ideology written by credible sources. The more recent academic journals used included 
current counterterrorism policies utilized by President Barack Obama. I also used current news 
stories from various newspapers in order to have up to date information on recent attacks, any 
recent leadership changes, or financial gains or losses. Government publications were also 
helpful throughout this research because of the policy implications this thesis has. These 
publications include congressional hearings, department websites, press releases from the 
President and other cabinet members, and policy outlines. Peer-reviewed academic journals were 
the primary source utilized throughout this research. These were used to describe the specific 
characteristics of each Islamic Fundamentalist group. Culminating all of these different types of 
sources together ensured that the thesis would have information from a variety of sources from 
accredited authors.  
 Within the countless sources utilized, the research presented in this thesis found a unique 
place in published literature. Throughout the research process of examining journal articles, 
books, and websites, there was not a single source that had taken many characteristics of 
multiple Islamic Fundamentalist groups and created comprehensive and individualized 
counterterrorism policy based on those characteristics. There are many books written about one 
certain terrorist group, where it lists the general information about the group, the history, and 
their ideology. Sometimes, but rarely, these sources touch on counterterrorism. However, this is 
usually in the general aspect and not specific to the terrorist group. The term ‘general aspect’ in 
this case means the typical defenses the United States uses, regardless of the threat. This includes 
military or diplomatic means. On the other hand, there are many books, journal articles, and 
government publications that extensively describe United States counterterrorism policies. The 
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issue with these forms of literature is that current counterterrorism policies do not directly relate 
to the characteristics of different terrorist organizations or differentiate between radial and 
traditional Islam.  
In order to account for these issues, this research topic fits in between these two types of 
literature, meaning it bridges the gap between an Islamic Fundamentalist group and 
counterterrorist policies. In order to bridge this gap, multiple characteristics of Islamic 
Fundamentalist groups are analyzed and counterterrorism policy implications are presented 
according to those characteristics. After each characteristic is individually discussed, they are 
combined into one comprehensive counterterrorist policy per Islamic Fundamentalist group. This 
is not one counterterrorist policy for all terrorist groups or even for all Islamic Fundamentalist 
groups. It is a separate plan for each group discussed. Take Stergiou’s research article on ISIS’s 
finances. Stergiou begins his article with how ISIS funds their operation. He then discusses how 
the United States plans to use counterterrorism policies to defeat ISIS through only their finances 
(Stergiou 201). The issue with this is that the counterterrorism plan presented doesn’t take other 
characteristics into account, including ISIS’s ideology, their allies, their methods of violence, etc. 
This issue is apparent in many sources utilized in this thesis, with them only taking one 
characteristic into account.  
 On the other hand, certain literature has the opposite problem. These sources focus on a 
one size fits all approach to counterterrorism. In other words, these sources just focus on past, 
current, or proposed U.S. counterterrorism policies. These sources do not take into account the 
specifics of each terrorist organization. They also do not focus on only one terrorist group, like 
the Taliban, or even one type of terrorist group, like Islamic Fundamentalist groups or religious 
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terrorist groups. By combining each terrorist group together, these counterterrorism policies only 
do half the work. Only some vulnerabilities of certain groups will be targeted, while other groups 
will be able to continue their operations unharmed. For example, in regards to organizational 
structure, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi claims to have direct control over their fighters and 
their territory. This is because he is the political and religious leader of ISIS, otherwise known as 
caliph. On the other hand, Al Qaeda’s leader Ayman al Zawahiri states that he does not have 
direct hierarchal control over the vast network of Al Qaeda. Instead he and the rest of Al Qaeda’s 
core leadership focuses on centralizing their message and strategy compared to the daily 
operations of their franchises (Glenn). These two different types of organizational structures 
offer different situations for counterterrorism policies to take into account. With ISIS, experts 
must listen, understand, and communicate with the leaders, because whatever Baghdadi wants, 
everyone follows. The other option is to kill Baghdadi and try to prevent another from taking his 
place. This loss of direct leadership could mean catastrophe for ISIS because of the established 
hierarchy. Since Al Qaeda is more decentralized, experts need to focus on the smaller cells and 
affiliates, where there are different leaders involved and different areas to cover. This requires 
extensive work in trying to map where these cells are located. That is why the death of Bin 
Laden didn’t completely demolish this group. If these two groups were combined into one 
counterterrorism policy, the organization structure of the groups could withstand certain policies 
because of how different they are from each other. Comparing the two group’s organization and 
leadership structure shows how necessary it is to differentiate between varying groups, because 
each group is unique based on their characteristics. Not all terrorist groups and not all Islamic 
Fundamentalist groups are alike. 
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 There are two examples that show this broad approach to counterterrorism the United 
States currently implements. The first is found directly through the U.S. Department of State’s 
Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism. Within this bureau, there are 
countless programs and initiatives being considered by the United States (U.S. Department of 
State). Although there are over 10 unique approaches to counterterrorism listed on the Bureau’s 
website, none of them refer to a specific terrorist organization. These initiatives are covering vast 
amounts of ground while they try and encompass all types of terrorism. Instead, initiatives and 
programs can be shaped in accordance to each specific terrorist organization depending on their 
specific characteristics. Another example is based upon a Congressional Research Service 
Report. In 2016, specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Christopher Blanchard and analyst in 
Middle Eastern and African Affairs Carla Humud developed a U.S. policy report based on the 
Islamic State. In comparison to the programs sponsored by the Department of State, these 
policies are directed at a specific terrorist group, ISIS. The issue with this report is that the 
policies contained within it are still broad. It discussed the overall U.S. strategy, threat 
assessments, and military operations (Blanchard and Humud 7). What this report doesn’t do is 
create policies in response to the specifics of ISIS. It is targeted to ISIS but not catered to ISIS 
Therefore, even when policies refer to a specific organization, they are usually general and not 
specified to the varying structures within a group.  
Another way the research presented in this thesis takes current literature one step further 
is with Stanford’s Mapping Military Organizations research project. This research project gave 
an overview of all three of the case studies in this thesis; Al Qaeda 
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, ISIS, and the Taliban. This source gave details on many characteristics of these three 
Islamic Fundamentalist groups, including the four characteristics discussed in this thesis. What 
this thesis does differently than this project is that it relates these characteristics to specific 
United States counterterrorism implications (Stanford University). Two other sources have 
discussed larger scale counterterrorism policies that are presented in the conclusion chapter. 
Ganor discusses the toolbox that can be available to counterterrorist experts if they pursue 
multiple forms of counterterrorism policies (Ganor 344). The issue is that he does not define 
these ‘tools’ as related to certain terrorist groups. Throughout his article he describes some of the 
‘tools’ or options experts can use, but he does not specify which tactic would be used for each 
threat a terrorist group presents. Another source was Bouzis’s article on U.S. counterterrorism 
against ISIS. Bouzis’s research was a small comparison of this thesis’s research, as it focused on 
linking ISIS’s tactics into counterterrorism measures (Bouzis). However, Bouzis failed to go into 
greater detail about how other characteristics like history, ideology, leadership, and finances can 
also be used to develop equally successful plans. To go into greater detail about the sources 
utilized in this thesis’s research, a literature review was conducted of the most influential 
sources. 
Throughout the past few decades, there has been multiple sources that have contributed to 
research on Islamic Fundamentalist groups, Islam, and counterterrorism. In 2003, two years after 
the 9/11 attacks on the United States, the academic journal article published by Quintan 
Wiktorowicz and John Kaltner argued the reasoning behind 9/11. Al Qaeda has continuously 
justified the killing of civilians as a part of a total war against the United States, even though the 
religion of Islam condemns violence. This article also discusses the basis of Al Qaeda’s 
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ideology. They are part of the Salafist movement, which is a part of the Sunni Muslim ideology. 
There are 4 ways Salafists promote Islam and work to create an Islamic society/caliphate. Al 
Qaeda is a part of this violent jihadist movement, which promotes using violence in order to 
promote Islam. Regardless of every criticism other Muslims have with Al Qaeda’s methods, they 
always have a justification for their defensive jihad, whether it is engaged because of broken 
treaties or the use of civilian targeting. For example, Al Qaeda follows conditions and rules of 
engagement for their use of their tactics against their specific targets. These justifications even 
lead to how Al Qaeda justified their attacks on the United States during 9/11. This is also shows 
why it would be difficult to ‘compromise’ with Al Qaeda to stop their attacks, because they 
believe their attacks are completely justified (Wiktorowicz and Kaltner 85). 
Also in 2003, Walter Lacquer’s book “No End to War” offered information on the 
foundations of terrorism, Islamic terrorism, the quest for a global jihad, tactics used by terrorist 
groups like suicide, and why America has become a target of terrorism. The beginning sentence 
itself proves one of the main points of this thesis. This is that attacks and violence are not the 
only things important to understanding terrorism, it is the underlying ideology of these terrorist 
groups (Lacquer 11). Lacquer also argues that religious terrorism is one of the primary forms of 
terrorism currently, which is a reason why religious terrorism was the type of terrorism that is 
focused on in this thesis. The entirety of the 2nd chapter focuses specifically on the origins of 
Islamic terrorism, which is a part of the introductory chapter. This includes details about 
Salafism, which is the movement within Islam that the three case studies in this thesis identify 
with. Lacquer also dedicates an entire chapter to why America is the focus of contemporary 
terrorism, which proves why America is a significant country to focus on when discussing 
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counterterrorism policies. He even goes in to detail about how America has felt about Muslims 
since the 9/11 attacks, with recent Islamophobia beliefs plaguing Americans and not helping 
relations with the Muslim community. 
In 2004, one of the most significant sources used in this research was published, which 
was related to Al Qaeda and counterterrorism. During 2004, the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States wrote the 9/11 Commission Report. This commission 
was created by the United States Congress and signed into effect by President Bush in 2002. One 
section focused on in this report was the financing of terrorist groups, which focused on Al 
Qaeda in particular because of their involvement in the 9/11 attacks. This section was titled 
Monograph on Terrorist Financing and was one of the two Staff Monographs included in this 
report (Roth et al). There were also many other aspects of this report that related to 
counterterrorism options and policies for the United States in regards to terrorism as a whole and 
Al Qaeda specifically. For example, one recommendation the commission was in Chapter 12, 
What to Do? A Global Strategy. “The U.S. government must identify and prioritize actual or 
potential terrorist sanctuaries. For each, it should have a realistic strategy to keep possible 
terrorists insecure and on the run, using all elements of national power. We should reach out, 
listen to, and work with other countries that can help” (Kean and Hamilton 367). 
Jumping ahead, many sources utilized were recently published in 2013. One was a report 
published by the AEI titled “The Al Qaeda Network a New Framework for Defining the 
Enemy”, which was written by Katherine Zimmerman. Al Qaeda has a complex organizational 
structure that has gone through multiple transformations since their formation in 1988. In 2013, 
Zimmerman discussed these transformations, including the difference between a networked 
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organization and hierarchal organization. The networked organization represents a more latticed 
structure, which prevents the deaths of Al Qaeda leaders from bringing down the entire group 
(Zimmerman 7). This network also shows how ideas are passed between one another. There is a 
difference between Al Qaeda Central and the rest of the group. Al Qaeda Central is the part of 
the group that is located in Pakistan and is directly led by the emir. There are also Al Qaeda 
affiliates that have been recognized by this emir and share Al Qaeda’s ideology and resources. 
Besides affiliates, Al Qaeda also has many associates who do not operate under Al Qaeda’s name 
but support the group and share the same ideology. These three groups together form Al Qaeda’s 
strong network (Zimmerman 14). This source is an example of a piece of literature that offers a 
detailed explanation of a specific characteristic of one Islamic Fundamentalist group. 
Since the history of Al Qaeda was discussed in great deal, it was necessary to have a 
reliable source focused on describing the history of this group. Therefore, the information would 
be simplified and understandable. In December 2013, Watts, a FBI agent assigned to a joint 
terrorism task force and a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, wrote about the 
transformation of Al Qaeda since their formation in 1988. Watt argues that Al Qaeda has been 
through three versions or ‘incarnations’ since 1988. These three versions represent three different 
forms of Al Qaeda and three ways this organization has been able to adapt to the changing 
jihadist, political, and technological atmospheres of the world. The first version spans from their 
original form in 1988 to the September 11th attacks on the United States. After these attacks, Al 
Qaeda entered into their second version. They were able to begin using the Internet to their 
advantage, recruit members around the globe due to the publicity of 9/11, and sponsor affiliates 
in surrounding Middle Eastern countries. Since the 2011 Arab Spring, the Syrian Civil War, and 
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the founder, Osama Bin Laden’s death, Al Qaeda has entered their third and current version 
(Watts). 
 
Significance 
 
 The topic of Islamic Fundamentalism has academia, theoretical, and policy dimensions. 
Each of these dimensions offers something different in terms of research. The research in this 
thesis focuses on the policy dimension of Islamic Fundamentalism. More specifically, it focuses 
on counterterrorism policy. Once it was decided that the policy implications of Islamic 
Fundamentalism would be focused on, the next step was to figure out whose counterterrorism 
policies would be examined. United States and their counterterrorism policies. This is when 
United States’ counterterrorism policies were chosen. The United States is a global superpower. 
Vladimir Putin himself stated that Russia (the largest nation in the world) accepts that the United 
States is the only true superpower in the world (Reilly). To study and research the 
counterterrorism policies of a global superpower is significant because they have great influence 
worldwide, a mass amount of resources at risk, and their actions have the ability to affect every 
other country. Middle Eastern politics and Islamic Fundamentalist groups engaging in acts of 
terrorism are important to the United States because the U.S. has allies in the Middle East. 
Besides this, there have been multiple attacks carried out directly against the U.S. and their 
allies. The United States also has interests, like oil, in the Middle East that needs to be protected 
from these terrorist groups.  
This research topic has utmost policy importance, as policy change is the potential 
outcome of this research. By looking at the defining characteristics of three Islamic 
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Fundamentalist groups that pose a threat to the United States, the foundation for individualistic 
counterterrorist policy is cemented. For example, by researching the ideology of different Islamic 
Fundamentalist groups, specific details within counterterrorist policies can be shaped according 
to why these radicals think and act the way they do. In the introduction section, this research 
begins by defining what it means to be an Islamic Fundamentalist and how that differs from 
being a traditional Muslim. This includes some of the main differences between Sunni and Shia 
Muslims and basic characteristics of Islamic Fundamentalists. The contrast between the many 
schisms of Islam affects policy because any counterterrorist policy trying to combat Islamic 
fundamentalist terrorism must not discriminate against all Muslims. Therefore, policy experts 
must understand the differences between these schisms. It is also important to understand the 
history of Islam so that historical contexts can be incorporated into U. S’s foreign policy 
regarding the Middle East (Moore 226). If there is an understanding of the basics of Islam, the 
United States can work with countries that have significant Muslim populations while being able 
to respect their customs and beliefs.  
The conclusion chapter is where the policy importance of this research comes together 
and explains why describing these terrorist groups is significant. This section begins by looking 
at the counterterrorism implications that were made throughout the three case studies and 
combines them into their own comprehensive counterterrorism policy. This has policy 
importance because this research shows that a counterterrorist policy must be shaped based on a 
variety of factors and characteristics, not just a one size fits all approach. By having multiple 
policy options in the United States’ overall counterterrorism plan, counterterrorism will become 
increasingly effective. If one plan fails or proves ineffective, the U.S. has multiple other options. 
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As of 2013, when President Obama last outlined point by point his strategy for U.S. 
counterterrorism, the policy didn’t touch on any specific terrorist group except Al Qaeda. This 
means that based on U.S. counterterrorism policies that have been laid out by the President 
himself, there is no mention of ISIS or the Taliban (“The President’s May 23 Speech on 
Counterterrorism”). Along with the varying groups that remain a threat to the United States, 
counterterrorism policies should be specifically formed based on each individual terrorist threat 
and their underlying characteristics. Overall, this research has policy significance, specifically 
United States counterterrorism. 
 
Background Information 
 
Before the topic of terrorism that is conducted by Islamic Fundamentalist groups can be 
discussed, there needs to be an understanding of what Islamic Fundamentalism actually is and 
how it compares to traditional Islam. In order to do this, a brief history of Islam as well as the 
branch of Islam these fundamentalists fall under must first be discussed. This will create the 
foundation necessary to discuss the radical interpretation of Islam that fundamentalists believe 
in. By researching and discussing traditional Islamic beliefs and customs, it is possible to 
compare these traditional beliefs to the radical beliefs held by Islamic Fundamentalists. Once 
there is a distinction drawn between traditional and radical Islam, experts will be able to discuss 
ways to prevent this radicalization, help those who have been radicalized, and stop future 
terrorist attacks. This foundation will also give policy experts the ability to understand the 
differences between varying branches of Islamic faith and be able to keep these differences in 
mind when creating counterterrorism policies and working with Muslims of all backgrounds. 
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These differences must be understood not only to create effective counterterrorism policies, but 
to avoid discrimination against all Muslims.  
Islam is one of the major religions followed around the world. Islam has 1.6 billion 
followers, considered Muslims, which cumulates to 23% of the world’s population (Johnson). 
The sheer amount of Muslims in the world is one reason why Islamic Fundamentalists pose such 
a large threat around the world. There are 1.6 billion people connected to this religion, following 
the beliefs, celebrating the rituals, visiting the sacred sites, and reading the holy books. Within 
the vast religion, there is a small minority, a select few that radicalize the beliefs shared by so 
many others. The fact that there are 1.6 Muslims worldwide, spread across every continent and 
nationality, makes it difficult to find the minority of radicals that are committed to engaging in 
acts of terrorism to ‘advance’ this religion. Another effect this extensive number of Muslims has 
is on politics. If one plays a numbers game, Muslims have the ability to show the pure power a 
group can have if they wish to project their values onto others. This means that if a group of 
Muslims band together to bring about change, the possible number of Muslims that can join 
together is enormous. Politics is also affected through policy change and whether these policies 
are advocated by Muslims or not. Policies that are created must take into account the general 
Muslim populations in each country. Muslims are predominately located in North Africa, the 
Middle- and Near-East, and Indonesia (Ball et al 209). The government of these countries must 
take into consideration the types of people they are representing. If the population is majority 
Muslim (assuming that there is some sort of democracy present), Muslims are able to direct the 
government towards decisions that cater to them.  
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Power isn’t necessarily derived from just pure quantity like the number of practicing 
Muslims. Power also comes from the quality, in this case the Islam religion, meaning what the 
religion is actually comprised of. To Muslims, Islam is not just a religion, it is a way of life. 
Through Islam, there are rules dictating every part of life. This includes prayer, welfare, morals, 
food, celebrations, and family life. These rules are derived from the origins of the religion itself, 
because Islam is also the Arabic word for submission. More specifically, it is the submission of 
one to God. Muslims’ God is named Allah (Ball et al 299). This submission lays the foundation 
of not just Islam, but is a crucial component of Islamic Fundamentalism. Fundamentalists not 
only give up their individuality to Allah, but oftentimes their life. By completely giving 
themselves to Allah, these radicals believe that anything they do is for their God, and any action 
is justified because they are submitting themselves to God’s will.  
 
The 5 Pillars of Islam 
 
The 5 pillars of Islam are the fundamental commitments that a Muslim must fulfill during 
their lifetime. These pillars are one of the major ways experts can compare how traditional 
Muslims and Islamic Fundamentalists interpret Islam. Similar to the 10 Commandments found in 
Christianity, these pillars of faith direct followers on the principles that should guide their daily 
life. The first pillar of Islam is Shahadah, which is known as the profession of faith. Through this 
pillar, Muslims recognize that there is only one true God. They also recite this creed in 
acceptance: “There is no God but God and Muhammad is the Messenger of God" (“The Five 
Pillars of Islam”). Upon taking this creed, Muslims express their total commitment to Islam. 
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The 2nd pillar is Salah, or prayer. This pillar focuses on a Muslim’s direct relationship 
with God through prayer. In order to properly respect the relationship between Man and God, 
Muslim’s all turn towards Makkah. Makkah is Islam’s holiest city. Muslims repeat prayer 5 
times a day, showing the timely dedication required to fulfill this pillar of faith. Like Church on 
Sundays for those who follow Christianity, Muslims also attend a congregational service on 
Fridays. Although the necessity to pray 5 times throughout the day is time consuming, Muslim’s 
are able to pray anywhere, whether it is by themselves or in a group (“The Five Pillars of 
Islam”). This allows some flexibility in such a rigid practice. Muslims prayer is something that 
every Muslim engages in. This represents how Muslims are connected with one another, not only 
throughout the world but throughout history. 
The third pillar is known as Zakat, or almsgiving. This pillar looks at a Muslim’s social 
responsibility to God. Zakat is a more liberal value and states that Muslims must pay a fixed 
2.5% percentage of what they own to the community. This is a liberal value because a Muslim 
gives a specific proportion of their wealth to those in need, compared to a fixed value. This 
means that the wealthier you are, the more you must contribute. It is also liberal because the 
contribution goes towards helping fellow members of the community that are less fortunate. This 
pillar also benefits Muslims in other ways besides providing charity. It frees them from their love 
of possessions, greed, and money. Zakat also teaches that a Muslim is only rich or poor because 
Allah has chosen that path for them and that they should not take advantage of that (“The Five 
Pillars of Islam”). 
Ṣawm is the 4th pillar of Islam, and represents the fulfillment of fasting during the month 
of Ramadan. Fasting is the act of not eating, drinking, or doing other sensual pleasures from 
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dawn to sunset. Fasting is important in Islam because it is an act of deep personal worship and it 
strengthens one’s relationship with God. It also allows wealthier Muslims to understand the 
deprivation that the poor faces with lack of food, which strengthens their sense of empathy. The 
entire month of Ramadan follows the following pattern: There is a special meal at sunset, called 
itfar. Then, Muslims perform an additional nocturnal worship, tarawih, after the typical evening 
prayer. Afterwards, they celebrate. At the very end of Ramadan, Muslims celebrate Eid Al-Fitr, 
which is a recognized holiday of Islamic faith (“The Five Pillars of Islam”). This is also where 
the fasting can officially be over. The act of fasting shows the self-control and discipline 
Muslims must practice day after day, ignoring the temptations of food, drink, and sensual 
pleasures.  
The 5th and final pillar of Islam is the Hajj. This is a Muslim’s pilgrimage to Mecca. This 
pilgrimage occurs once a year in the twelfth month of the Islamic lunar calendar. Any Muslim, 
regardless of ethnicity, country or origin, social class etc., joins together in Mecca to worship 
Allah. This journey is required of all Muslims who are mentally, physically, and financially able 
to (“The Five Pillars of Islam”). The Hajj’s importance is to bring together Muslims of all 
different backgrounds to realize their brotherhood, sisterhood, spirituality and equality. This 
shows that according to Allah, all are equal. 
By using the pillars that are the basis of Islamic belief, it is possible to compare how 
traditional Muslims interpret these pillars and how Islamic Fundamentalists could interpret them. 
These potential radicalized interpretations are vital to understand in order to get inside the mind 
of an Islamic Fundamentalist and attempt to fathom why they commit acts of terrorism. When 
experts can get into the minds of any terrorists, they can get to the root cause of the dissonance. 
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With the first pillar, Shahadah, it is rather easy to see how radicals Muslims can interpret it. A 
total commitment and complete acceptance of Islam allows extremists to justify acts of violence 
in defense of their religion. In other words, if a Muslim interprets the Quran in a violent manner 
or they believe that their total commitment to Islam must include violence and terror, radical 
Muslims will accept this violence as a legitimate means to bring about change. The flexibility of 
Salah, or the 2nd pillar, allows for extremists to pray anywhere they are able. These prayers can 
be seen whether a Muslim is at a theme park or in the comfort of their own home. The 2nd pillar 
is also the first pillar that represents the dedication and self-discipline required of a Muslim. In 
order to maintain praying 5 times a day, a Muslim must dedicate specific times throughout the 
day to satisfy this pillar. This dedication is also seen in a fundamentalist, as they will go to any 
length to fight for their version of Islam.  
Even though the third pillar represents helping those less fortunate, it can still have 
implications for radical Muslims. There are times that extremists claim that they are fighting for 
the people of Islam when committing acts of violence. Therefore, just like Zakat, extremists may 
believe that they must always look out for those less fortunate and all members of their 
community. This is in order to fulfil their social responsibility to God. The ability to fast during 
Ramadan, otherwise known as the Sawm (the 4th pillar), shows that extremists that follow the 5 
pillars have the ability to ignore temptations when they are working on strengthening their 
relationship with God. To extremists, their mission is to promote jihad. Jihad is, “a holy war 
waged on behalf of Islam as a religious duty” (“Jihad”). On a more individual level, jihad is a 
personal struggle for a devoted Muslim. Much like fasting, the violence perpetrated because of 
this jihad and other extremist beliefs cannot be stopped because of temptations or polite 
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conversation. These extremists are dedicated to their beliefs and will not be swayed to break their 
obligation to Allah for trivial matters. This means that the dedication a Muslim can have for 
fasting during Ramadan can also be used for other purposes in their life. This includes dedication 
to promoting jihad and violence. The ultimate test of dedication for a Muslim is the 5th and final 
pillar, Hajj, also known as the pilgrimage to Mecca. If a Muslim can be dedicated enough to their 
religion to travel the steps Muhammed did thousands of years ago means that they are able to do 
almost anything they desire. 
No matter the specific interpretations a Muslim has in regards to Islam, all Muslims share 
the values of the 5 pillars. These shared values connect all Muslims together regardless of 
gender, region of the world, age, or any other characteristic. This is simply because these values 
represent the basic identity of a Muslim. Nowhere in these 5 pillars is any negative connotation 
or adjective used to describe Islamic faith, beliefs, or practices. The issue arises when extremists 
take the 5 pillars, along with other sacred symbols of Islam, and turn them into symbols of 
violence and revolution. Their own interpretations to the 5 pillars as well as the qualities 
portrayed when following these pillars (like extreme dedication) is what can potentially breed a 
radical ideology.  
 
Sunni’s v. Shi’as 
 
Among the billion Muslims practicing Islam, there are various schisms, or divisions, that 
separate Muslims based on their history and beliefs. These schisms can be categorized into two 
main divisions of Islam, Sunni and Shi’a. This major division must be understood first in order to 
recognize the division of Islam that the terrorism discussed in this thesis is committed by. 
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Generally speaking, Sunni Muslims make up a majority of the Muslim population. A small 
proportion of Muslims are Shi’a’s, comprising around 10-15% of the overall Muslim population. 
Shi’a Muslims are generally located in Iraq, Iran, Bahrain, and Azerbaijan (Blanchard and 
Humud 1). The differences between these two types of Muslims isn’t due to disagreements about 
the basic beliefs of Islam. In actuality, the division comes from varying opinions on the 
succession of the Prophet Muhammed after he died. The succession of the Prophet is a major 
source of debate in Islam because any successor becomes the next leader of the Muslim 
community. If one entire group of Muslims disagree with who the successor shall be, then 
conflict is bound to arise because everyone wants to be represented by a leader who they support. 
On one side, there were Muslims who believed that the successor was to be a direct 
relative of the Prophet. These were known as Shi’a Muslims, which means supporters or helpers 
of Ali. On the other side were the Sunni Muslims. These Muslims agreed that the Caliph (the 
Arabic word for successor) and the caliphate (the Islamic state) was legitimate. The disagreement 
was that they did not agree that the Caliph had to be a direct relative of the Prophet. As long as 
the successor was qualified and would properly follow Islam, the Sunni Muslims were satisfied 
(Blanchard and Humud 1). This disagreement came to light with the succession of the first caliph 
after the Prophet Muhammed’s death in 632 AD. After his death, community leaders selected 
Abu Bakr as the first Caliph. Although he was not in the Prophet’s bloodline, he was a close 
companion and a reasonable choice to carry on the Prophet’s rule. Bakr was not the first choice 
for Shi’a Muslims, however, as they supported Ali ibn Abi Talib’s ascent to the throne. Ali was 
not only the husband of one of the Prophet’s daughters, he was also his cousin. This meant he 
was directly related to the Prophet. Once Bakr, and eventually the caliphs that came after him, 
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ascended to rule the caliphate, Shi’a Muslims claimed that these caliphs were illegitimate. “Ali’s 
followers believed that the Prophet Muhammad himself had named Ali as successor and that the 
status quo was a violation of divine order” (Blanchard and Humud 1). This division, one that was 
created thousands of years ago due to the question of who would be the first successor to Prophet 
Muhammed’s throne, was the original reason why there is discord between Muslims today. 
Not only did this split between Islam create controversy on the matter of the first Caliph, 
it created a breeding ground for the dissidence and even the terrorism that is still occurring. In 
the 13th century, the caliphate had lost most of its prestige and influence. By 1924, the name 
caliph was even abolished. The dissolution of this institution (the caliphate) angered Sunni 
Muslims, especially an institution that had laid out a foundation for Islam since the time of the 
Prophet himself. Activists claimed that the reason the caliphate’s power declined was because 
Muslims had strayed from the ‘true path’ of Islam. These activists are the same individuals who 
are also known as Sunni extremists. These Sunni extremists include the founder of Al Qaeda, 
Osama Bin Laden. In order to return to this true path, these activists plan on reconstructing a new 
caliphate based on pure Islam (Blanchard and Humud 1). This desire is one of the reasons 
Islamic Fundamentalists give when creating their propaganda, disseminating their message, and 
committing acts of terror. Fundamentalists believe that they are the true followers of Islam and 
that their actions (regardless of how violent they are) are helping Islam get back to its’ true form.  
The conflict between Sunni and Shi’a’s that occurred almost 2,000 years ago does have modern 
implications and has evolved throughout this time period, splitting the religion of Islam in two.  
 The reason that this conflict is necessary to explain before discussing the specific 
characteristics of Islamic Fundamentalists and the three following case studies is because Al 
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Qaeda, ISIS, and the Taliban are all based on Sunni Islam. There are fundamentalists based on 
Shi’a Islam, but they display different characteristics including ideology, tactics, and targets. The 
ideological differences have already been explained, but these differences only act as an 
underlying foundation for these groups. What is equally as important is how these ideological 
differences manifest in their actual attacks. According to the Brookings Institute, there are 6 
main differences between Sunni and Shi’a terrorism, especially dealing with targets and tactics. 
Sunni terrorists focus on a continuous and high intensity war against ‘infidels’. Shi’a terrorists, 
on the other hand, set their sights on state and organizational objectives and on their war against 
Israel. The second difference is that Shi’a terrorists are more likely to be state-sponsored, and 
receive resources directly from Iranian government. Sunni terrorists, especially Salafi-Jihadis 
(which these three case studies resemble), instead rely on international support. This means they 
communicate with Muslims in various countries who believe in the same extremist ideology that 
they do. Speaking of tactics, both Sunni and Shi’a terrorists kidnap victims. The difference is that 
Sunni terrorists kidnap with the expectation that they will kill their victim, while Shi’a terrorists 
kidnap with the intention to barter their life. Another difference is their targets and how much 
damage their attacks cause. Shi’a terrorists employ targeted assassinations for political gain, 
meaning they only have a few casualties with a specific purpose in mind. Sunni terrorist attacks, 
especially Salafi-Jihadis, have a much higher casualty count, as they conduct wide ranging 
attacks. When promoting their attacks, Sunni Muslims are much more public, taking credit for 
the destruction caused and trying to make the attack worldwide news. Shi’a Muslims tend to stay 
away from this large-scale approach to publicizing their attack (T. Lynch). The differences 
between these two types of Islamic Fundamentalist groups’ shows why it is necessary to choose 
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case studies that all identify as Sunni groups with Salafist jihadi beliefs. Since Shi’a groups have 
different ideological beliefs, targets, and tactics compared to Sunni groups, different 
counterterrorism approaches need to be taken against them.  
 
Islamic Fundamentalist Characteristics 
 
There isn’t a single description, a certain stereotype that can describe an Islamic 
Fundamentalist. Islamic Fundamentalists are oftentimes described as muta’ assib. This means an 
individual that is alienated and has dogmatic and rigid beliefs. They are also described as 
individuals with, “an inferiority complex that is reflected in their aggressiveness, 
authoritarianism, intolerance, paranoia, and conspiratorial tendency” (Monroe and Kreidie 21). 
In regards to their religion, they are devoted to Islam and incorporate their beliefs in their 
everyday life. Not only are they remarkably devoted to Islam, they are faithful to Allah and 
Islamic fundamentalism. Through this dedication, they expect to live a life full of struggle. 
Islamic Fundamentalists are oftentimes educated, as they are frequently university graduates. A 
religious upbringing is also a common attribute, and this traditional background lays as the 
foundation of an extremist ideology. Besides religion, these Islamic Fundamentalists face 
inequality in their politico-economic backgrounds, and this inequality leads them to feel 
alienated and frustrated with their government (Monroe and Kreidie 22). The typical background 
of an Islamic Fundamentalist offers counterterrorism experts a look into the type of individual 
they are dealing with when they target members of an Islamic Fundamentalist group like Al 
Qaeda. The ideology of Islamic Fundamentalists will individually be discussed further in the 
following case studies. The reason behind this is because each Islamic Fundamentalist group has 
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their own version of Islam and Jihadi-Salafism that they follow. Therefore, it would be more 
appropriate to explain ideology in regards to the specific Islamic Fundamentalist group. 
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II. Al Qaeda Case Study 
 
The terrorist organization and Islamic Fundamentalist group Al Qaeda has been a 
devastating force the past almost 3 decades. Since the devastating 9/11 attacks on the United 
States, Al Qaeda has become a household name and a continuous threat to not only the Middle 
Eastern, but to Westernized countries around the world. This threat has forced the most powerful 
countries in the world to adapt their defenses on the home front, focusing on defensive and 
reactive measures. Vulnerable countries have also come up with proactive and offensive 
counterterrorism tactics in order to prevent future attacks. The chaos Al Qaeda has caused since 
1988 is why it is necessary to study and learn from one of the first influential Islamic 
Fundamentalist groups that has threatened the United States. This research will help develop 
counterterrorism policies that will benefit the United States and other targets of Al Qaeda. Even 
though other terrorist groups currently seem more of a threat, like the Islamic State (ISIS), Al 
Qaeda was the original terrorist group that launched the United States into the War on Terror in 
the Middle East. During the War on Terror, the United States was forced to completely overhaul 
their counterterrorism policies. The counterterrorism policies created 15 years ago must continue 
to adapt to the evolving nature of Al Qaeda, and they must be formed based on the following 
characteristics of the group.  
 
History and Ideology  
 
Although Al Qaeda has only been an established group since 1988, their grievances and 
the basis of their ideology has been around years prior. By following the history and the 
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development of Al Qaeda’s ideology, there is a sophisticated path of development that Osama 
Bin Laden and his successors have taken since the beginning of this group. This development 
shows that Al Qaeda is not a group to dismiss or underestimate, even with the death of their 
leader Osama Bin Laden in 2011. Throughout the years, both Al Qaeda and jihadism have gone 
through multiple eras and have transformed from a small group of mujahedeen into a 
transnational global network. Clint Watts, a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research 
Institute and a FBI special agent apart of the joint terrorism task force, divides Al Qaeda into 
three versions since their formation. By compiling Al Qaeda’s history into three sections, it is 
easier to follow Al Qaeda’s transformation into the group that is around today. Altogether, an 
accurate historical timeline provides a foundation that is required before going more in depth into 
the specifics of Al Qaeda. Each point of transition into the other version also shows an important 
string of events that caused Al Qaeda to change, and these events can be used to see how Al 
Qaeda adapts to different situations. Discussing the history and the ideology of any terrorist 
group, including Al Qaeda, is necessary for a United States counterterrorism expert because it 
allows them to understand the group they are dealing with, the reasons why they are committing 
acts of violence against the United States, and the development of their goals as an organization. 
Before starting with the actual creation of Al Qaeda, there was a period prior to the 
formation of Al Qaeda that is equally as important. The struggle between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan against the Soviet Union is what originally led militant jihadists to want to fight on 
behalf of Pakistan and Afghanistan. This was not only the beginning of Al Qaeda, but an entire 
global jihadist network, including the Taliban. One original key contributor to this network was 
Abdallah Azzam. He is relevant to the history of Al Qaeda because he was the mentor of Osama 
32 
 
Bin Laden, who was the founder of Al Qaeda. Azzam preached about the obligation all Muslims 
have to jihad. Throughout his campaign, he was able to raise funds from sympathizers to the 
jihadist cause. Osama Bin Laden followed Azzam from Pakistan to Afghanistan, fighting 
alongside other Arab fighters while learning Azzam’s leadership style and financing strategies 
(Watts). Once the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1988, Bin Laden took this opportunity 
to recruit the Arab fighters and mujahedeen. These fighters became the recruits for his own 
organization, Al Qaeda. Meanwhile Azzam focused his own efforts on the Palestinian struggle. 
The original purpose of Al Qaeda was to serve as, “a training base and integration center to help 
Arab fighters support other jihads around the world” (Watts). This purpose is why Al Qaeda was 
named what is was, since Al Qaeda means the base. This was Al Qaeda 1.0.  
Since the fight was over in Afghanistan, Bin Laden moved his focus onto Saudi Arabia. 
Originally, he wanted to use his forces to defend Saudi Arabia from the Iraqi’s in the Iraq-Iran 
War. However, the Saudi regime decided to ally with the United States. This angered Bin Laden, 
as he believed that the United States was a nonbeliever of Islam and jihad. He also believed they 
were only claiming to help protect the holy lands of Islam. Eventually, Bin Laden was exiled 
from Saudi Arabia to Sudan in 1992. This Saudi Arabian conflict also represented Al Qaeda’s 
first struggle with the United States. This shows that when the United States tries to mediate or 
help Muslim countries, Al Qaeda fights back. There was also a shift in Al Qaeda’s motives at 
this point, as Bin Laden started focusing his violence towards the U.S. For example, as early as 
1992, Al Qaeda tried bombing American soldiers at the al Gidor hotel in Yemen (Watts). 
Eventually, he found his way back to Afghanistan, since he was expelled from Sudan because he 
continued to denounce American presence in the Middle East. It is in Afghanistan where he 
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declared war against the United States for the first time. This declaration was made public in his 
fatwa, “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places”, 
in 1996.  A fatwa is a ruling made by an authority in regards to Islamic law. Two years later, he 
co-signed another fatwa with his eventual second in command, Ayman al Zawahiri. This fatwa 
was titled “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders” and spelled out Al Qaeda’s want for a global 
caliphate dictated by Sharia Law (Watts). In order for this global caliphate to be created, Al 
Qaeda must battle the near and far enemy. The near enemy was considered the corrupt 
governments in the Middle East and North Africa. The far being the United States and their 
Western allies. The reason these enemies were targeted was because they were enemies of Islam, 
they were occupying Muslim holy lands, and they had caused harm to practicing Muslims during 
previous wars.  
While in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda was protected by a follow jihadist organization, the 
Taliban. Through their coalition, they were able to launch a successful attack on the United 
States. They first attacked the U.S. embassies in both Kenya and Tanzania and then proceeded to 
attack the USS Cole that was stationed in Yemen. With multiple successful attacks, Al Qaeda 
proved their capabilities and their plan to continue to attack the United States. No attack, though, 
was as detrimental to the United States as the 9/11 attacks. After the embassy and USS Cole 
bombings, Osama Bin Laden, in either 1998 or 1999, gave permission to Khalid Sheikh 
Muhammed to begin planning 9/11. Muhammed was the primary architect of 9/11 and one of 
Bin Laden’s trusted leaders (Kean and Hamilton 145). The attacks on this day is where Watts’s 
second version of Al Qaeda begins.  
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 After the 9/11 attacks, Al Qaeda was forced to transform their organization to coincide 
with the revolution of counterterrorism policies not only from the United States, but Western 
countries around the world. Unlike after Al Qaeda’s previous attacks, the United States retaliated 
with military force, sending ground troops to Afghanistan. These attacks threatened both Al 
Qaeda and their allies, the Taliban. Osama Bin Laden was able to find refuge in Afghanistan and 
then in Pakistan, where the U.S. was not able to use their military. By moving the central 
leadership to Pakistan to avoid the U.S. military, Al Qaeda began their steps to their global 
enterprise, as they were now carrying out attacks away from their homeland of Afghanistan. This 
included the bombing on the London metro station in 2005. This hideout in Pakistan is also when 
Al Qaeda Central was formed, which was, “a global headquarters providing ideological 
direction, propaganda, attack guidance, and resource distribution” (Watts).  
Meanwhile, in 2003 the U.S. invaded Iraq. This invasion occurred even though the U.S. 
supported Saddam Hussein led government had no participation in the 9/11 attacks and were 
barely linked to Al Qaeda. The Hussein government prior to this was even created with the help 
of the United States. During this time, Al Qaeda was able to find ways to get past new 
counterterrorism efforts through the Internet and the rise of technology. Through the Internet, Al 
Qaeda was now able to connect with sympathizers and recruit fighters from around the world in 
their quest for global jihad. Recruitment methods included Al Qaeda run websites, training 
manuals, and video footage of attacks. All the while, Al Qaeda was able to stay hidden in 
Pakistan while a technological warfare stirred. The large scope of the 9/11 attacks also gave Al 
Qaeda the opportunity to grow affiliates in other Middle Eastern countries, including the 
precursor to ISIS, Al Qaeda in Iraq. AQI’s violent tactics were directed on the U.S. troops who 
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had invaded Iraq and they quickly grew into a strong Al Qaeda affiliate. Another affiliate was Al 
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Their focus was on the Saudi government as well as Middle 
Eastern oil sectors (Watts). Eventually, AQAP had enough resources and leadership to take the 
lead in attacking the West and the United States directly. This led to the U.S. attacking Yemen 
with drone strikes intended for AQAP. This shows how even just an affiliate of Al Qaeda 
managed to threaten the United States. An increase in affiliates and technological advancements 
were not the only developments Al Qaeda was able to make after 9/11. Homegrown terrorism 
also began to increase, meaning that individuals born in the West were committing attacks on 
behalf of Al Qaeda (Watts). Overall, Al Qaeda 2.0, from the September 11th Attacks to 2011, 
attempted to adapt to the changing global conditions, even with counterterrorism efforts being 
directed at them and weakening recruitment and attack methods.  
The drone strikes from the United States didn’t remain secluded to Yemen. The United 
States, knowing that Al Qaeda had sanctuary among another terrorist group, Tehrik-i-Taliban 
Pakistan (TTP), started directing drone strikes towards Pakistan as well (Watts). These drone 
strikes led to increased losses in both Al Qaeda and TTP’s leadership. With less resources and 
less capability to execute their own plans because of this loss of leadership, Al Qaeda Central 
spent time logistically facilitating their global network of affiliates. These affiliates, especially 
AQI and AQAP, were proving to be successful in planning their own attacks in their own Middle 
Eastern countries. Therefore, Al Qaeda Central could continue what they started in Pakistan at 
the beginning stages of ‘Al Qaeda 2.0’, developing the guides, goals, ideologies, and resources 
for the foreign fighters spread across the world. Meanwhile, affiliates would be in charge of 
executing their own attacks. 
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 Once the Arab Spring and Syrian Civil War began in 2011, Al Qaeda entered into their 
third and current version. The Arab War brought difficulties onto Al Qaeda, as seemingly 
successful peaceful uprisings were happening around the Middle East. Since peaceful tactics 
were becoming successful, violent tactics became less appealing. Osama Bin Laden was also 
killed in 2011, signaling a turn in both global affairs and leadership. Instead of this bringing the 
entire organization down, Al Qaeda instead decentralized their organization. This means Al 
Qaeda relied on the leadership of their affiliates to carry out attacks instead of central leadership. 
Since the Middle East was brewing with conflict during the Arab Spring, Al Qaeda set their 
sights on Middle Eastern countries like Yemen, Egypt, and Syria. This allowed for affiliates, like 
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (located in Yemen) to step up and prove they could coordinate 
attacks themselves (Watts). Luckily for Al Qaeda, the so-called ‘successful’ peaceful uprisings 
actually left countries with weak and exposed governments, paving a way for affiliates of Al 
Qaeda to attack weakened governments, become stronger individual organizations, and resort 
back to violent tactics.   
The future of Al Qaeda 3.0 could rely partially on the outcome of the Syrian Civil War. Syria 
has produced many foreign fighters for the jihadist cause, and if the radicals succeed in this 
Syrian conflict, Syria could become a breeding ground for more terrorist operations. Al Qaeda 
might also shift their focus to Africa, as the continent has become increasingly unstable. 
Instability creates opportunities for Al Qaeda to enter new recruitment grounds and control new 
territory. Their influence could reach farther borders than ever before. Affiliates of Al Qaeda 3.0 
have also been able to raise funds for themselves and they have been relying less on Al Qaeda 
Central since the death of Osama Bin Laden (Watts). This means that there would be even less of 
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an impact to Al Qaeda affiliates if the financing of Al Qaeda is targeted. The last change that has 
been seen in this new version of Al Qaeda is that they have actually started focusing less on the 
United States and more on localizing their efforts. This shift in focus may give the U.S. the time 
they need to revise any counterterrorism policies they need to, especially before a solution is 
found to the Syrian conflict. 
These versions of Al Qaeda offer an array of counterterrorism implications for the United 
States. The main focus needs to be on Al Qaeda ‘3.0’, the version of Al Qaeda that has been 
created since Bin Laden’s death under the leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri and during the Arab 
Spring. It is useful to understand the previous two versions, but in order to create effective 
counterterrorism policies, the present and future is most important. The Syrian Civil War is one 
part of current global affairs that will affect the outcome of Al Qaeda. The Syrian Civil War is 
one of the few wars still in full force since the beginning of the Arab Spring and the creation of 
Al Qaeda 3.0, meaning it is a conflict the United States can continue to engage in. A defeat of the 
Syrian government could mean a defeat for Islamic Fundamentalist groups. The United States 
currently backs Syrian rebels like Rojava. If the U.S. continues with increased support, the rebels 
may be able to pull off a victory.  
The future of Al Qaeda is part of the unwritten history that also presents counterterrorism 
implications. Since affiliates are beginning to fund themselves instead of from central leadership, 
the finances of Al Qaeda Central are not as relevant of a priority anymore. Instead, the United 
States has to shift their efforts towards the individual affiliates that threaten the United States. 
America also needs to keep a close eye on Africa. If Al Qaeda shifts geographically towards 
Africa, the United States has to at least discuss with African leaders on how both parties can 
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remain safe, what the boundaries are, and what each government wants from one other. Finally, 
if Al Qaeda continues to turn their focus away from the United States like Watts suggests, 
perhaps the United States needs to put resources towards other terrorist threats, while keeping a 
close eye on any Al Qaeda movements. This is the time the United States can work on their 
defensive plans, like improved security measures and mapping techniques. If Al Qaeda becomes 
less of a threat to the United States (both direct attacks and attacks on U.S. resources), there does 
not have to be as many offensive measures taken, especially ones that risk American lives.  
 The timeline through Al Qaeda’s history offered some insight into the ideological 
transformation of Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda follows jihadism, which is a violent form of Salafism. Al 
Qaeda’s struggle is for a global jihad against a corrupt West, especially the United States. It is 
important to realize that members of Al Qaeda think that they are true believers of Islam. Most 
practicing Muslims do not use Islam and terrorism to further their political agenda or gain wealth 
and prestige. The irony of that statement is that most jihadists also believe that they do not use 
Islam or violence because of any political agenda or potential resources, even if that is an 
outcome of these practices. Instead, jihadists believe they need to commit violence and that their 
actions are justified because they are defending their religion in its’ truest form (Hellmich 40).  
 Al Qaeda’s current leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has influenced the development of the 
main ideological roots of the organization since the beginning. Al-Zawahiri combined his beliefs 
with Bin Laden’s in order for them to create a shared vision for the world and jihad (Riedel 24). 
Generally speaking, this shared vision centers around violence and hatred for America. It is not 
necessarily hatred for American/Western culture or democracy, it is hatred for what they believe 
America did to Islam and the Muslim Community. They believe that the United States, through 
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their foreign policy and actions in the Middle East, have caused Islam to decline. This includes 
actions like aiding in the division of Islamic states so that they are ruled by pro-Western and 
corrupt leaders. This isn’t a recent decline of Islam either, as they believe this decline started 
during the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the 15th Century. This is because according to Al 
Qaeda, the Ottoman Empire was the last true Islamic empire until the rise of the Taliban State in 
the 1990’s. There is also a link between the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the United States, 
because the West and the Zionist movement were the forces behind the Ottoman’s destruction 
(Riedel 25). Zawahiri uses this time period as the basis of Al Qaeda’s ideology, citing examples 
of the successes achieved by the Ottoman Empire. For example, the Ottoman Empire was able to 
defeat Napoleon and Palestine before their eventual decline, and this defeat represented the 
ummah coming together to resist the West. 
 Osama Bin Laden is also recognized as one of the main forces behind the motivation, the 
rage, and the violent actions of not only Al Qaeda, but groups that have come after (like ISIS). 
One of the recent motivations behind the violent actions of Islamic Fundamentalist groups is due 
to Bin Laden’s fatwa that he released in 1998. “By God's leave, we call on every Muslim who 
believes in God and hopes for reward to obey God's command to kill the Americans and plunder 
their possessions wherever he finds them and whenever he can. Likewise we call on the Muslim 
ulema and leaders and youth and soldiers to launch attacks against the armies of the American 
devils and against those who are allied with them from among the helpers of Satan” (Saloom). 
This fatwa is exclaiming that it is a Muslim’s responsibility to kill American infidels. Osama Bin 
Laden was qualified to issue these fatwas and justify violent actions as long as Muslims believed 
he was a previous legitimate imam of an Islamic state. Although Bin Laden is deceased, his rage 
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lives on through Al Qaeda and the others he influenced through his messages, like a previous 
affiliate ISIS.  Bin Laden’s rage draws from historical events like the fall of the Ottoman Empire 
due to Western influence to motivate his followers to want to help in the destruction of the 
United States and any other infidel. The beliefs that Osama Bin Laden projected to others and 
perceived fight against infidels is hard to counter. For one, even though Bin Laden was killed, 
the beliefs still remain in the minds of Al Qaeda members. Since these beliefs are imbedded in 
historical events also means there is nothing that can be done to change history. Members are 
going to perceive these events in a way that justifies their actions, regardless if that is how 
American intelligence sees it.  
Not only is the study of Al Qaeda’s ideology essential to understanding the group itself, it 
also helps counterterrorism efforts as well. “Without addressing the ideological root causes of 
terrorism, the surgical targeted killings of Al-Qaeda leaders will not result in the disappearance 
of the phenomenon” (Ganor 359). This means that even if the United States kills the leaders of 
Al Qaeda, the ideological roots will remain within the minds of the followers. As long as the 
ideology remains, there will always be a chance for future terrorist groups to rise up. 
Understanding ideology also gives the U.S. the ability to compare extremist views with views of 
a moderate Muslim. If the United States creates policies that are discriminatory to all Muslims, 
the moderate Muslim will feel alienated, and more likely to agree with some of the beliefs 
extremists hold. It will also mean strained relationships with U.S. allies in the Middle East, 
where these relationships are vital in order to have a joint force combating terrorism.  
 
Organization and Leadership Structure 
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A unique feature of Al Qaeda is their cell-based organizational structure. This structure 
allows Al Qaeda to have influence around the world. Al Qaeda Central, which is the group of Al 
Qaeda located in Pakistan, is directed by Al Qaeda’s emir (ruler). Outside of Pakistan, Al Qaeda 
has various affiliates that Al Qaeda’s emir recognizes. As of 2013, Al Qaeda had 6 recognized 
affiliates, al Qaeda in Iraq, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, 
Jabhat al Nusra, al Shabaab, and the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus. These affiliates share Al 
Qaeda’s resources, ideology, and network. Besides these recognized affiliates, Al Qaeda has 
numerous associates. These groups share them same ideology of Al Qaeda but do not operate 
under the Al Qaeda name because they have not been identified by Al Qaeda’s emir. 
Nonetheless, these groups strengthen Al Qaeda’s overall network (Zimmerman 15).  
Al Qaeda Central does not have direct control over their affiliates, as the Al Qaeda 
organization is based on networking rather than hierarchy. The difference lies in the distribution 
of responsibilities. Al Qaeda Central focuses on the organization’s message and strategy while 
the affiliates focus on daily operations. One way that Al Qaeda Central manages to maintain their 
control and authority is by having their affiliates consult with them before any large-scale 
attacks. Besides the leadership within Al Qaeda Central and the leaders of their affiliates, Al 
Qaeda has a shura council and multiple committees for their military operations, finances, and 
information sharing (Glenn). The separation between Al Qaeda Central and their affiliates effects 
not only Al Qaeda’s organization but counterterrorism polices as well. Since the affiliates of Al 
Qaeda focus on the day to day operations of the organization, the United States needs to focus on 
day to day operations if the U.S. decides to target Al Qaeda affiliates. If the U.S. feels the need to 
attack Al Qaeda Central, they need to focus on the underlying grievances of Al Qaeda’s ideology 
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and preventing their messages from circulating to their affiliates, their associates, and to 
sympathizers around the world. 
  Besides the global reach a cell-based structure creates, this kind of structure has other 
counterterrorism implications. Understanding the relationships between Al Qaeda Central and 
their affiliates and associates is necessary in order to create a picture of Al Qaeda’s network and 
how this network can be used against America. If one cell is destroyed, another one can take its’ 
place. It also means that if one affiliate is being focused on by the United States, another one has 
the ability to stay behind the scenes. “Both its structure and its adaptive nature have made the 
network extremely resilient, which has limited the ability of outside actors, such as the United 
States, to defeat it” (Zimmerman 18). For example, Al Qaeda Central leaders in Pakistan have 
been weakened by the U.S. government. 4 of the top 5 leaders of the Al Qaeda cells in Pakistan 
have been killed. On the other hand, Al Qaeda affiliates in Syria are quickly growing.  The Al 
Qaeda affiliate Syria, Jabhat al Nusra is, “emerging as the best motivated, best trained, and best 
equipped force fighting the Assad regime” (House of Representatives 2). The fact that Al 
Qaeda’s influence and leadership is diminishing in one area of the world while rising up in 
another presents a major problem for countries trying to stop a terrorist group. “Al Qaeda will 
continue to threaten the United States and its interests until the network is fully dismantled. It is 
not sufficient to destroy the capabilities of only one node in the network; time has proven that 
others groups will rise to the occasion and attempt to attack the United States” (Zimmerman 24). 
In order to prevent this, the United States must broaden their views and pay attention to every Al 
Qaeda affiliate. This may be possible if there is a small task force within the Executive Branch 
that focuses on a few Al Qaeda affiliates in a certain area.  
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Al Qaeda’s leadership structure is also unique compared to other Islamic Fundamentalist 
groups. Before his death in 2011 by a United States Navy Seals team, Osama Bin Laden was the 
founder and 1st General Emir of Al Qaeda. Making appearances in broadcasts, Bin Laden often 
used his charisma, fatwas, and rhetoric to rally his fellow jihadists (Glenn). Osama Bin Laden 
didn’t become one of the most prolific terrorists of all time overnight, though. Since his 
childhood, there have been events that have led to his radicalization and his future involvement 
in the Salafi-Jihadist movement. Colin Ross developed a psychological profile of Bin Laden that 
considered nature (genes), nurture (the environment), and his executive decisions as reasons why 
Bin Laden became an extremist. Osama Bin Laden was born in 1957 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 
He was one of the 54 children his father, Mohammed bin Oud bin Laden, had with 11 different 
wives. The sheer amount of siblings Bin Laden had indicated he most likely didn’t have a strong 
relationship with his father. Therefore, Ross believes Bin Laden was an emotionally neglected 
child. (Ross 311). His mother, on the other hand, was progressive, engaged in westernized 
traditions, and independent. Osama didn’t live with his mother, which meant that he lacked a 
relationship with both of his parents. 
In his free time, Osama read religious texts, in part because his father was highly engaged 
in religious debate. One source of father-son bonding Osama did have was when his father would 
take him and his brothers to a desert camp, where they learned to shoot guns, ride horses, and 
live outdoors. This experience indirectly trained Osama for a life as a terrorist. Because of his 
yearning for a relationship with his parents and his religious interest, Osama Bin Laden wished 
to form a connection with God. After his parents died, Bin Laden led the life of a college student 
at a boarding school in Beirut. Anywhere he went, he flashed his wealth and engaged in 
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extravagant activities. His party days ended, though, when Osama decided to fulfil the 5th pillar 
of Islam, the pilgrimage to Mecca. “Salim, Osama's older half-brother, invited Osama to make 
the pilgrimage with him, and he accepted. While in Mecca, he experienced a religious 
conversion” (Ross 313). This brother who contributed to Osama’s religious epiphany died while 
hang gliding in Texas, which was another reason for Osama’s hatred of the West. Another direct 
event that caused his hate for the West was when the United States dropped him as an asset. The 
U.S. utilized Bin Laden during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Once the Soviets were 
defeated, the U.S. no longer needed his assistance. Afterwards, Osama was angry, resentful, and 
he felt betrayed. He then began to despise American presence in the Middle East (Ross 316). 
This was another turning point in Osama’s life and the beginning of his hatred for the United 
States. Osama lacked a relationship with his parents, was born into wealth and prestige, was 
trained to handle guns and live in the wilderness, and had a solid religious education. His 
pilgrimage to Mecca was a turning point in his life and is what led him towards Islamic 
Fundamentalism. Getting dropped by the United States was the nail in the coffin. It stirred his 
resentment for the West, a resentment that propelled him towards his quest for jihad and 
eventually 9/11. 
After Osama Bin Laden was killed, fellow founder Ayman al Zawahiri took over 
leadership as the 2nd General Emir of Al Qaeda. In his leadership role, he continues to maintain 
media presence like his predecessor (“Profile: Ayman al-Zawahiri”). By having a vocal and 
charismatic leader appearing on media sources, messages are coming directly from the top, 
showing how powerful and prestigious the information is. This causes individuals to actually pay 
attention to the message. The way the U.S. can counter these messages is by trying to prevent 
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Americans from viewing them in the first place. The issue with this, though, is that this can step 
on the freedoms given in the 1st Amendment of the Constitution. If the United States censors 
certain websites or stops the media from showing Islamic Fundamentalist propaganda, 
Americans could retaliate.  
 
Finances 
 
 In order to manage the day to day operations of a terrorist organization as well as carry 
out large-scale attacks like 9/11, Al Qaeda has had to rely on various methods of raising funds. It 
is difficult to know exactly how much Al Qaeda raises and what percentage of their funds comes 
from each method, since the United States does not have access to their financial records and 
leaders aren’t willing to release this information. Luckily, since 9/11 the United States has been 
able to gain some information from detainees. There are two issues presented when gaining any 
type of information from an Al Qaeda member. The first is that they can simply be lying, giving 
false information to lead the U.S. off their trail. The second issue is that even if detainees are 
telling the truth, the information oftentimes comes too late and investigators are not able to 
follow these tips in order to disrupt the money trial from the facilitators and donors to operational 
elements (Roth et al 19).  
 Before 9/11, there was little truth known about Al Qaeda. Since the terrorist group was 
able to gain tremendous traction and was able to raise a considerable sum of money, many 
intelligence officials believed that the money came directly from Osama Bin Laden because he 
was the son of a wealthy construction family. When Bin Laden’s father died, people assumed 
that he had inherited a fortune, a fortune that he was able to use as the basis of his organization. 
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Though Bin Laden managed to earn around a millions dollars per year, this did not equate to the 
supposed $300 million inheritance. In 1994, the Bin Laden family’s account was actually frozen 
by the Saudi Arabian government, meaning any money used to create Al Qaeda was not from 
Osama Bin Laden’s personal bank account (Roth et al 20). Other experts argue that Bin Laden 
used his revenue from his personally owned companies in Sudan. Even though it is reported that 
Bin Laden owned around 35 companies in Sudan when he lived there, these profits may not have 
been very large or he may never have owned these companies in the first place. If anything, Bin 
Laden had owned these companies in order to get in with the Sudan government, not to earn a 
profit. In 1996, this myth was officially proven wrong. When the Sudan government forced Bin 
Laden out of the country, they proceeded to seize his accounts and his assets which left Bin 
Laden with nothing, especially not anything substantial enough to create an entire organization. 
In actuality, the early days of the organization were funded by donors, which was necessary 
since the CIA estimated that it costs Al Qaeda $30 million to operate their organization per year. 
Besides donors, Bin Laden also relied on the Taliban for support while he got back on his feet in 
Afghanistan. There, he was able to begin fundraising again and reconnect with his Saudi national 
contacts (Roth et al 20). 
 Al Qaeda’s main source of revenue is through their group of financial facilitators who 
raise their own money from other donors. These donors are primarily in the Gulf Coast region 
like Saudi Arabia. The issue with these donors it that part of the time, these donors aren’t aware 
of where their money is going to. Facilitators also fundraise during holidays like Ramadan where 
people are in good spirits and are feeling charitable. This is why the month of Ramadan is when 
Al Qaeda raises a bulk of their funds (Roth et al 21). Another way financial facilitators raise their 
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funds is through imams at mosques who support Al Qaeda’s radical ideology. These imams (the 
person who leads prayer at mosques) take the funds from donations, otherwise known as the 
zakat, and gives it to the facilitators. Zakat is one of the 5 pillars of Islam and this charitable 
giving is used for income tax and foreign assistance in Muslim countries. For example, Saudi 
Arabia zakat includes humanitarian relief and funding schools and mosques. Since Muslims want 
to follow the 5 pillars and support their communities, it is easy for Al Qaeda to rely on a constant 
stream of donations as long as they have the necessary means to secure these funds. A second 
way Al Qaeda raises most of their funds is through charities. Al Qaeda has been able to go into 
penetrable financial accounts of charities and redirect their funds into their own accounts. 
Another way Al Qaeda uses charities is that they partner with community-scale charities. When 
these charities receive funds from large scale charities like those in Saudi Arabia, they direct 
their proceeds to Al Qaeda. In other cases, Al Qaeda remains in complete control of a corrupt 
charity and therefore has direct access to their bank accounts (Roth et al 21). Due to arrests of 
big name facilitators and the charities that have been shown to engage in terrorist funding have 
been shut down, Al Qaeda has seen a reduction in funds. Luckily, recent operations have cost 
less and Al Qaeda has been able to continue funding their group without issue. Besides financial 
facilitators and funding through charities, Al Qaeda has been accused of being involved in the 
drug trade, trading in conflict diamonds, and being sponsored by local government (Roth et al 
24). The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, however, was not 
able to find substantial proof that any of these three other sources of revenue have been used by 
Al Qaeda. 
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 Once Al Qaeda secures their revenue, they must find ways to move this money around to 
affiliates and other members who need it. Before 9/11, Al Qaeda relied on hawala to move their 
money. Hawala is a way to transfer money, usually in the Muslim world. The money is paid to 
an agent who then instructs a remote associate to pay the final recipient the money. Hawala was 
the desired form of money moving Al Qaeda used because hawala does not keep detailed records 
and has less government oversight. Al Qaeda had a dozen hawaladars to conduct their business, 
most of them knowing they were dealing with Al Qaeda or did not care who they dealing with 
anyways. It was difficult for counterterrorism intelligence to rely on formal financial institutions 
to try and find Al Qaeda’s money because Al Qaeda Central rarely used the formal financial 
system. Otherwise, Al Qaeda used the accounts of the charities they controlled or relied on their 
financial facilitators to store their funds. It was easy for Al Qaeda to store their money using 
outside sources because banks were less likely to realize they were dealing with Al Qaeda 
money. Outside of Al Qaeda’s core leadership in Afghanistan, however, the use of formal 
financial institutions was more common. For example, the Al Qaeda members behind 9/11 had 
been using ATM cards, had bank accounts, and were wiring money to other banks (Roth et al 
24). Couriers were also used to move funds by Al Qaeda and were usually recruited from among 
Al Qaeda ranks. This meant they knew the courier had the background needed to travel with the 
money and deliver it where it needed to go, even if they were lesser known members. It also 
means they were already trusted members of Al Qaeda. Since 9/11, Al Qaeda continues to rely 
primarily on these couriers, especially since the hawala network has been largely destroyed. 
 Al Qaeda relies on couriers to move their money from location to location and relies on 
outside sources like financial facilitators and donors to supply them with their money. Once they 
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have this money, the last question is, “How does Al Qaeda actually spend their money?” At the 
beginning stages of Al Qaeda, the focus of funds was on military training, salaries, and training 
camps. Al Qaeda even had a Finance Committee where finances were closely monitored by Bin 
Laden and a trained accountant named Sheikh Qari Sa’id. Al Qaeda members/affiliates usually 
financed the day-to-day expenses while Al Qaeda Central gave out money for large scale 
operations. While Bin Laden and the rest of Al Qaeda were relying on the Taliban for safe 
haven, they repaid them in the form of money, weapons, and others goods (Roth et al 28). Since 
the decentralization of Al Qaeda and the defeat of the Taliban, The National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States believes that the Finance Committee may no longer 
exist and financing may be more personalized instead of closely monitored like before. Al Qaeda 
no longer has to support the Taliban and they no longer run training camps. Therefore, 
Intelligence analysts estimate that Al Qaeda’s operating budget may be only a few million 
dollars per year, although such estimates are only tentative (Roth et al 28).  
 Following the money trial of Al Qaeda, exploring the means of transporting funds, and 
determining what Al Qaeda actually spends its’ money on is necessary in order for intelligence 
experts to track supporters of the group and attempt to disrupt the fundraising process. The way 
to counter Al Qaeda’s means for raising money is to focus on the middlemen, these financial 
facilitators and donors who supply Al Qaeda with their funds. By continuing to try and find the 
financial facilitators, charities and churches that are supplying Al Qaeda with donations, 
counterterrorist intelligence can force Al Qaeda to figure out new ways to secure funds and deter 
others from deciding to join Al Qaeda’s money trial. In regards to transporting funds, 
counterterrorism experts need to focus primarily on couriers, since the hawala network no longer 
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seems to deal with their major cash transfers. Since couriers move this money physically from 
destination to destination, it takes longer for the money to get to where it needs to go (Roth et al 
27). In order to stop an actual person, local law enforcement needs to be involved, where they 
can monitor the traveling of suspicious personnel or those already known to be connected with 
Al Qaeda. Another issue, though, is that Al Qaeda affiliates tend to raise money on their own for 
day-to-day operations. Therefore, they may not rely on couriers that travel across the Middle 
East if they can contain their own finances among their own organization. The real conundrum 
comes into play when experts look at what Al Qaeda spends their money on. If Al Qaeda Central 
does not have a large budget, it means that the United States may want to focus on other 
characteristics in their counterterrorist policies. Otherwise, increased focus on affiliates may be 
the best option since they tend to finance themselves.  
 
Targets and Tactics 
 
 Al Qaeda has been criticized by both foreign enemies and members of the Islamic 
community for their use of violence. This is especially true when Al Qaeda targets violence 
against civilians. Muslims, like the non-violent Salafist’s, opposed the 9/11 attacks committed by 
Al Qaeda. They quote numerous hadiths (messages from the Prophet Muhammed), as to why 
violence against civilians are against Islam and the word of God. This includes the following 
hadith, “Set out for jihad in the name of Allah and for the sake of Allah. Do not lay hands on the 
old verging on death, on women, children and babes. Do not steal anything from the booty and 
collect together all that falls to your lot in the battlefield and do good, for Allah loves the 
virtuous and the pious” (Wiktorowicz and Kaltner 86). This hadith explains that even when 
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engaging in jihad, no women or children should be hurt, nothing should be stolen from the 
public, and all Muslims should work on being virtuous members of society. Al Qaeda responds 
to these criticisms by justifying their targeting of civilians through rules of engagement 
conditions, in which only one condition must be met in order for their attacks to remain justified. 
The first condition is the norm of reciprocity. This condition goes along with the following verse 
from the Quran 2, “And one who attacks you, attack him in like manner as he attacked you.” 
This means that Al Qaeda justifies attacks because they have been attacked with violence from 
their targets. Since America, according to Al Qaeda, has targeted Muslim civilians, Al Qaeda can 
in return target American civilians (Wiktorowicz and Kaltner 87). The way America can try and 
prevent this condition from being fulfilled is simple; military force needs to be directed at Al 
Qaeda members and extremists only. However, actually being able to follow that plan is quite 
difficult, as drone strikes (one of the primary military weapons used by the U.S.) aren’t 
necessarily the most accurate forms of military weapons (Fang). 
 The second condition that can be met is that a specific site can be attacked if Al Qaeda is 
unable to distinguish civilians from combatants. This means that if Al Qaeda determines a 
certain site is a legitimate enemy of Al Qaeda, they can attack regardless of the possibility of 
civilians being injured. Also, if ‘innocent’ Muslims are killed because they were within the 
target, they were not actually innocent because they were within a site that threatened Islam 
(Wiktorowicz and Kaltner 87). This condition is hard to counter for the United States. We cannot 
deny access to buildings within United States to anyone, and Al Qaeda will always find some 
site that threatens them, regardless if it actually does or not. A third condition is that if civilians 
assist in deed, word, or mind to the enemy of Islam, they are no longer innocent. Al Qaeda 
52 
 
interprets this not only to mean that combatants and intelligence advisors of the U.S. are targets, 
but also anyone involved in the media because they publish American propaganda. Even 
academia researchers can be targets because they provide information to the government that can 
help in their fight against Muslims (Wiktorowicz and Kaltner 88). This is another condition that 
ties the hands of counterterrorism experts, because if Al Qaeda connects it enough, every single 
adult in the United States can somehow contribute to the perceived fight against Islam.  
 The 4th condition is that civilians, even Muslim civilians, can be killed if it is necessary in 
war. If their deaths can contribute to harming their enemy, like the United States, then their 
deaths are justified. A 5th condition relies on the concept of heavy weaponry. If a goal (like 
bringing down the World Trade Center on 9/11) needs the use of heavy weaponry, then it is 
obvious that some civilians will have to die because of the methods that need to be used. Al 
Qaeda has even gone as far to say that if civilians are used as human shields, they can justifiably 
be killed. This is because if they do not kill them, Al Qaeda risks defeat, which is worse than the 
killing of women and children. The final condition Al Qaeda uses is if a treaty is broken. 
Muslims are given permission to kill innocents if they are teaching the people of the broken 
treaty a lesson (Wiktorowicz and Kaltner 90). Besides the 1st condition of the norm of 
reciprocity, all other conditions represent lose-lose situations to the United States. Even if 
counterterrorism experts understand the conditions Al Qaeda has for targeting civilians, Al 
Qaeda will almost always find a way to interpret situations in order to justify the killing of 
innocent people, even Muslims. 
 Even though the United States will run into difficulties countering the targets of Al 
Qaeda, since virtually everyone can be interpreted as a targets, the United States can instead 
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focus on their tactics. The use of the media and technology in general has been a critical tactic Al 
Qaeda has used, especially after the 9/11 attacks when counterterrorism efforts changed 
dramatically. The media has been a powerful tool in the promotion of their beliefs, advertisement 
of their attacks, and recruitment of new fighters. Al Qaeda was able to see early on the 
importance the media would have in the 21st century and they have been able to use it as a part 
of their political strategy ever since (M. Lynch 50). Technology and media in particular is 
rapidly changing, and during the late 20th century, Al Qaeda was able to understand the 
importance of satellite television and the Internet and adapt through these new media 
technologies. Once Al Qaeda invested, they were able to create a new type of terrorist cell, one 
without physical territory or boundaries, one that was able to reach people no matter their 
location on the globe. This was their media presence.  
 While on their quest for a media-centered organization, Al Qaeda created a separate 
media wing, al-Sahab (Ciovacco 853). The message portrayed by the media wing of Al Qaeda 
Central is vital to the operation of the organization, especially for AQC to remain relevant in this 
technological age. As discussed in the history section of this case study, Al Qaeda Central has 
taken over the task of defining ideology, goals, and the vision of the entire organization. In order 
to rely those messages not only to affiliates but to everyone around the world, Al Qaeda must 
have adequate media sources, making the media a lifesaving tactic in their plans. Therefore, Al 
Qaeda has an arsenal of media strategies available to them, both offensively to showcase future 
attacks or to simply promote their message through propaganda. One strategy Al Qaeda uses the 
media for is when they try to justify their actions based on history or the Quran. After a certain 
controversial attack, Al Qaeda lists their justifications in their media releases. “Bin Laden and 
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Zawahiri utilize verses from the Koran in almost every media release to demonstrate that their 
movement follows the “true” Islam” (Ciovacco 857). A way that the United States can counter 
these media releases is to speak directly against them, having high ranking Islamic officials 
release their own stories about how the violent actions of Al Qaeda go against Islam. It is not 
helpful to ignore Al Qaeda’s media releases because everyone can and will see them, whether 
they are plastered on social media or on the television. If America can release statements catering 
to the moderate Muslim, then these Muslims will more likely remain sympathetic to the United 
States rather than to Al Qaeda. 
 Al Qaeda also tries to cater to specific audiences through their media releases. One of 
those audiences is local Al Qaeda affiliates. Since Al Qaeda Central is still the umbrella 
organization of the smaller affiliates, they still provide guidance and delegate attacks for the 
local movements. Through various media releases, Al Qaeda affiliates can gain approval from Al 
Qaeda Central. This is especially true when that approval comes from previous releases Bin 
Laden and Zawahiri sent out that sanctioned the proposed attack. This allows the leaders of Al 
Qaeda affiliates to avoid the process of having to travel to headquarters to speak with central 
leadership directly and instead continue with their attacks. If counterterrorism experts studied 
previous sanctioned attacks that were mentioned in media releases from the leaders of Al Qaeda, 
America could work on defensive measures that would protect themselves from attacks by 
affiliates. Another audience of Al Qaeda is America itself. Al Qaeda attempts to direct messages 
at the American public at critical moments in order to influence foreign policy (Ciovacco 862). 
These critical moments include the 2004 Presidential election and the 2006 Congressional 
election. Before these moments, Al Qaeda would send messages directed at the American public, 
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like attacking President Bush and his policies. Bin Laden and Zawahiri’s hope was to try and 
influence Americans to change the leadership and views in America. For example, the 
Republican Party was more likely to leave American presence in the Middle East. By attacking 
Republican officials, Al Qaeda could alter certain political processes like elections. In order to 
counter these directed messages, the best course of action by counterterrorism experts would be 
to also speak directly to the American public, rather than leave them in the dark. Experts would 
explain the psychological games these Al Qaeda messages were constructed upon. Regardless of 
the particular ploy Al Qaeda uses regarding the media, the best course of action is to also use the 
media to America’s advantage. The world needs to know that America acknowledges that these 
threats exist, these threats are legitimate, and that they plan on addressing the issues apparent in 
any Al Qaeda media releases. 
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III. ISIS Case Study 
 
The name ISIS has been circulating the news in the past decade, news combined with 
messages of violence and hatred against the West. From the Paris bombings in 2015 to the 
Orlando shooting in 2016, which was the largest mass shooting on United States soil, attacks 
around the world have been linked to ISIS in some way. Their media presence is just as 
terrifying, as videos of the beheadings of Americans committed by ISIS members have been 
aired on nightly news channels (“Islamic State 'beheads US hostage Steven Sotloff'”). Compared 
to Al Qaeda, however, ISIS has just recently entered the arena of terrorism and emerged as an 
Islamic Fundamentalist groups. This means that in the short time they have been a mainstream 
terrorist group, they have caused massive amounts of destruction. This is why they are still a 
necessary group to study. Fighters have been bred right here in the United States (called home-
grown terrorists) and attacks have been committed against the U.S. and their allies. The threat 
ISIS poses is why it is necessary to focus on ISIS as one of the case studies that should influence 
the decision to implement case-specific counterterrorism policies.  
 
History and Ideology 
 
ISIS has not always been its’ own standalone organization. Since 2000, ISIS has gone 
under different names and transformed themselves from a Jordanian focused militant group to an 
anti-Western jihadist group. In order to understand the characteristics of ISIS that is currently 
relevant, the history of the group must be explained. Then, the progression of beliefs, goals, and 
leadership throughout the past 16 years can be seen. This progression will allow counterterrorism 
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experts to track the processes of this group, how they have evolved, and how they have managed 
to remain independent from other Islamic Fundamentalist groups. By looking at this, experts 
may be able to reverse this evolution or stop them from growing stronger.  
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (also known as Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant/ISIL), originates with the militant group of Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ). JMT was 
led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and began in 2000. This group focused on the Jordanian 
government, specifically the Jordanian monarchy. Prior to this, Al-Zarqawi frequented 
Afghanistan, where he ran an Islamic militant training camp and fought with the mujahedeen in 
the jihad against the Soviets who were occupying Afghanistan in the 1980’s (Hashim). The 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan created the breeding ground for many terrorists, including 
fundamental leaders of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. When the United States invaded Afghanistan 
in the wake of 9/11, al-Zarqawi moved his forces to Iraq. However, in 2003, the U.S. proceeded 
to invade Iraq as well. This invasion led to the downfall of Saddam Hussein and the U.S. became 
hopeful that this was the beginning of democracy in Iraq. The issue was that the Sunni’s in Iraq 
opposed this democracy. The Sunni’s were not keen on the idea of a democratic Iraq, and they 
responded by starting an insurgency against the new democratic interim government (Hashim). 
JTJ was one of these Sunni insurgent groups, which shows how Iraq is a major part of the 
foundation of ISIS and why it still remains an important country to ISIS today. It also shows why 
Sunni groups are the focus of this thesis.  
This insurgency allowed JTJ to develop their first set goals specifically related to Iraq. 
These goals included forcing a withdrawal of coalition forces from Iraq, toppling the Iraqi 
interim government (the one that was promoting democracy and stability), assassinating the 
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interim government’s collaborators, targeting the Shia population, and establishing an Islamic 
state under God's law. This is also known as sharia law. Throughout the pursuit of these goals, 
JTJ was able to separate themselves from the other insurgent groups around them. Instead of 
relying primary on using guerilla tactics that are typical of terrorist organizations, like ambushes 
and hit-and-runs, they utilized suicide bombers. They also targeted non-combatants and soft 
targets, including Shia Muslim civilians (Hashim). This is also when al-Zarqawi began to use the 
Internet to his advantage. He posted his first statement, or fatwa, in April of 2004. His volunteers 
also continued to post messages and videos of beheadings on multiple servers. This made it 
difficult for any propaganda to be taken down and allowed JTJ to recruit members, promote their 
message, and overall terrorize on a whole new platform. It is one thing to commit physical 
violent attacks against people, it is another thing to be able to access and view this violence from 
anywhere in the world. It provides a threat and an unescapable terror that is sitting right on the 
Internet.  
In October 2004, JTJ underwent their first transformation, slowly becoming the ISIS that 
is around today. Al-Zarqawi pledged allegiance to Osama Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda, marking an 
official entrance into Al Qaeda’s vast network. This turned Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad into Al 
Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). This alliance provided each party with an incentive to join forces. Al-
Zarqawi received prestige, being a part of the leadership, group, and brand that was responsible 
for 9/11. Through Al Qaeda, he was also able to receive increased recruits and financial support. 
On the other hand, Al-Qaeda received an affiliate that already had an established base and one 
that could help in their fight against the United States. By March of 2005, AQI had developed 
their own unique vision, which defended monotheism, planned to excommunicate and kill 
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anyone who did not believe in the oneness of God, thought any belief in secularism, nationalism, 
communism, etc., were violations of Islam, and believed the Prophet Muhammed was God’s 
messenger for the entire human race. Overall, they believed that, “Waging jihad against the 
enemies of Islam was next in importance to the profession of the shahada (faith)” (Hashim). 
Through this vision, AQI formed new and improved goals from that of JTJ and shared them to 
the world through their spokesperson, Abu Maysara al-Iraqi. Their goals were developed from 
their overall vision and included removing the aggressors from Iraq, affirming tawhid 
(monotheism), waging jihad, and establishing a caliphate through sharia rule. This caliphate 
would be reminiscent of the time of Prophet Muhammed (Hashim).  
As an Al Qaeda affiliate, AQI and Al-Qaeda Central leaders agreed on their overall 
ideology and goals. When it came to their methods, however, AQI had a different approach. 
Their attacks included targeting mass civilian casualties, which worried some AQC leaders. A 
top leader of Al Qaeda operations in Jordan, Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi, went so far as to say 
that AQI needed to stop targeting Shia Muslims, churches, and civilians, and start focusing on 
the true enemy, American occupiers. However, al-Zarqawi fought back, saying that Shia 
Muslims were more important enemies, as they were rejectionists and apostates who claimed to 
be Muslim but did not share the views of Sunni Muslims (Hashim). Al-Zarqawi blamed the 
Shia’s for bringing misfortune and desolation to the Sunni people, and for that, they must be 
targeted. Ayman al-Zawahiri, who at the time was second in command for central leadership of 
Al Qaeda, also wrote to al-Zarqawi. In his letter, Al-Zawahiri wrote that he agreed that the Shia’s 
could not be trusted, but he didn’t believe they needed to be slaughtered. He also worried for the 
public relations that revolved around al-Zarqawi’s postings of beheadings and other vicious acts. 
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He also wrote that in order to succeed in their goals, Al Qaeda needed the support of the entire 
Sunni population as well as the ulema, which might not happen if AQI continued their tactics 
and mass propaganda of brutal attacks.  
The disagreements that occurred between AQI and central leadership eventually led to 
the next form of ISIS, the Islamic State of Iraq. AQI tried at first to take into account what al-
Zawahiri had suggested and tried to recruit Iraqi Sunni’s as the face to their cause. However, 
their violent tactics remained. In June 2006, longtime leader of JTJ and AQI, Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, was killed. An Al Qaeda top operate Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, became the representative 
of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Afterwards, AQI announced the establishment of a new group, the Islamic 
State of Iraq (ISI), which was headed by Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. ISI’s main focus was 
establishing an Islamic state, otherwise known as a caliph (Hashim). This focus was different 
than the previous two forms of ISIS, al-Qaeda in Iraq and JTJ, as it focused on creating an 
Islamic state. This was a broader goal than just necessarily fighting American occupiers or 
liberating Iraq.  
Since ISI’s establishment, this new group presented an array of problems. With their violent 
tactics, they were not able to secure enough support, resources or recruits from Sunni tribes or 
the Iraqi insurgents. This problem exasperated when these same insurgents and Sunni tribes 
allied with the United States to fight ISI. This alliance formed with the promise that the U.S. 
would help integrate Sunni fighters into the Iraqi military and help the economy that ISI had 
contributed in destroying (Hashim). By 2008, this alliance helped weaken ISI into a state of 
extraordinary crisis. 
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During this state of crisis for ISI, Iraq was able to stabilize. Therefore, in 2009 the United 
States began to pull out of Iraq. This allowed the now American-trained Iraqi forces to be in 
charge of maintaining this new found stability. At the same time, though, ISI began to rebound 
(most likely due to the American troops leaving). In August and October 2009, ISI was able to, 
“sabotage government infrastructure and launch terror attacks against civilians, killing hundreds” 
(Hashim). Luckily for the United States, by 2010 the top leaders of ISI, Abu Ayub al-Masri and 
Abu Umar Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi, had been killed. 80% of the top leaders had also 
been killed. Even with this major loss of leadership, ISI remained intact and allowed for current 
leader, Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai (also known as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi), 
to take control. Not much is known about al-Baghdadi, but one major thing that is known is that 
in February 2004, he was captured by Americans. By December, however, Baghdadi had been 
released because he was not a high value target (Arango and Schmitt). 
ISI eventually started to reemerge under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Besides a 
leadership change, this reemergence led to the restructuring of their organization, military, and 
administration. It also led to the growing dissatisfaction ISI had for Iraq and the Sunni 
population, their distancing from Al Qaeda, and the Syrian civil war. In March 2011, the Syrian 
Civil War began in the awake of the Arab Spring. Al-Baghdadi decided to join in the Syrian 
Civil War against the Assad regime because it threatened Islam and his organization. This war 
allowed ISI fighters the opportunity to put their military skills to use. Around this time is when 
al-Baghdadi also transformed ISI into the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and into the 
Islamic State. With the name change came new goals, where the creation of an Islamic caliphate 
and the overthrow of corrupt governments became ISIS’s number one concerns. “The focus on 
62 
 
creating an Islamic state is the defining element for ISIS” (Hashim). As May of 2014 approached 
and after a conflict with another Al Qaeda affiliate, Al-Nusra, Al Qaeda decided to cut all ties 
with ISIS. This allowed ISIS to finally become an independent jihadist organization. Even 
though the original form of ISIS, Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, only began in 2000, ISIS has a 
complicated history of alliances, attacks, name changes, and goals. It is important to track the 
timeline of ISIS’s history, as it shows what events have caused the downfalls/disasters of ISIS as 
well as the successes. It also shows what policies were effective against ISIS and which were 
counteractive. Once the downfalls and successes of ISIS are known, the United States can work 
towards repeating plans that caused those downfalls and preventing situations that created 
successes.  
Although not as complicated or as long as the history of Al Qaeda, the history of ISIS allows 
for a glimpse into the underworking of this terrorist group. One weakness that was shown in this 
timeline was the crisis that occurred in 2008 when the United States allied with Sunni tribes and 
Iraqi insurgents to take down the Islamic State of Iraq. This proved to be a successful 
counterterrorism plan, and something that can be incorporated by the United States now to battle 
ISIS. The death of their longtime leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as well as the deaths of 80% of 
their top leadership also contributed to this state of crisis. This crisis not only has implications 
for counterterrorism against ISIS, it also represents weaknesses of Al Qaeda. Since AQI was an 
affiliate of Al Qaeda, the crisis of AQI shows that defeating main leaders of the actual smaller 
cells/affiliate organizations can cause destruction for the affiliate. If the United States focuses 
more on the individual affiliates compared to central leadership like Osama Bin Laden, they 
could dismantle Al Qaeda from the bottom up. Osama Bin Laden was part of Al Qaeda Central, 
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and when he was killed, al-Zawahiri was able to take over swiftly and rather easily, since he was 
constantly at the side of Bin Laden. Due to their decentralized organization, al-Zawahiri was able 
to continue with forming the message of Al Qaeda (which he was doing anyways), and leaders of 
affiliates continued to carry out attacks uninterrupted. 
Focusing back on ISIS, a wrong move by the American government led to the release of one 
of the most prolific terrorists of all time, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. This shows that the US must be 
extremely careful in who they release from their custody. Without al-Baghdadi, who might be 
the most successful of ISIS’s leaders, ISI might never have rebounded after the loss of 80% of 
their leaders and never have turned into ISIS. America has made both right and wrong decisions 
against ISIS in the past, and by learning from these mistakes, America can prevent history from 
repeating itself. 
Throughout ISIS’s history, there have been transformations of ISIS’s ideology, usually in 
connection with name or leadership changes. For example, the original JTJ group focused on a 
specific country’s government, the Jordanian monarchy. Once JTJ allied with Al Qaeda and 
became Al Qaeda in Iraq, their ideology became more detailed and started focusing on the bigger 
picture of Islam. They believed in monotheism, that anyone who didn’t believe in Allah should 
be excommunicated or killed, that Shia’s were enemies of Islam, that Prophet Muhammed was 
God’s messenger for all, and that secularism, nationalism, and communism were violations of 
Islam. They also believed that besides the 1st pillar of Islam Shahadah (professing one’s faith to 
God), waging jihad against the enemies of Islam is top priority (Hashim). Once AQI turned into 
the Islamic State of Iraq, their ideology turned into an all-encompassing belief to create an 
Islamic State. This a broader belief than the previous organizations, who were focusing on 
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American occupiers in the Middle East and liberating Iraq. After Al Qaeda cut ties with ISIS and 
they became their own separate entity, the defining element of their ideology was to create an 
Islamic State (Hashim). For counterterrorism experts, it is necessary to know the previous 
ideological beliefs of the many precursors to ISIS in order to prevent them from returning to 
these beliefs and to understand how they have developed into a sophisticated and dangerous 
terrorist organization.  
On June 29th, 2014, ISIS declared their worldwide caliphate, which means they plan on 
expanding their holy war. With this declaration, ISIS has started to identify themselves as the 
Islamic State (IS). Under this caliphate, Muslims must pledge their alliance to the leader of IS, 
al-Baghdadi. They also declared that other jihadist groups like their past leader Al Qaeda must 
accept that IS has supreme control. This caliphate came after ISIS was able to consolidate their 
control over territory in Syria and Iraq, which allowed ISIS to have a main area of land to control 
and reside in (“What Is 'Islamic State'”). Since the Islamic State is the new form of the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria, it is necessary to decipher the ideological basis for the Islamic State in 
order to create a counterterrorism plan for the group that is currently a threat. 
The ideology of the Islamic State goes hand in hand with the politics and the leadership 
apparent in this group. The Islamic State follows the strain in Salafism known as jihadism, 
meaning they are a part of the more violent political thought known as Jihadi-Salafism. This 
movement is based on extremist beliefs and is rooted in tradition and textual meanings. The 
Jihadi-Salafism thought combines a Brotherhood and a Salafi dimension. The Brotherhood 
dimension comes from the Muslim Brotherhood, where they wanted to restore the caliphate as 
the ideal system of government. The Salafi dimension is concerned with the purity of faith by the 
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elimination of idolatry (shirk) and affirming God’s Oneness (tawhid) as well as remaining anti-
Shi’ite (Bunzel 8). These ideological beliefs are not new, as they have been apparent in the 
previous groups that came before the Islamic State.  
ISIS’s ideology also plays a role in how they are motivated as a group and why they choose 
the tactics that they do. This further explains where ISIS’s rage manifests from. This rage is what 
has propelled this group to commit heinous crimes like beheading civilians. The main source of 
both motivation and rage is that they, along with groups like Al Qaeda, are in a war against 
infidels. This is a part of their overall belief in an extreme Islamic conception of world order 
(Saloom). Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, one of the first influential leaders of ISIS when it was still JTJ 
and AQI, was influenced greatly by the fatwas of Osama Bin Laden. Since Osama Bin Laden 
was the leader of Al Qaeda and al-Zarqawi was the leader of a precursor to ISIS and an affiliate 
of Al Qaeda (Al Qaeda in Iraq), it is reasonable that Bin Laden influenced the extreme 
viewpoints of ISIS.  
To showcase these viewpoints, many verses (or Suras) from the Qur’an are used to justify 
beheadings and violent actions in general. These verses are used to try and encourage Muslims to 
commit violent actions because the holy book told them they could. Historical contexts are also 
used to draw upon the anger felt by Muslims that came before them. If previous Muslims felt the 
need to engage in violent jihad, then they must continue their fight. One of the Suras (Sura 8:12) 
states, “When the Lord inspired the angels (saying) I am with you. So make those who believe 
stand firm. I will throw fear into the hearts of those who disbelieve. Then smite the necks and 
smite of them each finger” (Saloom). Terrorists take messages like this and interpret ‘smite the 
neck’ as a direct indication of beheading. Another historical context that is used to justify these 
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beheadings comes from the Prophet Muhammed himself. The Prophet Muhammed was believed 
to be a part of the beheadings of a Jewish tribe named Qurayza (Saloom). If the Prophet 
Muhammed utilized this violent tactic, then Muslims, according to extremists, are permitted to 
do so. However, there are many Suras that denounce the use of violence and indirectly the act of 
beheadings. Terrorists, like those in ISIS, choose to only look at verses that correspond with their 
beliefs. They use these historical contexts to motivate their members and engage in a violent 
jihad. The motivation of ISIS members and all Islamic Fundamentalists is hard to counter. Since 
terrorists only choose to interpret the Qur’an in ways that align with their viewpoints, they don’t 
understand the many Suras that condemn the use of violence and preach the importance of peace. 
Therefore, a diplomatic approach is ineffective because they choose to ignore interpretations 
different than their own. 
 Although motivations may be similar, the Islamic State has a different ideological basis 
within Jihadi-Salafism than other jihadist groups like The Muslim Brotherhood and Al Qaeda. 
The Muslim Brotherhood focused on creating a radical, revolutionary version of the Brotherhood 
dimension of Jihadi-Salafism. This was the creation of a caliphate as the system of government. 
In order to do this, they wanted to overthrow governments and replace it with Islamic states. Al 
Qaeda, on the other hand, thought that attacking the United States would help create this Islamic 
state (Bunzel 9). The biggest difference between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State is that the 
Islamic State is stricter in their adherence to their ideological beliefs. While the Islamic State 
tends to adhere to the same Jihadi-Salafist beliefs as these other jihadist groups, they focus on a 
few main beliefs in particular. These beliefs have been extracted from statements released from 
the Islamic State themselves (Bunzel 38). The first is that they must only associate themselves 
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with other true Muslims. If this is the case, then it would be difficult for any counterterrorist 
intelligence to infiltrate IS because they will not associate with outsiders. Therefore, any 
intelligence must also convincingly adhere to the same belief system. Another belief is that all 
Shia Muslims deserve death. This makes it challenging to try and protect Shia Muslims, because 
their death is one of the main beliefs of IS. They also believe that, “failure to rule in accordance 
with God’s law constitutes unbelief” (Bunzel 10). This adherence to sharia law shows why the 
Islamic State is against the Western way of governance. It is impossible for the United States to 
change this governance to try and please a terrorist organization. The Islamic State is also 
dogmatic in their application of Salafist literature and they justify violence through their waging 
of a defensive jihad. This means that they believe that most military force they use is actually 
defensive. They are defending Islam from secularism and the West. They also use offensive jihad 
to justify their offensive military actions, as they are fighting against idolatry especially in Shia 
controlled regions (Bunzel 11). The Islamic State adheres to a strict, extremist, and historically 
based ideology. This presents a problem to counterterrorism experts because it is hard to 
compromise or communicate with individuals who believe in an all-encompassing ideology that 
leaves no room for other ideas or beliefs. Therefore, it seems that in regards to battling the 
Islamic State’s ideology, the United States must rely on options other than compromise in order 
to dismantle this organization.    
 
Organization and Leadership Structure 
 
ISIS has created an organizational structure different than other Islamic Fundamentalist 
groups, like their previous leader Al Qaeda. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s overall organizational 
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structural changes in 2010 (when ISIS was still ISI) included a disciplined, cohesive, and flexible 
organization. He wanted direct control over the members of ISIS and focused on the details. 
Through this, he created a hierarchal and a centralized organization. He also included more Iraqi 
fighters in leadership roles, which allowed younger Iraqis to aspire towards membership in this 
well-known organization. During al-Baghdadi’s organizational changes he specifically divided 
ISIS leadership into the al-imara, or the executive. This was made up of al-Baghdadi and his top 
advisors (Hashim). The al-imara is like the government of a country, as it is composed of the 
policymakers and the governing body of the Islamic State. Besides the main leadership, ISIS is 
divided into first and second echelon structures. The first echelon is composed of the Shura, 
Military, and the Security and Intelligence Councils, which are all supervised by al-Baghdadi. 
This Shura Council is next in leadership to the al-imara and it is the body that can remove al-
Baghdadi if they decided he was unfit to run ISIS. The Military Council oversees the military 
commanders and the wilayats, which are the provinces or units of the Islamic State. The Security 
and Intelligence Council focuses on providing security to al-Baghdadi himself, maintaining 
communication between al-Baghdadi and the provincial governors, making sure these governors 
follow Baghdadi’s orders, overseeing court rulings, making sure penalties are executed, 
providing counterintelligence to prevent enemy infiltration, and overseeing mail delivery. This 
council is also in charge of conducting kidnappings, assassinations, and collecting any funds 
(Hashim). This first echelon is the core of the Islamic State that presents many difficulties for 
counterterrorism experts, especially the Security and Intelligence Council. This council is in 
charge of maintaining the security of the organization and preventing breaches in the system. As 
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long as this council remains intact and reliable, it would be difficult to infiltrate the organization 
directly.  
The second-echelon structure deals with the finances and funding of ISIS. They 
especially focus on costs related to running and building a state and maintaining their military 
(Hashim). Other councils in ISIS include the media council, which regulates the media of ISIS, 
the legal counsel, which makes decisions about executions, and the fighter’s assistance council, 
which gives foreign fighters’ aid (Glenn). There is one positive aspect of ISIS’s organizational 
structure in regards to counterterrorism; their direct hierarchal control over their fighters. If one 
of the top leaders of ISIS, or even a few members of one of the councils, are killed, the lower 
level fighters may not be able to lead and plan attacks themselves.  
Abu Bakr al Baghdadi is the current leader of ISIS, who emerged when he took control of 
ISIS back when they were still the Islamic State of Iraq. Baghdadi received training in 
Afghanistan in the late 1990’s, which is where he met ISIS’s founder and first leader, Abu 
Musab al Zarqawi. Besides claims that he is from a religious family, he is descended from noble 
tribes, and has a PhD from the Islamic University in Baghdad, there is not much known about 
Baghdadi. Baghdadi also only has two known photos of himself and conceals his identity with a 
bandanna, showing how much he stays out of the spotlight (Glenn). This makes it quite difficult 
for a direct attack against Baghdadi, seeing that he only shows his identity to his small inner 
circle. This means that any conversations with ISIS would have to take place with other leaders 
or to the group in general. His education also presents a counterterrorism issue, because if he 
does have a PhD, it means it would be hard to undermine his authority or use tricks to get him to 
cooperate with any policies. It would also be hard for the United States to directly target 
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Baghdadi. With only a few pictures of him in circulation and the fact that only his small inner 
circle gets the pleasure of seeing his face, it would be difficult to track his movements or have 
someone within the ISIS organization be able to inform intelligence of his exact location.  
There is more to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi than just a concealed identity. Since he is 
currently the most influential leader of ISIS, his background is vital to know in order for 
counterterrorism experts to target al-Baghdadi and understand the origins of this organization. 
Al-Baghdadi was born in 1971 in Samarra, Iraq. Even as a child, al-Baghdadi was extremely shy, 
and he spent his childhood either in school or at the mosque, since he was devoted to religion 
early on. This made sense because his father was also religious and taught at a mosque. Even 
though he was shy, when he was promoting or teaching Islam to others, he would come alive. 
“According to one of his brothers, Shamsi, he was quick to admonish anyone who strayed from 
the strictures of Islamic law” (McCants). His grew up in a lower middle-class family and he 
claimed that he was a direct descendent of the Prophet himself. Al-Baghdadi’s family is one of 
the reasons why he was specifically radicalized. Two of his uncles were in Saddam Hussein’s 
security force and one of his brothers was an officer in the army. Another brother even died in 
the Iran-Iraq war that the United States was a part of (McCants). His familial background shows 
that al-Baghdadi was bred to not only defend his country and his beliefs because they were 
members of the military, but also to be a religious scholar. The combination of his intensive 
religious beliefs and the influence his family had helped turn al-Baghdadi into the extremist he is 
today. 
Education and prison life are two other factors that radicalized al-Baghdadi early on. In 
1996, he graduated from the University of Baghdad. He then proceeded to enroll in a Quranic 
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recitation program at the Saddam University for Islamic Studies. There, he wrote a thesis on the 
medieval texts of the Qur’an. He continued the same course of study into his doctorate program 
at the same university (McCants). His education focused exclusively on Islamic studies, which 
means his main influence during these years of schooling was the importance and signifance of 
religion. During this time is also when al-Baghdadi was convinced by his Uncle to join the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Within this organization, al-Baghdadi began to align himself with the 
violent Jihadi-Salafits, which laid out the ideological foundation of ISIS. Eventually, al-
Baghdadi helped form an insurgent group named Jaysh Ahl al-Sunna wa-l-Jamaah, which 
focused on fighting U.S. troops and their allies in northern and central Iraq. By 2004, al-
Baghdadi was arrested as a ‘civil detainee’, as they were unaware he was actually a violent 
jihadist (McCants). While in prison, al-Baghdadi was able to network with others who had 
similar views as himself. He also continued religious practices for his fellow prisoners. The 
prisoners al-Baghdadi bonded with are the same insurgents who became prominent leaders of 
ISIS. The fact that al-Baghdadi was previously imprisoned helped him become radicalized 
because of who he was surrounded by. Not only was he influenced by his family, now he was 
influenced by his peers. He knew he was no longer alone in his quest for a pure Islamic state. His 
extensive education background also allowed al-Baghdadi to take on a leadership role and 
develop a strong organization that is around today. Therefore, al-Baghdadi’s religious 
upbringing, family influence, prison life, and educational background all contributed to the 
radicalization of ISIS’s current leader.  
Baghdadi, in relation to the entire organization of ISIS, is the supreme political and 
religious leader. In other words, he is the caliph. He relies on deputies to oversee and manage 
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certain areas of ISIS territory in Iraq and Syria. The Shura Council also ensures that the caliph is 
fit to rule. Otherwise, he has unchecked authority. Baghdadi also appoints members to the Shura 
Council and relies on advisors and the previously mentioned deputies to compose the upper 
echelon of ISIS. The current leaders that help compose the upper echelon are Abu Ali al Anbari, 
ISIS’s deputy in Syria, Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, ISIS’s official spokesman, Abu Arkan al 
Ameri, the head of the shura council, and Abd al-Rahman Mustafa al Qaduli, a fellow senior 
leader (Glenn). Even though counterterrorism intelligence may not be able to target Baghdadi, it 
may be possible for experts to target these others leaders or at least members of the Shura 
council. Direct hits against a centralized organization like ISIS may trickle down to create 
disaster among the entire group. 
 
Finances 
 
 Since ISIS is considered a hermit kingdom, an organization that isolates themselves from 
the rest of the world, it is difficult to find published official data, balanced sheets, or audits from 
international organizations. Therefore, researchers must rely on Western media sources, 
journalists, indirect habitants’ testimonies, ISIS propaganda, and few official reports (Stergiou 
189). This does not mean there are no options for the United States and their goal to dismantle 
ISIS using their financial means. This just means that the sources the United States does have 
must be reliable but be taken with caution. The United States must also continue to edit 
counterterrorism policies as certain policies succeed and fail and as more reliable information is 
discovered.  
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ISIS, the world’s richest terrorist organization. With a label like that, it is clear that ISIS 
has been able to finance their terrorist group properly and with great success. Like any legitimate 
business or corporation, ISIS has bills to pay, mouths to feed, and payrolls to maintain. The 
money ISIS raises not only goes towards financing operations and buying weaponry, like would 
be expected from a terrorist organization, it also goes towards paying its members. In an area 
where many are poor and need a way to support their family, joining ISIS comes with a steady 
income, giving opportunities to those who normally wouldn’t have them. A member’s pay is, 
“based on a flat monthly rate per person and then additional fixed amounts for each wife, child 
and dependent unmarried adult woman in the household” (Shatz). For example, in Iraq in 2003 
and 2004, the rate was $491 per year with an additional amount of $245 per dependent. These 
payments even continue if the ISIS member is killed or captured. This gives families’ life 
insurance they wouldn’t have otherwise (Shatz). This is also why it makes sense that families 
would support those in their family that join ISIS. Even though there are dangers involved with 
being a part of this terrorist group, money will continue even if they are killed. The fact that ISIS 
members are on payroll in turn affects how counterterrorism experts must approach ISIS 
members. In some cases, this is their family’s only source of income. Without it, they would live 
a much worse life. This means that members are dedicated to ISIS not necessarily because of 
their beliefs or because they want to commit violent attacks, but because they are supporting 
their family. This makes members harder to deter. Therefore, the United States can find ways to 
deal with the underlying financial reasons extremist decide to join terrorist organizations. If some 
prosperity can be brought to the Iraq and Syria region and to those who are impoverished, they 
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might be deterred from going from an extremist to a terrorist. Another way intelligence can use 
ISIS’s finances to defeat them is by stopping funds from getting to the group in the first place. 
The question is, then, how does ISIS finance their operation? Howard Shatz, a senior 
economist at RAND Corporation, has looked at documents, ledgers, and manuals from the 
precursor organizations of ISIS, like Al Qaeda in Iraq and the Islamic State of Iraq. Through his 
research, along with scholars from Emory and Princeton, there have been discoveries of what 
most likely is ISIS’s primary source of income. ISIS raises most of their money domestically in 
Iraq and Syria. Their biggest source of revenue is oil, where they smuggle and sell it to other 
countries. ISIS is currently in control of about a dozen oil fields in Iraq and Syria as well as 
refineries. This means they do not have to travel outside their own territory to find oil supplies. 
They are then able to smuggle oil to other countries in tanker trucks. The issue with these tanker 
trucks is that they would never be labeled something that could connect that truck with ISIS. 
This makes it difficult to pinpoint which trucks are actually being controlled by ISIS. Once the 
oil is smuggled out, they sell it to surrounding countries at a discounted rate. These countries 
include Syria, Turkey, and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (Shatz). Due to these discounted rates, 
countries are more willing to buy oil from a terrorist organization, especially if they already 
support them. 
ISIS’s ability to raise funds through oil does offer some counterterrorist options. One 
secretive option would include following tanker trucks in areas that are known to be in ISIS 
territory, potentially leading officials to their oil fields. These oil fields, with permission and 
cooperation from Iraq and Syria, could potentially lead to ISIS members. Another simple 
solution is to stop the selling of the oil to other countries. If other countries refuse to buy oil from 
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a known terrorist group like ISIS, then there would be no demand. ISIS could no longer rely on 
their oil funds to finance their operations. These options rely on cooperation between the United 
States and other Middle Eastern countries, however, which may be difficult to do. Another issue 
comes from the fact that the United States cannot destroy the oil infrastructures that ISIS 
controls. This oil is the primary source of revenue not only for ISIS, but for the general 
population and the lawful government in the area. This government also needs the oil to remain 
legitimate and keep oil and gas production up. If the U.S. destroys them, they wipe out this oil 
for everyone (Stergiou 202).  
Other ways ISIS raises funds besides oil is through extortion, taxes, and other criminal 
activities. Although ISIS’s main source of funding is through the control and sale of oil, it is still 
important to focus on the other options ISIS uses. One of these ways is extortion, typically 
through, “the banking system, transportation tariffs, daily business activity, salary payments, 
human trafficking, seizure of property-mostly from Christians, Shiites and formal government 
officials which is been later auctioned off for cash or simply theft at gunpoint” (Stergiou 192). 
They have even been able to take control of state-owned banks, take cash deposits from locals, 
tax goods going in and out of ISIS territory, and organize slave auctions that not only act as a 
source of revenue, but gives them access to cheap labor. Not only does ISIS have control of oil 
fields and smuggle out oil, they have control of dams and gas plants. They even smuggle 
antiquities. Their last source of self-funding is through kidnapping for ransom (Stergiou 195). 
Kidnapping provides a win-win for ISIS. If the ransom is paid, ISIS has secured an easy source 
of revenue. If the ransom is not paid, ISIS has no problem going ahead and performing a 
ritualized killing, which sends a political message and shows that they are merciless. On top of 
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these self-funding means of raising money, ISIS has also received donations from wealthy 
private regional donors and have gotten contributions from certain fraudulent foundations that 
are established based on broad messages like humanitarian relief for refugees (Stergiou 196). 
These fake foundations lead directly to the banks of ISIS.  By having many sources of revenue, 
both internally and externally, it is easy for ISIS to change their plan around in response to 
counterterrorism policies like increased military strikes. Therefore, the United States must look 
at every source of revenue, from their illegal smuggling of oil to their kidnappings, and find 
ways to cut off each simultaneously.   
Overall, the United States must take a new approach when they are dealing with ISIS’s 
finances. First, the United States must focus on internal financial structures rather than their 
external donors, because only a small portion of ISIS funds comes from these donors and ISIS is 
considered a self-sufficient organization. The Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial 
Intelligence, David S. Cohen, has focused on three main ways to threaten ISIS’s financial 
foundations: cutting off ISIS’s access to revenue, restricting their access to the international 
financial system and targeting sanctions against ISIS’s leadership and facilitators (Stergiou 202). 
In order to cut off ISIS’s access to revenue, the United States must cooperate with financial 
intelligence with local governments, like the Iraqi and Iran governments. This means increased 
coordination and information sharing with each country’s financial institutions. This increased 
sharing can lead to the identification of facilitators working with ISIS. Local institutions can also 
observe the flow of goods into and out of ISIS territory and keep track of the prices and 
quantities of goods that are smuggled into their countries. These goods may have been directly 
smuggled by ISIS (Stergiou 202). Without cooperation by countries around the Middle East, the 
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United States will not be able to monitor the flow of funds in and out of ISIS and properly cut 
into this flow.  
The second way Cohen planned to threaten ISIS’s funding is by restricting their access to 
the international financial system. There are over 100 financial institutions within ISIS territory. 
To cut off their access, institutions have been told by the Central Bank of Iraqi to stop wire 
transfers in and out of the banks in ISIS territory. The international financial system has cut their 
ties with these institutions as well. This is so ISIS does not have the ability to funnel their money 
through this global system and easily send their money wherever they please (Stergiou 202). The 
issue with this is that these banks may not follow these global and local mandates and continue 
their relations to ISIS. If this happens, there is no choice but to close these banks down and hold 
those who own the bank liable for their actions. Cohen’s final part of the plan was to create 
targeted sanctions against ISIS’s leadership and facilitators. This includes travel bans, an arms 
embargo, and asset freezes of known ISIS associates. This can also be done by having security 
measures set up for when ISIS oil or illegally traded items enter the financial system. Through 
buyers, middleman, and carriers, these items are bound to enter into the legal financial system 
and there it can be stopped and hopefully tracked back to the source (Stergiou 203). With a 
combination of defensive security measures and mandates, as well as cooperation with other 
Middle Eastern governments, the United States has multiple options available to them to try and 
dismantle ISIS’s finances and prevent them from accessing millions of dollars. 
 
Targets and Tactics 
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In order to keep up with the continuous struggle for global jihad while also battling 
constant counterterrorism threats, the Islamic State has mastered an array of tactics and methods 
of violence that they can use to attack their targets, recruit fighters, and spread propaganda. 
Therefore, with each additional ‘tool’ the Islamic State employs, the United States must have a 
separate counterterrorism plan in place to counter each tactic. Just the like the history of ISIS, it 
is easier to split the targets and tactics of the Islamic State into different time periods that 
correlate to the different names this organization has gone under. At the beginning of ISIS’s 
creation, when they were referred to as JTJ, the main targets were American forces in Iraq. In 
order to damage American interests, JTJ, along with the other insurgent groups, attacked oil 
companies, Iraqi police, the National Guard, Iraqi politicians, and humanitarian aid workers 
(“The Islamic State”). The reason Iraqi’s were targeted was because Americans were working 
with the interim Iraqi government at the time of the invasion, meaning they were allied with the 
United States. This array of people and organizations were also targets in hopes to deter others 
from aiding the Americans and their plans for the Iraqi government. JTJ began using suicide 
bombings instead of usual guerilla tactics. They also used assassinations and abducted foreign 
citizens. These abductions are still one of the well-known tactics of the Islamic State. This is 
because once they were abducted, JTJ would broadcast their execution, usually beheadings. For 
example, in 2004 JTJ beheaded an American named Nicholas Berg. This execution is even 
thought to have been carried out directly by al-Zarqawi (“The Islamic State”). More recently, 
ISIS was charged in 2014 with beheading another American, Peter Kassig. He, along with 
several other Syrian soldiers, were executed and the video of their execution was uploaded to the 
Internet (Hjelmgaard) 
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Once JTJ transformed into AQI, the targets remained somewhat the same. AQI targeted 
coalition forces, Shia civilians, religious sites, and the Iraqi government. America continued to 
occupy Iraq which meant they would remain a target. AQI realized the power that suicide 
bombers had and continued to utilize this tactic. They also began to use improvised explosive 
devices, also known as IEDs. A more complicated and high-tech tactic that AQI used was 
chlorine gas combined with conventional explosives (“The Islamic State”). After Bin Laden’s 
death and during the creation of ISIS, the new leader Baghdadi wanted to focus on freeing AQI 
prisoners out of prison. Therefore, a new target of ISIS was Iraqi security forces. ISIS also joined 
the Syrian Civil War, meaning their targets shifted to the other governments and rebel groups. 
When ISIS realized they wanted to take over land as well, targets started to include the 
inhabitants of their wanted territory. For example, ISIS targeted Shia and minorities in the Iraqi 
and Syrian cities they wanted to control.  
In order to secure territory, capturing buildings became a tactic ISIS used. Through this 
tactic, ISIS was able to control the necessary resources to establish their stakes. Another tactic 
ISIS used in order to take over towns was the establishment of sleeper cells (“The Islamic 
State”). This means that there were fighters already established in towns that ISIS wanted to take 
over. These were smaller units that would be able to rise up and take over when they thought it 
was the right time. These sleeper cells cause a problem for counterterrorism intelligence because 
it is hard to detect fighters when no one knows they are there. The United States can defensively 
wait for the sleeper cell to arise. Then, hopefully the U.S. has allies in those areas to help prevent 
complete takeover. On top of sleeper cells, ISIS continued to kidnap foreigners and demand 
ransom money. If the ransom money is not paid, ISIS publicly beheads the captive. There have 
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been countless beheadings in the past few years, including a few more American civilians (“The 
Islamic State”). The problem with American captives is that American policy is to never make 
concessions to terrorists (“FACT SHEET: U.S. Government Hostage Policy”). This means that 
America cannot pay the ransoms demanded by ISIS. There needs to be another way that America 
can rescue these hostages. This does not have to necessarily mean paying the ransom, but this 
could be a technological way to track these videos or shut down the propaganda altogether. If 
there is no audience, ISIS could potentially put off the beheadings. Since Americans have left the 
Middle East, especially Iraq, it seems that ISIS has shifted away from targeting America directly. 
The more America stays out of the Middle East, the more it seems ISIS focuses on other targets 
and battles. 
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IV. Taliban Case Study 
 
History and Ideology 
 
Much like Al Qaeda, the Taliban was formed by members of the mujahedeen that had 
resisted the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980’s. A long with these members, Pashtun 
students who studied Pakistani madrassas also helped form this organization. In fact, the word 
Taliban means students in Pashto (Laub). These students are influential in Afghanistan because 
Pashtun’s comprise the majority ethnicity in the country. Any group that is able to compose the 
majority of any country has major leverage within the government. This group is able to 
influence the rest of the population and direct potential governmental policies, which is exactly 
what Pashtun’s did in Afghanistan. Pashtun’s still compose most of the Taliban. “Accordingly, a 
significant portion of Taliban members follow Pashtunwali, a strict moral and cultural code of 
conduct for Pashtun tribesmen” (“The Taliban”). During this time, the budding Taliban was able 
to rely on the young people of Afghanistan to supply their operation, both with recruits and 
supplies. Weapons were secured from retreating and abandoned forces or while the military was 
disarming the population (Marsden 43). 
After the Soviets abandoned Afghanistan, the Taliban was able to take control, promising 
to return the country to the stable country it used to be. They were able to convince others of the 
sincerity of that promise by going to Kandahar, Afghanistan to help bring peace and take control 
from the reigning corrupt President, Burhanuddin Rabbani (Laub). The successful overthrow of 
this President provided the Taliban with the persuasion needed to convince an entire population 
that they were necessary tools in protecting the interests of the Pashtun people.  
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The first militarized attack from the Taliban was also when the world realized their existence. In 
October 1994, the Pakistani government sent a trade convey through Kandahar, Afghanistan. 
Once the convoy entered Afghanistan, it was attacked by an armed group other than the Taliban. 
The Taliban actually rescued the convoy and fought the other armed group. This marks the 
emergence of the Taliban (Marsden 43). After this rescue, the Taliban took root in Kandahar. 
There, they began acting on the promises they made years prior to the people of Afghanistan to 
restore the country to stability, which included the removal of Rabbani from Presidency. It didn’t 
take much to secure their reign on Kandahar, and they managed to overtake other leaders who 
were stationed there and they forced the population to hand over their weapons.  
This is the time when the Taliban started implementing their ideological viewpoints on 
the Kandahar population. A long with their goal of removing the corrupt President Rabbani, the 
Taliban wanted to create a pure Islamic society. This included forcing men to wear turbans, 
beards, short hear, and shalwar kameez (traditional dress). For women, they had to wear a burqa 
to cover their entire body. Women were given the responsibility to raise children and they were 
not allowed to have any other occupation. Education for women was also put on the backburner. 
The Taliban also wanted a curriculum drawn up for schools that focused on religion, and the 
Taliban claimed that this could only happen after they controlled all of Afghanistan. Meanwhile 
men would travel to mosques to pray 5 times a day in accordance to the 2nd pillar of Islam, 
Salah (Marsden 44). These extreme rulings by the Taliban over the Kandahar people seemed to 
be put into place to force obedience to their new leaders and to create a single, powerful, and 
united population. The women would focus solely on raising more soldiers for their military and 
the men would focus on their religion. Together, individual diversity would not be tolerated. This 
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is why they were forced to look as identical as possible. A united Taliban would become more 
powerful and work towards their common goals. This is the unity that would have to be broken 
through counterterrorism efforts. 
The Taliban continued to do what they did in Kandahar throughout the next few years. As 
they moved westward, they managed to pick up recruits and weaponry a long they way, as they 
defeated other armed groups and bandits. By February of 1995, after a long winter of acquisition, 
the Taliban had overtaken almost half of Afghanistan (Marsden 34). Throughout the years, a 
cycle would occur regarding the Taliban and their territorial achievements. They would take over 
a city, receive some push back (and possibly lose the city for a period of time), and eventually 
overtake the city once more. Some of these cities in Afghanistan included Kabul, Herat, and 
Mazar. Within these cities and the cities in between, the Taliban encountered other militant 
groups fighting for similar purposes as them. However, these groups were also fighting for the 
same land as the Taliban, which created resistance every city they entered. The largest of these 
groups was Hizb-e Wahdat (Marsden 34). On top of these additional militant groups, the 
government of Afghanistan, especially the Northern Alliance (United Front) against the Taliban, 
tried to resist Taliban occupation. One of the most prominent actors of this resistance was Abdul 
Rashid Dostum, who is the current Vice-President of Afghanistan.  
Working alongside Dostum seems like a relatively simple and easy way to enforce 
American counterterrorism policies in Afghanistan. The issue with Vice-President Dostum is that 
America is currently opposed to working with him. As of April 2016, Dostum has been unable to 
receive a visa from the United States so he can visit and discuss the current issues with the 
Taliban (Rosenberg). The United States continues to have an interest in defeating the Taliban 
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because Afghanistan is their ally and they still have thousands of troops and dollars invested in 
the country. Vice-President Dostum has been accused of war crimes, which is the why the 
United States and the Obama administration is unwilling to work with him, especially on 
American soil. These war crimes include Dostum putting hundreds of Taliban prisoners in 
shipping containers without food and water, which resulted in their death. This took place after 
Dostum, “fought alongside Central Intelligence Agency operatives and Special Operations forces 
to oust the Taliban (Rosenberg). The issue with this unwillingness is that Dostum provides 
invaluable information of the current workings of the Taliban. As stated before, Dostum has been 
working against the Taliban since the 1990’s during his involvement with the Northern Alliance 
and his resistance of Taliban forces in Mazar. He is now the second-in-command of Afghanistan. 
This power combined with experience is needed to adequately formulate a plan to defeat the 
Taliban or prevent their expansion. This is also one reason why discussing the history of the 
Taliban is necessary when planning counterterrorism options. By diving into the history of the 
Taliban, previous influential actors in the fight against the Taliban (like Vice-President Dostum) 
are uncovered. Once uncovered, these actors are able to help current efforts to defeat the Taliban. 
The option of utilizing older actors is unique to Taliban counterterrorism, because compared to 
groups like ISIS who have only been around for a few years, the Taliban has been around since 
the 90’s. History repeats itself, and luckily the U.S. has enough history with this group to use it 
against them.  
Not only does the Taliban have an extensive history, there are also ideological roots 
embedded into this organization. In order to understand this ideology, the Foreign Policy 
Research Institute interviewed 78 Afghan Taliban fighters. Through these interviews, the 
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Institute was able to uncover some of the main motivations Taliban members have for joining the 
organization. This study found two main motivations for these fighters. The first was opposition 
to Western presence and influence over Afghanistan. The second was the inherent flaws of the 
Afghan government (Garfield and Boyd). In order to act on these motivations, fighters want to 
remove foreign presence and establish a traditional Islamic government. Not only do fighters 
have these particular goals, they have experienced rage and anger as well because of the 
American presence in Afghanistan. This rage is because of the imposition of non-Islamic values 
in Afghanistan, the disgracing of the Qur’an, and the abuse Americans have committed against 
Afghans, especially Afghan women. The beliefs held by fighters have impacted Taliban ideals 
and the propaganda they release. However, since these beliefs are constructed based on true 
experiences of abuse, counterterrorism experts cannot simply speak out against Taliban 
propaganda. These beliefs are embedded in the hearts of those around Afghanistan because of 
personal experiences.  (Garfield and Boyd). Therefore, because members have been personally 
victimized or have had family members, friends, or neighbors victimized, they are more 
motivated to join an insurgent group like the Taliban.  
Personal experiences and Western influence aren’t the only sources of motivation for the 
Taliban. There are also religious and political reasons for joining. Members claim that the United 
States and other Western countries are at war against Islam. They also believed that the 
Afghanistan government portrays American beliefs, not those of Afghans (Garfield and Boyd). 
Overall, a combination of political, religious, personal, and anti-Western motivations come 
together to push Afghans towards joining the Taliban. Their rage culminates because of the 
perceived injustices caused by the United States, and this rage cannot simply be stopped because 
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America tries to defend their actions or claim they didn’t happen. Instead, Americans must 
understand these grievances, as this study found that they are held by Afghans and Pashtuns 
everywhere, not just those a part of the Taliban (Garfield and Boyd). These views must also be 
considered when dealing with the Afghan government and how that government decides to rule 
their people.  
The United States Institute of Peace has created a timeline of the Taliban’s rhetoric 
development and their ideological beliefs throughout the last two decades in relation to historical 
events. This combination of history, rhetoric, and ideology allows experts to see the development 
of the Taliban throughout the years and the best approach to take when trying to stop their next 
move. It also allows for a simpler explanation of Taliban history, as it is easy to get confused 
since it is meddled with politics and military battles. The first phase of the Taliban has already 
been extensively discussed, as it is also the phase they emerged from and officially became a 
threat. This phase has been labeled the emergent Taliban and took place from 1994-1996 
(Semple 6). This is when the Taliban quickly transformed from a band of fighters to a group that 
had the capability to take over Afghanistan’s capital, Kabul. During this time, they began 
fighting the Islamic State of Afghanistan, which was the government of Afghanistan that was 
created after the Soviets left. Besides the official government, the Taliban was also fighting 
various armed groups like Hizb-e Wahdat. The goal of this first phase of the Taliban was to, 
“Combat the moral corruption of the former mujahedeen commanders in control of Kandahar” 
(Semple 7). This went on to include trying to dismantle all other factions that were a part of the 
Afghanistan civil war. The underlying ideology during this phase was that during the battle 
against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, jihad had been betrayed by members of the 
87 
 
mujahedeen who resorted to illegitimate means of extortion, violence and oppression (Semple 7). 
Therefore, the Taliban justified any violence during this phase because the former mujahedeen 
commanders deserved to be removed because they disgraced the jihad. 
The second phase of the Taliban took place from 1996-2001 and is known as the 
ascendant Taliban. This is when the Taliban began rapidly expanding across Afghanistan while 
continuing to fight the mujahedeen forces that still remained. This expansion turned into the 
Islamic emirate, which was the Islamic State in Afghanistan that was created and ruled by the 
Taliban. Emirate is another word for the land ruled by an emir. Up until 2001, the Taliban 
focused mainly on forces in Afghanistan. The most involved the Taliban was internationally was 
through the assistance they received from Pakistan (Semple 6). This means that the Taliban was 
not yet a threat to the United States directly. Ideologically during the phase, the Taliban 
continued to focus on jihad. They engaged in jihad through their creation of the Islamic Emirate 
of Afghanistan (IEA). Since the Taliban was able to take over vast amounts of Afghanistan, they 
also believed that every other force should succumb to their rule. Any resistance was against 
Islam and the Islamic system of Afghanistan the Taliban was trying to create. According to the 
Taliban, this system was the only legitimate way to rule Afghanistan. 
The invasion of Afghanistan by the United States advanced the Taliban into their third 
phase. This invasion was partially reminiscent of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as both 
invasions were by countries with ideologies different than Islam and the Taliban. This phase was 
from 2002-2006, and was known by the U.S. Institute of Peace as the emergent insurgency. This 
insurgency was due to the new, post-invasion Afghanistan government that was supported not 
only by the United States, but internationally (Semple 6). The Taliban army was defeated during 
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this time by these international forces, including in Kabul. Therefore, the only military 
accomplishments by the Taliban at this time was small groups of Taliban forces fighting back 
against these international forces and the new Kabul government. This phase also forced the 
Taliban to enter the international arena and start dealing with other countries besides those in 
their immediate geographical area. Once the United States started planning their invasion, the 
Taliban took this time to preach their case to those who would listen, especially the ulema (the 
scholars). They claimed there needed to be an armed resistance against these foreign invaders 
(and soon to be occupiers) because they were challenging the Islamic system that the Taliban had 
created the past 5 years (Semple 7). The notable thing to come out of this phase was that the 
local armed forces were no longer the only enemies of the Taliban. Now, there was a foreign 
enemy identified, the United States and their allies.  
From 2007-2014, the Taliban entered their fourth phase, which was considered the 
national insurgency. Their main goal during this phase was to expand their influence past South 
and East Afghanistan. Taliban forces were still focused on fighting against international enemies 
and the new government, but they were overpowered by the Afghan government and their allies. 
Therefore, the Taliban spread their resources across Afghanistan and created a parallel 
administration (Semple 7). By spreading out their resources, the Taliban had better opportunities 
to control the parts of Afghanistan that up until now, were untouched by the Taliban’s influence. 
As the fighting against the U.S. occupiers continued, the Taliban tried to use propaganda to 
spread their message and rally the Muslim people against the United States. For example, the 
Taliban claimed that U.S. forces were engaging in cruel, oppressive behavior against Muslim 
civilians in both Afghanistan and the rest of the Middle East because of the new war on terror 
89 
 
(Semple 8). To the Taliban, if they were able to convince others that the United States was acting 
against all Muslims, they could convince them that the U.S. was against Islam in general. Then, 
the Taliban could try and get others to join in their fight to rid the Middle East and Afghanistan 
of these foreign invaders.  
Currently, the Taliban is in their 5th phase. This phase is about balance, a balance 
between fighting against local and foreign enemies. The Taliban is focusing more on the Kabul 
government than before, and they have started to use larger groups of fighters to take control of 
territory all over Afghanistan (Semple 7). Ideologically, the Taliban claim they are fighting not 
only foreign forces, but the ‘puppet’ regime planted by these forces. This is the regime currently 
ruling Afghanistan as well as any of their collaborators. They have also claimed that those in the 
Taliban are the only true members of the mujahedeen and the only true ones engaging in jihad. 
To enforce this, the Taliban state that any of the other groups or leaders that were around during 
the Soviet occupation in the 90’s allowed the U.S. occupation in 2001 (Semple 8). This is simply 
the Taliban claiming that any of their actions as reasonable and justifiable, while disregarding the 
legitimacy of any other Islamic group who may pose a threat to their rule.  
What do these phases mean to the United States? The U.S. has seen that the Taliban was 
focused purely on Afghanistan soil until the invasion in 2001. It was then that focus shifted 
towards attacking foreign forces. The more time that has passed since this invasion, the more the 
Taliban seems to be focusing on the local Kabul government and how to overtake them. 
Therefore, in relation to the current phase the Taliban is in, U.S. counterterrorism needs to 
diplomatically work with the Kabul government without physically putting boots on the ground 
in Afghanistan. If the U.S. can increasingly and covertly work with the Kabul government by 
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strengthening their control and individual leadership abilities, the Taliban may feel less 
threatened by the United States because troops aren’t physically present. If the lack of American 
troops triggers the Taliban to directly attack Afghan troops, the U.S. can be ready to deploy 
forces once the situation calls for defensive measures. 
 
 Organization and Leadership Structure  
 
Since the Taliban arose from the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, the logical choice of 
their first leader would be a member of the mujahedeen involved in the resistance movement. 
This leader was Mullah Mohammed Omar, who naturally was also accredited to founding the 
Taliban. He referred to himself as amir al-mu’minin, which means commander of the faithful 
(Laub). During his rule, he was the leader who was involved with giving Al Qaeda refuge from 
Pakistan. This refuge is what first forged a relationship between the Taliban and Al Qaeda, two 
Islamic Fundamentalist groups with different protocols and belief systems. This refuge was 
given to Al Qaeda as long as Al Qaeda did not anger the United States. The relationship between 
the two groups became strained, however, when Bin Laden coordinated the attacks on the U.S. 
embassies in East Africa. Although this deal was cut short after these 1998 bombings, Omar was 
still the leader of the Taliban during the 9/11 attacks. The U.S. demanded that Omar tell them 
information on the whereabouts of Osama Bin Laden after the attacks. Omar refused to cater to 
the United States wishes. The U.S. proceeded to announce that Omar was wanted by the United 
States and they placed a bounty of 10 million dollars for his capture. This shows that although Al 
Qaeda didn’t follow the terms of the deal, the Taliban was still willing to protect them, even with 
the anger of the United States. 14 years later, the Taliban announced that their first leader and 
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founder had passed away, although there are reports that indicate he actually passed away year’s 
earlier (“The Taliban”). The conflicting reports for his death shows that even announcements 
directly from the Taliban must be taken with skepticism.  
The confliction around Mullah Omar’s death shows how difficult it is to culminate 
accurate information about the previous Emir of Afghanistan. However, there are some sources 
that provide a look into the early life of Omar and how he came to be the leader of the Taliban. 
Omar was born around 1959, however the exact year is unknown. He grew up in a poor family 
and his parents were Pashtun peasants. Since he grew up in less than desirable conditions, he was 
of low social status and not well-known in his tribe (Rashid 23). This is compared to Osama Bin 
Laden, who was raised in a notable and wealthy business family. When the Soviets invaded 
Afghanistan, he and his family moved to Tarinkot, which is in the Urozgan Province of 
Afghanistan. Due to this location, it was almost completely untouched by the Soviets and the 
evolving war. The lack of Soviet presence also also made it a backwards environment. It was 
there that his father died, which meant he was now in charge of taking care of his family (Rashid 
24). The struggles Omar faced early on and the environment he grew up in makes it easy to see 
why Omar could have started developing more extremist views. The anger he felt because of the 
conditions he was forced into, especially because of the Soviet invasion, could have contributed 
to why he joined Hizb-e-Islami. This is an insurgency group in Afghanistan that originally 
fought against the Soviets. Omar also had a rather untraditional education. At one point, he 
moved to Singesar village in the Meand district of the Kandahar province. It was there that he 
headed a madrassa, became the village mullah, and began his own religious studies (Rashid 24). 
Mullah Omar was born into less than desirable conditions. He was the son of peasants with no 
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social standing, lacked a proper education, was forced into the role of caretaker for his family, 
and grew up in a backwards environment. It can be assumed that the combination of these factors 
plus his religious studies contributed to his decisions to join insurgent groups and eventually lead 
the Taliban 
The relationship between Al Qaeda and the Taliban offers insight into how the United 
States should approach counterterrorism directed at the Taliban. The most influential thing in 
counterterrorism policies involving the relationship between these two groups is to be wary and 
cautious. Even though Bin Laden went against his deal with Mullah Omar and attacked the 
United States in which he lost his opportunity of refuge, Mullah Omar was still unwilling to 
cooperate with the United States. Omar was unwilling to share information about Bin Laden’s 
location and he risked his own life knowing he would become a wanted man. The underlying 
reason for him refusing to cooperate with the United States could be for two reasons. One, he 
wanted to protect a follow Islamic Fundamentalist, especially one he had collaborated with in the 
past. Another, possibly more threatening reason, is that no matter who they are protecting and 
what their current relationship is, the Taliban is willing to help any organization/individual who 
is against and willing to attack the U.S. Either way, it would be very difficult to try and put a 
wedge into Taliban-Al Qaeda relations or try to get the Taliban to cooperate with the U.S. at the 
expense of another Islamic Fundamentalist group. 
However, before Mullah Omar’s death, he helped establish the main organizational 
structure of the Taliban’s leadership. After resistance in 2001 from the Northern Alliance and the 
United States in Northern Africa, which was where the Taliban was originally located, Omar and 
top leadership fled to Pakistan (Laub). This is where the ‘Quetta Shura’ was established, which is 
93 
 
still the leadership structure apparent today. The Quetta Shura derives from the capital of the 
Balochistan province in Pakistan. The capital is named Quetta and is where the Taliban is 
currently based. The Quetta Shura is comprised of the top leaders of the Taliban and provides 
central leadership to the entire Taliban organization. (“The Taliban”) The central leadership 
provided by the Quetta Shura means there is a direct target for attacks, whether it is through 
detention or drone strikes. It also means there is a direct liaison for the United States to utilize if 
they want to make contact with the Taliban. 
Like much of the information learned about terrorist organizations, much of the 
information on the organizational and leadership structure of the Taliban is comprised from press 
reports, discussions with US intelligence, and specific Taliban studies. This is compared to direct 
information gained from personal experiences or official Taliban sources. The Taliban is 
secretive in their private activities because they realize there are experts out there trying to 
dismantle their group from the inside out. The only information that comes directly from the 
Taliban is information they choose to release. This explains why it took two years to realize that 
their leader Mullah Omar had died. It was at that time that the Taliban decided it was in their best 
interest to release the information. Therefore, it is difficult to know exactly how the Taliban is 
organized. On a positive note, the basic structure of the Quetta Shura is known, and it provides 
counterterrorism experts a basic understanding of the chain of command of the Taliban. 
Besides the main leadership council, the Quetta Shura, the Taliban has 4 regional military 
councils and 10 committees. The Quetta Shura, as the council that contains the head leaders of 
the Taliban, controls these military councils and committees. The military councils are split 
based on the four major geographical areas of the Middle East that the Taliban controls. The 
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Quetta Regional Military Shura is the military council that controls the area where the Quetta 
Shura is located, which is southern and Western Afghanistan. The Peshawar Military Shura is in 
the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan and is focused on the eastern and northeastern part 
of Afghanistan. In North Waziristan, the Miramshah Regional Military Shura focuses on 
southeastern Afghanistan. The final military shura/council is the Gerdi Jangal Regional Military 
Shura, which is in Baluchistan, Pakistan. This shura is located in the Helmand Province and is 
part of the Nimroz province (Roggio). The valuable asset these four military councils provide for 
the overall Taliban organization is that they split up this group into four separate and different 
geographical locations. If one of these councils was attacked, the other three would remain 
intact. This means that counterterrorism must account for the fact that if one area of Pakistan or 
Afghanistan is attacked, the Taliban still has other options and sources of control. Therefore, all 
four military councils can work together to prevent attacks or mend themselves after an attack. 
Therefore, United States counterterrorism must also split their resources towards all four military 
councils in order to create a solid dent into Taliban’s Middle Eastern control.  
On top of the Quetta Shura and the four regional military shura’s, the Taliban leadership 
is composed of 10 committees. These committees focus on different issues any other normal 
organization would concentrate on. These committees are military, Uleme/religious, finance, 
political affairs, culture and information, interior affairs, prisoners and refugees, education, 
recruitment, and repatriation (Roggio). All of these committees mirror government organizations 
(like agencies and cabinets) that are established within the United States. This shows that the 
Taliban runs itself based on the structure of a legitimate organization. One unique way United 
States counterterrorism could attack Taliban committees is by utilizing these U.S. government 
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cabinets and federal agencies and having them come up with ways that their own operations 
could be disrupted. In other words, the different agencies within the U.S. would be working with 
the Department of Homeland Security and the State Department to come up with ways to attack 
the Taliban committees. For example, the U.S. Department of Education would help develop 
ways to attack the Taliban Education committee, while the U.S. Department of the Interior 
would focus on the Taliban’s Interior Affairs committee. This method would allow government 
officials who are trained in specific areas of government affairs to offer their input and provide a 
team effort to counterterrorism. 
 
Finances 
 
Since the Taliban has been in power since the early 1990’s, they have needed consistent 
and sufficient resources to fund their operation. The original instruments they used to commit 
violent acts was actually not purchased by themselves. In actuality, the Taliban was able to hold 
onto weapons that came directly from the United States. More specifically, they obtained 
weapons from CIA programs that were designed to help the mujahedeen fighters attack the 
Soviets during their occupation of Afghanistan. As stated before, the mujahedeen are the same 
fighters that formed the Taliban originally (“The Taliban”). One of these weapons in particular 
was the shoulder-fired Stinger. Shoulder-fired Stingers are missiles that target low-flying 
aircrafts. In the 1980’s, these Stingers were given to different resistance groups in order to allow 
local groups to stop the Soviet Union in the Middle East, especially in Afghanistan. Once the 
Soviet Union retreated and left the Middle East, the United States was unable to retrieve these 
missiles. This inability allowed the missiles to remain in the hands of a future threat against the 
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U.S. The Taliban saw the value of these missiles and rejected any monetary offers for their 
return. They knew that having these missiles in their arsenal was an invaluable asset to any 
future plans (Fitchett and Intl. Herald Tribune). The increased security after 9/11 has prevented 
the Taliban from being able to use these missiles in Western airports. However, the pure 
knowledge that they have deadly weapon capabilities is a threat in itself.  
 The Stingers incident has counterterrorism implications, since history can and does repeat 
itself. Learning from this transaction, the United States needs to be cautious in every single arms 
deal they have with groups from other countries. Even though the United States was working 
closely with the Inter-Services Intelligence, which is the top intelligence agency of Pakistan, the 
U.S. government must do their own research on who they are supplying weaponry to (Fitchett 
and Intl. Herald Tribune). Or, the United States can simply avoid dealing arms with any other 
individual group, in order to avoid providing weapons to groups that may one day become a 
threat to the United States. Since the Stingers have not been a threat to the United States recently, 
especially since the new security measures post 9/11, they should be watched, but they are not a 
number one concern for counterterrorist experts dealing with the Taliban. 
Ignoring the cash reward for the return of the Stingers means that the Taliban has been 
able to find other methods to secure their finances and buy additional resources. The Taliban’s 
main source of revenue has been the drug trade and the production of poppies for opium. The 
opium trade thrives in the Afghanistan region, the same region that the Taliban encompasses. 
The opium trade not only helps the Taliban stay powerful both resourcefully and financially, but 
it also corrupts the Afghan government and their police. This corruption adds to the 
destabilization of the state. Taliban leaders perform various roles among the chain of command 
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in this drug trade. Some simply collect extortion money and charge protection fees. Others, 
however, have extended their involvement to include running heroin refineries, kidnapping, and 
smuggling.  
The United States Institute of Peace claims that it is “no longer possible to treat the 
insurgency and the drug trade as separate matters, to be handled by military and law 
enforcement” (Peters 1). The most obvious way for counterterrorism policies to approach this 
situation is to attack the drug trade head on. If the drug trade falls apart, the Taliban will lose one 
of their key sources of income and some stabilization will return to the region. This approach 
isn’t without issues, unfortunately. Many smuggling rings for opium are run by families that are 
less likely to open their doors to strangers, making it hard to infiltrate from the inside out. Since 
involvement in this drug trade is based on a yearning for profit, the United States cannot cater to 
ones’ religious beliefs to hopefully change their behavior. Afghanistan has not only been torn 
apart from the United States’ invasion but also by this drug trade. Hopefully, if the United States 
can combine their resources with Afghanistan’s home forces, the drug trade can be attacked head 
on and they can undo some damage caused by the 2001 invasion. A coalition force also promotes 
unity and togetherness, two things that have been lacking between the United States and their 
Middle Eastern allies. These combined sources also need to turn their attention towards the non-
criminal Afghan people living in these drug ridden communities. Their support in defeating the 
insurgents could mean insider help for counterterrorism. If the Afghan people are turning their 
backs on the neighboring Taliban members by boycotting opium, the drug trade may diminish 
and provide less of an incentive for the Taliban to continue production.  
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The report from the United States Institute of Peace lays out exact counterterrorist 
options the United States could employ to target the opium trade, even with the problems that 
already have been addressed. First, NATO can include counternarcotic personnel on their 
military missions. This would allow them to investigate and collect evidence that could lead to 
information and potential locations and be used in trials as proof of involvement. Another tactic 
(which mirrors regular police tactics in the United States) is to set up checkpoints. These 
checkpoints would allow troops to seize drugs found on the highway. Another way is for the 
U.S. to specifically target opium convoys. They can be spotted from the air, which means that 
conveys could be found even if they don’t travel on the highway. The U.S. could also target the 
opium chemists themselves (Peters 34). Although these chemists have a behind the scenes role in 
the opium drug trade, they still are contributing to the production of opium and engaging in 
illegal activities. By targeting them, the U.S. can cut off the opium from its point of origin, the 
drug labs themselves.  
All of these drug counterterrorism tactics have ways to be thwarted. That is why the 
United States and NATO needs to employ a multitude of these tactics and create a 
comprehensive and exhaustive opium trade counterterrorism plan. That way, if the drug 
smugglers/Taliban insurgents find a way around one strategy, there are countless other strategies 
already in place. For example, checkpoints can be avoided by not taking the highway, avoiding 
manned roadways, or by delivering certain materials on foot. In this instance, the U.S. is already 
employing tactics to target opium conveys that do not take the main roads through air 
surveillance. Either way, the opium and the smugglers are stopped. Many of these rely on direct 
cooperation with counternarcotic personnel. This means that United States counterterrorism 
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should increase their staffing and training for counternarcotics if they want to increase their 
chances on ending the opium trade for the Taliban (as well as other drug trades other Islamic 
Fundamentalist groups are involved in). 
Although the main study on the Taliban’s involvement in the opium trade was published 
in 2009, there is still evidence that the Taliban is still highly reliant on opium production. In 
2016, the New York Times reported on the opium harvest for the current year. Current harvesters 
have commented on the increase in production yields in 2016 thus far. For example, Abdul 
Rahim Mutmain is a farmer in a district called Musa Qala, which is under the control of the 
Taliban. The opium from his harvests will be controlled by the Taliban as they oversee their own 
land. Some of the harvesters themselves are also members of the Taliban (Shah and Mashal) 
The Taliban’s current fighting tactics are also centered on the opium harvest, which 
provides more of an incentive to directly intervene into their drug trade. The Helmand Province 
is the area in Afghanistan that the Taliban receives a majority of their opium profits. Helmand 
Province is also the largest in territory and poppy cultivation, so it provides a backdrop to many 
Taliban insurgencies and fighting. In the winter, when harvests are at a low point because of 
weather and field conditions, fighting between the Taliban and Afghan forces is at a high. 
America even had to send forces during February 2016 in order to offer military support to 
Afghan forces. Once the weather starts to warm up and the winter season ends, opium harvesting 
begins. Therefore, in March and early April, fighting slows down in the Helmand Province so the 
Taliban can focus on poppy seed cultivation. Instead of fighting, Taliban members become day 
laborers. Therefore, much of the trading process is in the hands of Taliban’s own members 
instead of outsourced farmers. The Taliban also collects an opium tax from the local population 
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as well as a portion of the ushr which comes from a tax on farm produce. The Taliban also takes 
this time to recruit men with the lure of these vast poppy fields and the opportunity to make 
money. The Taliban decides to, “Recruit from the pool of 15,000 laborers, mostly jobless young 
people, who arrived in Helmand for the harvest season” (Shah and Mashal). These recruited 
harvesters have now been influenced by the Taliban, not just because of their beliefs, but because 
of their financial opportunities. These recruited harvesters are now also working in the fields 
with the Taliban members who have put down their weapons to help with the harvest. This 
provides an atmosphere to not only field together, but to discuss Taliban ideology and tactics. 
These conversations could possibly convince these once harvesters to become fighters when the 
season ends.   
This slow season provides the United States and their Afghan allies an opportunity to 
formulate an attack strategy at a time when Taliban focus is on drug trading and not on fighting. 
If the U.S. initiates and attacks Taliban headquarters during harvest season, there may be less of 
a threat for retaliation. Or, if there is retaliation, the United States could focus on dismantling the 
drug trade because the focus would be back to the military, not narcotics. It would be unwise to 
first directly attack the poppy fields because the Taliban is focused on the harvest. If an attack on 
the poppy fields and the drug trade is successful, the Taliban’s finances for the upcoming year 
may become in danger. This would create a snowball effect, as the Taliban will have less 
resources for their military and for planning attacks. Another basic plan the United States should 
take when targeting the opium trade is to attack fields during the winter, when the Taliban’s 
focus in on fighting and not on their fields. If the fields are attacked any other month, the Taliban 
may have time to relocate or rebuild any damaged fields. 
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Besides their revenue from the drug trade, the Taliban also secures money from illegal 
timber trading, extortion, and mining (“The Taliban”). Like Al Qaeda, the Taliban also gets 
contributions from Islamic charities in the Persian Gulf region and Pakistan. Even though the 
Taliban has these other means of acquiring funds, the opium trade is their major source. 
Therefore, counterterrorism policies should focus on the drug trade and poppy fields in order to 
do the most damage to the organization. That doesn’t mean that counterterrorism efforts should 
completely ignore these other sources, they are just lower priorities. 
 
Targets and Tactics 
 
The Taliban has used both ideological-based and physical tactics in order to promote 
jihad and attack their enemies. The more ideological-based tactics are employed to get into the 
minds of their followers. This allowed the Taliban to be able to control their thoughts and 
actions. Physical tactics were used not only to punish those who broke Sharia law, but to attack 
their enemies and nonbelievers. This combination of tactics has allowed the Taliban to remain 
relevant throughout their time as an Islamic Fundamentalist group. They have been able to 
employ various methods to help them maintain a steady following, recruit members, and initiate 
violent attacks. The main ideological tactic of the Taliban is their strict imposition of Sharia law, 
which is the body of Islamic law. These laws state how public and some private life is governed 
and regulated. The Taliban has taken these laws and turned them into a tool in their war. An 
example of a law enforced by the Taliban is the banning of all forms of entertainment, like 
sports, games, and music. Women are also strictly limited in the roles they can perform in 
Taliban society. Since formal schooling was limited for girls, women are not able to get a proper 
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education. They are also banned from working, wearing makeup, and are forced to cover up their 
faces with a hijab (Soherwordi et al 347). This interpretation and implementation of Sharia law 
allows the Taliban leaders to control their followers, control their women, and overall promote a 
sense of unity within their organization. The ideological tactics the Taliban uses is aimed at those 
already involved with the Taliban organization. They are used to keep everyone in line and under 
the control of Taliban ideology.  
 Unlike their ideological tactics, the Taliban does not have any distinguishing tactics they 
utilize against their targets. This is why the focus should be on the mind-games the Taliban plays 
with their members. The physical tactics the Taliban utilizes is usually when violence comes into 
play. This violence is oftentimes targeted at their enemies, compared to the ideological-based 
tactics that are targeted at their existing members. These forms of violence include placing 
explosives in public and suicide bombing. The Taliban also uses civilians as decoys in order to 
drive enemy forces into a specific area. Once in that area, the Taliban explodes a certain device 
or physically attacks them. They have also used improvised explosive devices and have even 
placed them in schools (“The Taliban”). 
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V. Conclusion 
 
Throughout this thesis, there has been pieces of counterterrorism policies and 
implications among the descriptions of each characteristic in an individual case study. Now, the 
bits and pieces of these counterterrorism suggestions will come together to form three overall, 
comprehensive counterterrorism policies. These three policies will be individualized according 
to each case study, meaning there will be a separate policy for Al Qaeda, ISIS, and the Taliban. 
These policies will also be formed according to the 4 characteristics that were discussed in each 
case study. These were history and ideology, organizational and leadership structure, finances, 
and tactics and targets. Since each case study was unique in their characteristics, it is necessary 
to form different policies, as counterterrorism needs to target certain aspects of each Islamic 
Fundamentalist group. The following table is a visual representation of the three case studies 
discussed and the 4 characteristics defined within each case study. Following this table is an 
explanation of each of these characteristics and how they impact counterterrorism. 
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Table 1: Table of Characteristics 
 
 
 History and Ideology Organizational and 
Leadership Structure 
Finances Tactics and Targets 
Al Qaeda  Reevaluation of 9/11 
policies 
 Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan 
 Syrian Civil War 
 Current focus on Africa 
 Justifications of 
Violence b/c of 
perceived wrongdoings 
 Decentralized 
organization (AQC 
and affiliates) 
 AQC- ideology and 
strategy 
 Affiliates- day to day 
operations 
 Cell-based structure 
 Emir Ayman al-
Zawahiri and media 
presence 
 Bin Laden’s death 
 Financial 
facilitators  
funneling 
money from 
donors to Al 
Qaeda 
 Corrupt 
charities and 
churches 
 Courier system  
 Targeting of civilians 
using radical 
justifications 
 Increased media 
presence 
 
 
ISIS  ’03 U.S. Invasion of 
Iraq and the swift 
implementation of a 
democratic interim 
Iraqi government 
 AQI and their 
relationship with Al 
Qaeda 
 ISI and state of crisis 
 The Islamic State’s 
extremist ideology  
 Centralized 
organization  
 First and Second 
echelon structures 
 Abu Bark al-
Baghdadi and his 
capture by the U.S. in 
‘04 
 Payment of 
members 
 Oil and control 
of fields and 
refineries 
 Tanker trucks 
and business 
with other 
countries 
 Financial 
institutions ISIS 
uses 
 JTJ against American 
forces 
 Suicide bombings 
 AQI- similar targets 
like coalition forces 
 IED’s 
 ISIS- Iraqi security 
forces and Syrian Civil 
War 
 Sleeper cells  
 Kidnapping and 
ransoms 
 Videos of beheadings   
The 
Taliban 
 Pashtun majority 
 U.S. invasion of 
Afghanistan 
 Vice-President Abdul 
Rashid Dostum   
 Current focus on Kabul 
government 
 Protection of Al 
Qaeda by leader 
Mullah Mohammed 
Omar 
 Centralized 
organization and the 
Quetta Shura 
 Military councils 
 10 committees 
 Stingers 
 Opium trade 
 Fighting and 
harvesting 
patterns 
 Ideological tactics  
 Strict imposition of 
Sharia law 
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Al Qaeda Counterterrorism 
 
Al Qaeda is responsible for launching the United States into a War on Terror in the 
Middle East after the September 11th attacks in 2001. While occupying foreign countries abroad 
and offensively attacking enemies using military force, the United States was also overhauling 
their entire defensive counterterrorism efforts. This included the creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security and increased transportation security. Although in relation to the entire 
history of the United States federal government, 15 years seems like a short time period and it 
seems plausible that the counterterrorism changes made in 2001 should still be applicable today, 
that is not the case. Al Qaeda (as well as every other Islamic Fundamentalist group) is constantly 
changing, developing, and adapting to new counterterrorism tactics. Therefore, it is necessarily 
to reevaluate and improve on policies that were put into place 15 years ago, especially those that 
were directed at Al Qaeda. New groups like ISIS have also entered the terrorism arena, and the 
original Homeland Security policies were created before they were even a threat. 
Al Qaeda’s history offered insight into how the organization has transformed and grown. 
Their history and development of ideology effects counterterrorism because experts can see what 
Al Qaeda’s reactions have been to certain counterterrorism efforts directed by the United States. 
The first instance of this was when the United States allied with the Saudi regime in the late 
1980’s and the early 1990’s in the fight against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This alliance 
angered Al Qaeda, because they believed that the United States was against the ideals of the 
jihadist movement (Watts). The United States involving themselves in Middle Eastern affairs 
meant they would be spreading their Westernized beliefs to Islam. This was the time when Al 
Qaeda first attacked the United States in the attempted bombing of American soldiers in the al 
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Gidor hotel in Yemen (Watts). This shows that every time an offensive counterterrorism policy 
is enacted that involves direct contact with Middle Eastern countries, there needs to be defensive 
counterterrorism efforts against Al Qaeda already in place. This is because history shows that 
when Al Qaeda feels directly threatened, they will fight back. History also shows that Al Qaeda 
has been able to survive even the direst conditions because of the refuge surrounding countries 
have offered them. This includes Afghanistan and Pakistan. The United States needs to work on 
relations with Middle Eastern governments to help them create effective penalties and deterrence 
measures to prevent Al Qaeda from being able to take refuge in these countries. If the country 
successfully implements these policies, the United States can offer certain military or 
trading/economic incentives in return. Terrorism prevention is not the time to be greedy. If the 
country doesn’t attempt to implement these policies, the United States can restrict these same 
incentives or take away existing assistance the U.S. currently provides. This is harder to do if the 
United States has a strained relationship with the country at the time, but if the relationship is 
positive, this diplomatic approach can work.  
Al Qaeda managed to stay intact after the increased security of 9/11 and the loss of 
several key leaders. One of the main reasons was the development of strong affiliates like AQI 
and AQAP (Watts). Generally speaking, this means that the United States cannot just focus on 
Al Qaeda Central and hope that the entire Al Qaeda network will collapse. Any relevant affiliates 
need to be looked at as their own terrorist organization, an organization that happens to have ties 
to Al Qaeda. This means that each affiliate must be individually targeted. If another affiliate 
collapses due to the policies directed at Al Qaeda Central or another affiliate, then two birds 
were killed with one stone. If this does not happen, the United States must be ready to investigate 
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the weaknesses of each affiliate that poses a threat to the United States. The rise of affiliates is 
partially due to their increased ability to raise their own funds. This means that the United States 
should not focus on the financing of Al Qaeda Central as much as they should focus on the 
funding of individual affiliates. Financing of AQC is not one of the more important 
characteristics that counterterrorism policies should focus on currently.  
Knowing where Al Qaeda stands in the present day is another reason Al Qaeda’s history 
affects counterterrorism implications. Al Qaeda’s future can be determined by the outcome of the 
ongoing Syrian Civil War. This is why Al Qaeda 3.0 needs to be the main focus of continuous 
counterterrorism policies. The United States should assist the Middle East and rebel groups like 
Rojava in ensuring that the Syrian Interim Government is placed into power. The U.S. must stay 
weary, however, because this direct interference with Middle Eastern policies will cause Al 
Qaeda to retaliate like they have in the past. Since Al Qaeda’s focus in currently on local battles 
and not entirely on the United States, the U.S. should take this time to build up defensive 
measures. This is because offensive attacks from Al Qaeda are inevitable the more the U.S. 
interferes with Syrian politics. This shift in focus also means that the United States can direct 
their offensive efforts towards other terrorist threats. Al Qaeda 3.0 is also focusing more on 
spreading their influence to Africa (Watts). This means that the United States should start or 
continue communicating with African governments on how to prevent further terrorist 
involvement on African soil. An example could be Africa allowing the United States more bases 
in certain countries, which would security measures. Another example would be the United 
States sending more foreign diplomats who are trained in counterterrorism policies over to 
African countries. There, they can assist with formulating new plans.  
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Ideological developments also offer counterterrorism options towards Al Qaeda. 
According to Riedel, Al Qaeda doesn’t commit violence against the United States because of 
their hatred of Western culture. In actuality, Al Qaeda believes violence and hatred is justified 
because of incidents where America aided in the decline of Islam and the Muslim Community 
(Riedel 24). This means that the U.S. does not need to focus on limiting Westernized culture in 
the Middle East if they want to stop Al Qaeda ideologically. Instead, the U.S. needs to address 
their supposed ‘wrongdoings’ in the Middle East and try to find ways to respect and honor Islam. 
An increased effort on America’s part to appreciate Muslim culture and show Al Qaeda that they 
understand and honor Islam is needed. The difficulty with this approach is that Al Qaeda’s views 
on Islam are skewed. Therefore, it will be rather hard to try to convince Al Qaeda that the U.S. 
aligns with their extremist viewpoints. The major effect ideology has on counterterrorism 
policies is how it effects traditional and moderate Muslims. Any policy the United States 
implements cannot be discriminatory towards all Muslims. Jihadists are the minority. If moderate 
and traditional Muslims feel alienated based of a policy, they may begin to support the rhetoric 
of terrorist groups like Al Qaeda. Therefore, the United States must focus on the characteristics 
of Islamic Fundamentalists, not Muslims. 
Al Qaeda’s extremist views and skewed justifications of violence make it difficult to try 
and prevent Al Qaeda from committing any type of violent attacks. Since ideological means may 
not be the most effective way to counter terrorism, looking at Al Qaeda’s organizational and 
leadership structure may be more suitable. The responsibilities of Al Qaeda are split between Al 
Qaeda Central and Al Qaeda’s affiliates (Zimmerman 15). In order to attack Al Qaeda Central, 
who focuses on ideology and strategy, the U.S. must understand Al Qaeda’s underlying 
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grievances. On the other hand, in order to attack the affiliates, the U.S. must counter the day to 
day operations of each affiliate. The cell-based structure of Al Qaeda is one of the more unique 
characteristics of Al Qaeda. Different cells (in this case, affiliates and associates) are 
independent of one another, but still rely on Al Qaeda Central for direction. Since they are 
independent, if one cell is destroyed or targeted, another cell is thriving and safe from threats. 
Therefore, the United States must focus on each and every affiliate of Al Qaeda. Priority can 
shift depending on recent activity, but no affiliate or associate can be ignored. The cell that is 
ignored will be the cell that rises up and has the chance to gather resources and support. One way 
that United States can do this is by creating a few small task forces within the Department of 
Homeland Security that not only focuses on Al Qaeda, but each affiliate as well.  
Leadership wise, the emir of Al Qaeda al Zawahiri continues to embrace the media as a 
platform for his messages (“Profile: Ayman al-Zawahiri”). A way to prevent homegrown 
terrorism or American sympathizers is to try and restrict these messages from being viewed in 
the U.S. There is always a balance between freedom and safety in the United States. Censoring 
certain messages may fringe on 1st Amendment rights, but it could also prevent future terrorist 
attacks. The major implication the leadership structure of Al Qaeda has on counterterrorism is 
how their cell-based structure affects leadership. Al Qaeda Central contains the core leadership 
and the general emir (currently al Zawahiri). If a leader is killed from AQC, there are still leaders 
alive in Al Qaeda affiliates. These leaders are still able to smoothly run their operations because 
they are self-sufficient from Al Qaeda Central. This is why Osama Bin Laden’s death didn’t 
completely destroy Al Qaeda. The United States must focus on targeting leaders of Al Qaeda 
affiliates. These leaders are the ones organizing attacks and ensuring Al Qaeda doesn’t fall apart. 
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A death in central leadership means a short lapse in media presence and weaker ideological 
messages. These losses are easier to account for than a loss in the logistics of affiliate leadership. 
Another strong indicator of counterterrorism is Al Qaeda’s finances. This is also another 
characteristic that separates Al Qaeda from other Islamic Fundamentalist groups. Unlike the 
Taliban, for example, whose main source of revenue is through the drug trade, Al Qaeda secures 
their funds through financial facilitators. Therefore, counterterrorism must find a way to take out 
the ‘middle-men’ in this funneling of money. If these financial facilitators are removed, Al 
Qaeda might not be able to get funds directly from donors. The U.S. has already shown that this 
tactic works, since big name facilitators have been arrested and there seems to have been a 
decrease in Al Qaeda’s funds (Roth et al 21). Besides financial facilitators, corrupt churches and 
charities need to be identified and shut down, whether they have a direct link to Al Qaeda or not. 
Another way to stop Al Qaeda from storing money is to inform banks of certain ways to ‘flag’ or 
inquire about certain suspicious accounts. If money is being deposited from multiple sources 
who usually deposit large sums of money at one time, this may be a sign that the money is part 
of the Al Qaeda network.  
The courier system Al Qaeda uses to move funds from place to place is another way to 
attack Al Qaeda’s finances. Couriers are recruited from within the ranks of the organization, 
meaning they are individuals who have proven worthy of Al Qaeda’s trust. If these couriers are 
captured or killed, it can be difficult for Al Qaeda to replace them. If they are captured, U.S. 
intelligence may be able to learn the intricate system of moving Al Qaeda’s illegal money. The 
couriers also move money physically from one place to another. This provides the perfect 
scenario to attack. Local law enforcement needs to be involved with profiling tactics that help 
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narrow down potential couriers. This would be dependent on their movement patterns and how 
they engage with others. Overall, the U.S. must focus on following the money trial of Al Qaeda, 
their means of transporting funds, and what they spend their money on. The U.S. must also 
remember that affiliates tend to finance themselves, and further research must be done on how 
each affiliate raises their own funds. This is also another characteristic that separates Al Qaeda 
from other Islamic Fundamentalist groups. Unlike the Taliban, for example, whose main source 
of revenue is through the drug trade, Al Qaeda secures their funds through financial facilitators. 
Therefore, counterterrorism must find a way to take out the ‘middle-men’ in this funneling of 
money. If these financial facilitators are removed, Al Qaeda might not be able to get funds 
directly from donors. The U.S. has already shown that this tactic works, since big name 
facilitators have been arrested and there seems to have been a decrease in Al Qaeda’s funds 
(Roth et al 21). Besides financial facilitators, corrupt churches and charities need to be identified 
and shut down, whether they have a direct link to Al Qaeda or not. Another way to stop Al 
Qaeda from storing money is to inform banks of certain ways to ‘flag’ or inquire about certain 
suspicious accounts. If money is being deposited from multiple sources who usually deposit 
large sums of money at one time, this may be a sign that the money is part of the Al Qaeda 
network.  
The targets and tactics of Al Qaeda is the final characteristic that was researched that 
should be factored into counterterrorism policies. Al Qaeda targets not only militants, but 
civilians as well. One of the reasons Al Qaeda justifies targeting civilians is because they believe 
America has targeted Muslim civilians (Wiktorowicz and Kaltner 87). Therefore, America needs 
to focus their efforts on minimizing the amount of Muslim civilians affected by any intervention 
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by the United States. This includes drone strikes and any military campaign. According to Fang, 
drone strikes are not accurate forms of military weapons (Fang). It isn’t sensible to risk the lives 
of Muslim civilians for the remote chance of killing a few Al Qaeda members, especially 
because this propels Al Qaeda to attack the U.S. further. Besides this justification, it is difficult 
for the U.S. to counter many of the reasons Al Qaeda has for killing civilians. Al Qaeda can 
always find a way to accuse an individual of helping their enemies in the fight against Islam. A 
political science student could be an enemy of Islam because they are an academic student 
researching counterterrorism. Students, regardless of major, can be enemies of Islam because 
they are engaging in Westernized education or are practicing other religions. These obscure 
justifications are why the targets (in this case civilians) of Al Qaeda is not the strongest 
characteristic that should be utilized when formulating counterterrorism policies.  
Instead of focusing on the targets of Al Qaeda, the tactics offer more effective 
counterterrorism implications. A major tactic utilized by Al Qaeda is the media, and the United 
States can use Al Qaeda’s media presence against them. When Al Qaeda releases a press release 
after a certain attack or to try and spread a certain message, the United States must release 
statements in direct response to them. In order to reach Muslim listeners, the U.S. can encourage 
Islamic officials to speak on their behalf. These officials can both denounce the violent actions of 
Al Qaeda and promote their relations with the United States. One thing the U.S. cannot do is 
ignore these press releases. The media holds enough of a threat that any broad communication by 
Al Qaeda needs to be taken seriously. If messages by Al Qaeda are targeted towards the 
American public, the U.S. must counteract these messages. The American public must stay 
educated about the dangerous language Al Qaeda uses to try and manipulate listeners. 
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Each characteristic discussed provided a piece of what the United States’ 
counterterrorism policy should be for Al Qaeda. This policy must be an entirely separate plan 
than the ones for ISIS, the Taliban, and any other terrorist organization. The organizational 
structure of Al Qaeda offers one of the more unique characteristics of this Islamic 
Fundamentalist group, and there needs to be a renewed focus on the smaller cells associated to 
Al Qaeda.  
 
ISIS Counterterrorism 
 
ISIS offers a unique insight into counterterrorism because the group is new, innovative, 
and merciless. Their violence is portrayed by the media as deadly and their personnel as cunning, 
which is why counterterrorism efforts must keep the overall image of the group in mind. The 
history section of this case study is an important characteristic of ISIS because it allows experts 
to see what previous counterterrorism actions by the United States were effective and which 
actions were detrimental. The history of ISIS, as far back as the invasion of Iraq by the United 
States in 2003, offers counterterrorism implications. One of ISIS’s first influential leaders, the 
leader of JTJ Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, created forces in Afghanistan. When the U.S. invaded 
Afghanistan, al-Zarqawi moved his forces to Iraq. It was in Iraq where JTJ began to form as a 
resistance to the U.S. established interim Iraqi government (Hashim). This shows how Iraq was 
one of the major parts of ISIS’s foundation, and why relations with Iraq are priority. However, 
the resistance originally occurred when the U.S. helped create an interim government in Iraq that 
was built on democratic values. These values were much different than previous governments. 
This change was swift and inevitable after the U.S. entered the Middle East. When an entire way 
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of life is interrupted, whether the change is positive or negative, resistance to change is bound to 
occur. This resistance was also seen during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980’s, 
where the first pieces of modern Islamic Fundamentalism is apparent. The Soviet’s invaded to 
try and recreate the Afghan way of life. The Afghani’s revolted, creating Al Qaeda and the 
Taliban in the process.  
Therefore, in order to learn from the mistakes of the past, if the U.S. wants to directly 
change the structure of a government, a slow implementation may be the best approach. The U.S. 
could continuously work with the government to change certain policies and remove corrupt 
leaders, eventually becoming a democracy. The possible effectiveness of this approach is based 
on the failure that occurred the first time the U.S. tried to established a new Iraqi government. 
JTJ (and eventually ISIS) was bred from the resistance of a U.S. established government. If the 
government had produced gradual change, younger and more impressionable generations of 
Iraqi’s could have accepted a change in government. This is one of the future precautions the 
U.S. should take when interfering in the affairs of a country, which will hopefully lead to 
effective preventative counterterrorism. Terrorism is bred from dissonance and struggle. If the 
population supports the government, there may be no reason to engage in violence in the first 
place. 
The beginning of ISIS isn’t the only part of their history that offers counterterrorism 
ramifications. Another point was in 2008, when the United States allied with Sunni’s and other 
Iraqi insurgents to fight the Islamic State of Iraq. ISI was another one of the predecessor groups 
of ISIS. When the U.S. created this alliance under the promises of economic stability, they were 
able to put ISI into a state of crisis. If ISI would have been stopped then and there, it is possible 
115 
 
ISIS would have never existed. However, this did not happen, and ISIS is still a threat to the 
United States. Therefore, a counterterrorist approach the United States can take is to recreate an 
alliance within Iraq to defeat ISIS. This alliance can be with Iraqi insurgents, Sunni or Shia 
tribes, Iraqi police, or other nontraditional forces. During this time is also when 80% of the 
leadership was killed (including their longtime leader al-Zarqawi). This also contributed to ISI’s 
state of crisis (Hashim). Unlike Al Qaeda, who has a decentralized organization and can survive 
the death of their leader, this major loss of leadership almost destroyed ISI. Therefore, the U.S. 
should target the leaders of ISIS as much as possible, as this could lead to the destruction of ISIS. 
Another note is the fact that Iraq was able to stabilize after ISI was weakened. This is when the 
United States began to pull out of Iraq and leave the American-trained Iraqi forces to maintain 
stability. This is another mistake the United States made. Once the U.S. pulled out, ISI was 
eventually able to rebound. The United States should continuously keep military presence in a 
country they helped recreate. A newly created military, regardless of how well-trained they were, 
was no match for the terrorist groups and insurgents that had been around for years. A continued 
United States presence can help the Iraqi military progressively improve their skills and become 
established in the delicate system of government.  
The current ideology of ISIS, more recently referred to as the Islamic State, is necessary 
to understand for counterterrorism because ideology lays the foundation for any organization. 
When the foundation of an organization is targeted, the potential destruction of ISIS is possible. 
ISIS focuses on few particular beliefs more than other Jihadi-Salafist or Islamic Fundamentalist 
groups (Hashim). The first is that ISIS must only associate themselves with other true Muslims. 
This belief effects counterterrorism because it will be very difficult for any intelligence to 
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infiltrate ISIS. If ISIS will not associate with anybody besides those who proclaim their loyalty 
to their version of Islam, it will be hard for United States intelligence to convincingly believe in 
that same belief system. Another ISIS belief is that they must rule in accordance to God’s law, 
otherwise known as sharia law. It will be impossible for the United States to try and please ISIS 
through this belief, as it would require the United States to change their Western way of 
governance. Overall, ISIS has a strict, extremist, and historic-based ideology. This means it is 
difficult for the United States to create counterterrorism policies in accordance to ISIS’s ideology 
because it is hard to compromise with individuals whose loyalty to their ideological beliefs is 
unwavering. ISIS’s ideology is all or nothing. Someone either believes in all of it or none of it. 
Therefore, any amount of compromise with ISIS will be ineffective, and other counterterrorism 
measures must be utilized depending on other characteristics. 
The organization and leadership structure of ISIS is different from that of other Islamic 
Fundamentalist groups like Al Qaeda. The vast differences in these structures proves why there 
needs to be counterterrorism policies per each terrorist organization. Then, the ISIS 
counterterrorist policy can reflect the uniqueness of the group and their leaders. Besides the al-
imara, ISIS is divided into first and second echelon structures. The first echelon structure is not 
only what al-Baghdadi and central leadership controls, it is also where the valuable councils are 
located. This includes the Military Council and the Security and Intelligence Council. The 
significance of these councils makes them a likely target of counterterrorism. The Security and 
Intelligence Council of ISIS is an especially prominent target because the destruction of this 
council would make ISIS vulnerable. For example, this council provides security to al-Baghdadi. 
Without this council, al-Baghdadi would be vulnerable to any attacks. This council also manages 
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communication between al-Baghdadi and the provinces. Since al-Baghdadi has direct control 
over his provinces, lack of communication means operations would cease. Most importantly, this 
council is the part of ISIS that provides counterintelligence to prevent enemy infiltration 
(Hashim). If this part of ISIS is strong, counterterrorism will be limited. Therefore, a new target 
of United States counterterrorism must be the leaders of the Security and Intelligence Council. 
By targeting this council, the United States can disrupt ISIS operations. It also gives the U.S. 
another target besides al-Baghdadi to eliminate.  
Unlike Al Qaeda, ISIS is a centralized and hierarchal organization (Hashim). This means 
that leaders like al-Baghdadi have direct control over the members of ISIS. This organizational 
structure presents a significant opportunity for counterterrorism. Since leaders have direct control 
of their members, if a leader (or members of one of the councils) is killed, regular members may 
not have the autonomy to plan and execute attacks themselves.  
Al-Baghdadi is the central figure of ISIS, as he is the leader of the organization. Al-
Baghdadi conceals his identity except to those in his inner circle of trusted leaders. He stays out 
of the spotlight and leads his group from behind the scenes. The makes any direct attacks against 
al-Baghdadi almost impossible, because if his identity is hidden, his location will be hidden as 
well. This also means that if the U.S. was to ever try and communicate with ISIS (which would 
already be difficult since they don’t involve themselves with anyone except believers of true 
Islam), they would have to converse with other leaders or to the group as a whole. If the U.S. 
wanted to take a diplomatic approach to eliminating ISIS, they would have to keep al-Baghdadi’s 
lack of presence and cooperation in mind. The fact that al-Baghdadi has a PhD also means that 
al-Baghdadi is educated (Glenn). Trying to ‘trick’ him into cooperating or trying to berate his 
118 
 
character will be difficult because he is formally schooled at the highest level. If al-Baghdadi 
cannot be killed, it is possible that a death in other central leadership can spell disaster for the 
group. Since ISIS is centralized, any loss of leadership will cause chaos in that area of the group, 
whether it be military, intelligence, media, or financing.   
The history and leadership of ISIS combines into this other counterterrorism policy. In 
February 2004, before he was the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), al-Baghdadi was 
captured by the United States. By that December, he was released because he was not a high 
value target (Arango and Schmitt). The future leader of ISIS was at one point in the U.S.’s 
custody and they let go of him. This was perhaps the release of one of the most dangerous 
terrorists to ever threaten the United States. In order to learn from their mistakes, the United 
States must be hesitant to release anybody even vaguely connected to ISIS. If they are released, 
they must be closely monitored and there must be conditions of their release, much like parole. 
ISI may have never overcame their period of crisis in 2008 if it wasn’t for al-Baghdadi’s 
leadership and restructuring ideas. This also again proves how vital superior leadership is for 
ISIS’s success. 
The finances of ISIS is another characteristic that can be used to develop case-specific 
counterterrorism policies. One major counterterrorism implication is based on what ISIS uses 
their finances for. ISIS pays their members through a system that is based on a fixed amount of 
money a year with additional money given per dependent (Shatz). This income, no matter how 
small, is sometimes the only income a family may have especially in this part of the Middle East. 
This payroll affects counterterrorism because members may not necessarily be involved with 
ISIS because they share the same beliefs or because they want to commit acts of violence. They 
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may be involved because it is their only way to support their family, which is much harder to 
deter members away from. One way the United States can prevent this is by addressing the 
financial issues members of ISIS face. If the U.S. can help stimulate the economies of Iraq and 
Syria, people may not need to find extreme sources of income like joining a Fundamentalist 
group.  
This counterterrorism policy, however, only stops people from joining an organization 
they otherwise wouldn’t be a part of. The leaves the vast amount of members who are involved 
because of their extremist beliefs or the power being in ISIS brings. In order to counter this 
group of people, the United States must stop funds from getting to ISIS in the first place. One of 
ISIS’s primary source of funds is oil, especially their control of a dozen oil fields and refineries 
(Shatz). With this control, ISIS is able to produce oil themselves and they do not have to rely on 
any ‘middle-men’ to run their operation. Once the oil is made, ISIS sells it to other Middle 
Eastern countries at a rate much lower than legitimate suppliers. The oil business ISIS is a part of 
creates many counterterrorism options. The first is through the transportation of oil. If the tanker 
trucks that are linked to ISIS are monitored, they could lead to ISIS members and the oil fields 
they control. One problem the U.S. faces is that these oil fields must not be destroyed. Even 
though they are controlled by ISIS, they actually stimulate the economy for everyone, ISIS 
members or not (Stergiou 202). The fact that the population relies on the oil trade means that the 
U.S. cannot simply damage ISIS’s oil fields. Instead, the U.S. must focus on the distribution of 
this oil instead. This is why the United States must stop other countries from knowingly 
purchasing oil from ISIS. Even though the prices of ISIS’s oil is discounted, there must be 
penalties in place for countries caught doing business with a known terrorist organization. These 
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penalties could include less trade with the United States or decreased involvement with 
worldwide organizations. If penalties are severe enough, countries will end their involvement 
with ISIS, which will hopefully decrease the demand for corrupt oil as well as ISIS’s revenue. To 
put this policy into action, there must be cooperation between the United States and the Middle 
East because these penalties should be agreed upon by all parties. Any policy, whether it is 
related to finances or not, should encourage a strong joint relationship between the United States 
and the Middle East.  
Oil control isn’t the only source of ISIS’s revenue. The United States must create policies 
that attack each avenue ISIS uses. For example, ISIS also has control of dams and gas plants. 
These infrastructures (as long as they are not vital to the well-being of the general public) should 
be specifically targeted by military strikes or raids. If they are vital to a few in the general 
population, the United States can individually help those who would be affected by the 
destruction of these dams or gas plants. There also needs to be a way to detect fraudulent 
foundations/charities on the Internet. If it is detected that an organization asking for money is not 
legitimate, there needs to be a public service announcement to stop any donations from going to 
that organization. The United States must also focus on the internal means of raising funds 
instead of external donors. External donors only provide a small portion of ISIS’s overall assets 
(Stergiou 202). Cohen has also formulated a counterterrorism plan to attack ISIS financially. 
First, he claims that ISIS’s access to revenue must be cut off. This means the U.S. must 
coordinate with Middle Eastern financial institutions (like banks) to try and identify potential 
facilitators of ISIS. Working with legitimate financial institutions will also make it easier to 
monitor the flow of resources out of ISIS territory. They can also record the influx of prices on 
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goods usually controlled by ISIS, like oil. With more reliable information, the U.S. may be able 
to find the best time to attack ISIS.  
Instead of just being monitored, the financial system ISIS uses can also be attacked 
directly. Over 100 banks and other financial institutions are in ISIS territory. If other 
international financial institutions, like other Middle Eastern banks, refuse to accept transfers or 
any type of interaction with these banks, ISIS will have to find other ways to internationally 
access their finances or move their money around. If banks did not comply and continued to do 
business with ISIS controlled banks, the U.S. should work with the country these banks are 
located in and shut them down. Even if they aren’t an ISIS bank themselves, they knowingly did 
business with an ISIS affiliate and need to be held accountable. Cohen also concluded that 
targeted sanctions must also be created against ISIS leadership and facilitators (Stergiou 202). 
Things like an arms embargo, account freezes, and economic bans can deter associates from 
interacting with ISIS. When known ISIS oil or other illegal resources enters the legal financial 
system, another counterterrorism policy can be to have a security measure that alerts the bank 
that this item/cash is related to ISIS. Then, it could be investigated. These items could potentially 
leave a money trail right back to ISIS. If America can create mandates and sanctions against ISIS 
affiliates, target the oil trade, cooperate with Middle Eastern governments, deal with the 
underlying economic instability of Iraq and Syria, and try to interfere with the illegal financial 
systems of ISIS, the U.S. has a good chance in dismantling ISIS through their financial means. 
 
The last characteristic that was studied in this thesis that affects counterterrorism against 
ISIS is their targets and tactics. One tactic ISIS has used to take over cities in the Middle East is 
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the creation of sleeper cells (“The Islamic State”). Sleeper cells are groups of ISIS fighters that 
are already living in the cities that ISIS wants to invade. Once it is the right time to attack, these 
sleeper cells ‘activate’ and take over the city. These sleeper cells present clear issues for 
counterterrorism. The point of these sleeper cells is for them to remain undetected. If they are 
undetected, no one knows they are already established within a city. Therefore, the only way to 
counter these sleeper cells is to build up the defenses of cities ISIS is most likely to target. This 
means Iraq and Syrian governments must find a way to predict which cities are likely to be of 
interest to ISIS. This could be as simple as looking at the cities ISIS controls now and finding 
cities that have similar resources and structures. Then, these cities can be provided with 
increased military presence, defensive measures, and strong leaders. If ISIS has less territory of 
their own, they will have less presence in the Middle East and become less of a threat to the 
United States. Even though this counterterrorist option focuses on building up Middle Eastern 
cities, it is still a necessary policy for United States counterterrorism because the U.S. is still 
targeted by ISIS. If preventing them from taking over more territory in the Middle East lessens 
their influences and leads to their downfall, the U.S. needs to consider this approach. The U.S. 
also has the leadership capabilities and resources to assist Middle Eastern countries as they 
defend their cities against ISIS  
Another tactic ISIS uses is the kidnapping of foreigners. The kidnapping follows a simple 
step by step procedure. Once kidnapped, ISIS demands ransom money. If the ransom is not paid, 
ISIS publicly executes the captive, usually by beheading. Then, the video of the execution is 
posted online. Current American counterterrorism policies have established that no concessions 
be made to terrorists. This means the United States will never pay the ransoms demanded by 
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terrorists. In 2015, the U.S. government revised their hostage policies in response to the violent 
executions of American hostages. This shows that a specific characteristic of ISIS, their violent 
tactics, has already influenced U.S. counterterrorism policies (“FACT SHEET: U.S. Government 
Hostage Policy”). Overall, these hostage policies need to be reevaluated every so often to see if 
this is still the best course of action to take against ISIS, especially when beheadings are the 
outcome.  
Besides the revisions of U.S. hostage policy, another option would be to technologically 
track these videos and shut them down. This censorship would protect Americans from being 
influenced by these brutal executions and would take away ISIS’s audience. Without an 
audience, ISIS may find that beheadings are ineffective. The issue with this approach is that it 
could potentially leave the hostage in the dark. No one will know the hostage’s face, their story, 
or their struggle. The media coverage of a hostage execution isn’t only focused on the brutal 
attack; it is on honoring the hostage and their fight. A way to solve this is by remembering the 
person that was executed through news specials while also trying to prevent the video of the 
actual execution from circulating the country. Overall, ISIS seems to focus on other targets when 
the United States stays out of the Middle East. This means that if the United States is not 
currently involved in Middle Eastern affairs or stationed on Middle Eastern soil, America may 
have the opportunity to refocus their efforts. ISIS shouldn’t be as big of a direct threat during 
these times. 
 
Taliban Counterterrorism 
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The creation of the Taliban in the late 1990’s offers the first implication for 
counterterrorism. The Taliban was formed by members of the mujahedeen who fought against 
the Soviets in Afghanistan as well as Pashtun students. As the Taliban was established, the 
Pashtun’s were the majority ethnicity in Afghanistan. By being the majority ethnicity in 
Afghanistan, it was understandable that they were able to influence government policies and 
public opinion. It also meant that it was more likely that Pashtun’s would comprise Afghan 
groups like the Taliban. Therefore, as Afghanistan works towards democracy, Pashtun’s will 
have a dominant say in politics. The United States must work with the Pashtun people to create 
policies that are favorable to them. If the Pashtun’s are content with their status in society and 
how the government is run, they may be more likely to work with the United States on 
counterterrorism policies. This has historical significance because the Taliban was originally and 
is still comprised of Pashtun’s. Catering to their ethnicity may deter future Fundamentalist 
ideology or Pashtuns from joining the Taliban. This point is furthered strengthened by the fact 
that when the Taliban helped overthrow the corrupt Afghan President Rabbani, they proved to 
the rest of the Pashtun population that they were invested in protecting the wishes of the Pashtun 
tribes (Laub). 
 During the 1990’s when the Taliban controlled land in over half of Afghanistan, one of 
the most powerful people against them was Abdul Rashid Dostum, who was part of the Northern 
Alliance (United Front). Since Dotsum has already established that he is against the Taliban and 
has actively worked towards defeating this group, it seems obvious that he would be willing to 
work with the United States on counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan. However, Vice-President 
Dostum has been accused of war crimes against Taliban prisoners. These accusations have led to 
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President Obama and other counterterrorism experts to deny Dostum a visa to enter the United 
States and refuse to work with him, even though he has stated that he wants to work with the 
United States on current Taliban issues (Rosenberg). Dostum’s long history with working against 
the Taliban means that he has valuable information that could help the United States with their 
fight against the Taliban. Since he is also the Vice-President of Afghanistan, Dostum has the 
political power to make influential decisions and create policies for Afghanistan and to the 
United States’ benefit. Although Dostum is accused of war crimes, the United States needs to 
balance their want for justice and their need for protecting the American population and their 
allies in the Middle East. If the U.S. can find a way to work with Dostum, it by no means excuses 
his accused actions. This alliance, however, could potentially be the combination needed to 
implement effective policies directed at the Taliban. It could also lead to less violence in the long 
run. Dostum isn’t the only actor that may provide the United States the information needed to 
defeat the Taliban. Compared to recent terrorist groups like ISIS, the Taliban has been an 
established organization since the 90’s. During their rise, they have made many enemies in their 
violent acquisition of Afghani cities. These enemies may not have the power or title that Dostum 
has, but they may have the drive needed to assist the United States in their counterterrorism 
plans.  
 The U.S. Institute of Peace has labeled five different phases of the Taliban, and these 
phases have been extensively discussed. These phases show the creation of the Taliban, their 
emergence into the international arena, their acquisition of land, and their fight against the 
United States (Semple 6). Although the 1st four phases might not necessarily show specific 
counterterrorism implications, as the past characteristics of the Taliban are not as influential as 
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present ones, they do allow experts to track to the development of the Taliban as a whole. For 
example, these phases show that until the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the Taliban was focused 
almost exclusively on Afghanistan. Once the U.S. invaded, the Taliban’s interests and territory 
was attacked by the West, which is why America became a target. This shows counterterrorism 
experts that direct threats against Taliban interests will result in potential attacks. The 4th phase 
also showed that the Taliban spread propaganda about the United States in order to gain support. 
If this happens, the United States needs to create positive (and true) propaganda of their own to 
counter these false attacks on their character. These 4 phases eventually led to the 5th phase the 
Taliban is currently in.  
 Currently, the Taliban is focusing on the Kabul government as well as taking over land 
around Afghanistan (Semple 7). The United States can help the Kabul government resist the 
advancement of the Taliban once again, by helping build up defensive measures and getting the 
military ready offensively. This could include training camps specifically created to attack and 
defend against the Taliban’s tactics. The more time that passes since the U.S. invasion, the more 
the Taliban seems to focus on the geographical locations around them. Therefore, the most 
appropriate counterterrorism would be to avoid physically deploying military to Afghanistan, as 
that will turn America into a direct target of the Taliban again. Instead, the United States can 
utilize covert methods to work with the Kabul government and Afghanistan as a whole. This 
could include working on individual leadership skills and how to control their territory better. 
The United States must also be ready to help Afghan troops if the Taliban decides to attack them 
directly and these attacks cause significant enough damage. 
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 Like the other two Islamic Fundamentalist groups discussed, there should be more that 
goes into counterterrorism policies than just historical events and ideological beliefs. The 
creation of the Taliban’s organization and leadership structure also affects counterterrorism. 
When the Taliban’s first leader Mullah Mohammed Omar was still alive, he formed a 
relationship with fellow Islamic Fundamentalist group Al Qaeda. This relationship was cemented 
with the protection the Taliban provided Al Qaeda. Although this relationship was cut short, the 
Taliban still protected Bin Laden after the 9/11 attacks. Even though the United States offered 10 
million dollars for the capture of leader Mullah Omar because of the protection he provided Al 
Qaeda around 9/11, he remained uncaptured (“The Taliban”). This shows that even when the 
United States offers cash rewards to people with information regarding the whereabouts of 
prominent Taliban leaders, it is possible that this is not enough of an incentive. Or, it is just 
impossible to accurately know the location of that leader. If this is the case, no amount of money 
would ever lead to the capture of that leader. The conflicting reports of Omar’s death proves that 
it is difficult to pinpoint the location of high-profile Taliban leaders. The fact that Omar still 
protected Bin Laden after he broke their deal when he attacked the United States also impacts 
counterterrorism. Even though Omar has since passed away, this refusal of cooperation means 
that it will be difficult to break Taliban-Al Qaeda relations. It also means that if Omar was 
willing to put his own life on the line to protect a fellow Islamic Fundamentalist, it is unlikely the 
Taliban will ever cooperate with the United States. This is especially true if the cooperation is at 
the expense of another Islamic Fundamentalist group. 
 Like ISIS, the Taliban has a centralized organizational structure. The top leadership of 
the Taliban is known as the Quetta Shura and it is located in Quetta, Pakistan (“The Taliban”). 
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Since the leadership is contained within the Quetta Shura, the United States has a direct target for 
attacks. This could be through the military like drone strikes or direct captures. The central 
location of these leaders is also known, since the Quetta Shura is based in Quetta. If Quetta is 
monitored, by drones or any other technology, the United States can track the comings and 
goings of known Taliban leaders. This can provide the U.S. with appropriate times to attack the 
city. The Quetta Shura also acts as a liaison the U.S. can contact if they want to directly speak to 
this group. The secretive nature of the Taliban’s organization structure is another obstacle U.S. 
counterterrorism faces. The Taliban will only release information if they want to and at the time 
they believe it is most beneficial to the organization. Besides this, the Taliban remains covet. 
Therefore, it is difficult for United States counterterrorism experts to learn more about the inner 
workings of the Taliban network. 
 Besides the Quetta Shura, the Taliban has four military councils that are split among the 
different geographical locations of Pakistan and Afghanistan the Taliban controls (Roggio). 
Since the military aspect of the Taliban is divided into 4 different areas, the Taliban is able to 
withstand attacks from the United States and other countries. If one military council or 
geographical location is attacked, there is still 3 other councils intact. These councils would be 
ready to defend their own territory and continue leading the members of the Taliban that are in 
their particular region. They could also offer assistance to the assaulted military council. This is 
similar to Al Qaeda’s network of affiliates. In order to offset this organizational structure, the 
United States must simultaneously attack all 4 geographical locations. That way, it is more likely 
the Taliban will not be able to withstand all 4 areas of their territory being attacked. Also, a 
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certain military council wouldn’t be able to help other councils since they were attacked 
themselves. 
A long with the military councils and the Quetta Shura, the Taliban has 10 committees 
(Roggio). Each of these committees typify an agency or cabinet that is in the United States. One 
policy the U.S. could formulate in response to these committees is to utilize other U.S. 
government agencies. These agencies could come up with ways to attack their corresponding 
Taliban committee. One way would be to have U.S. government agencies think of ways their 
own operation could potentially be destroyed. Then, the United States can utilize these means 
against the Taliban. Overall, this means other federal agencies and cabinets would work hand in 
hand with the Department of Homeland Security to come up with ways to attack the Taliban 
committees. For example, the U.S. Department of Education would focus on the Taliban’s 
Education committee. The Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Prisons would focus 
on the Taliban’s prisoners and refugees’ committee. This counterterrorism policy would allow 
officials in different fields of government provide assistance to counterterrorism experts using 
their specific expertise. 
 The financing of the Taliban is another characteristic that affects counterterrorism 
policies. The first weapon the Taliban was known for using was the shoulder-fired Stinger 
missile. This relates to financing because the Taliban didn’t actually have to create or raise the 
funds for these missiles themselves. They were actually given them by the United States in their 
fight against the Soviet Union in the 1980’s. Luckily, the counterterrorism policies created after 
9/11 has prevented the Taliban from being able to use these missiles against the United States. 
Just in case, the United States needs to remember that it is plausible that the Taliban still has 
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possession of these missiles. Therefore, the U.S. must keep security measures in place at airports 
that prevent the use of these missiles against-low flying aircrafts. The Stingers operation is also a 
lesson to be learned by the United States. Since the Stingers were acquired by the Taliban 
because of the U.S., the United States needs to be more cautious in their arms dealings to other 
countries/groups. The United States also cannot solely rely on the intelligence agencies of other 
countries. During the Stingers transaction, the U.S. was working closely with the Inter-Services 
Intelligence agency in Pakistan (Fitchett and Intl. Herald Tribune). Even with this cooperation, 
the U.S. failed to create a solid relationship with the groups they were supplying their weapons 
to. In order to prevent this situation altogether, the United States can also choose to stop 
providing weapons to non-formal groups and only deal with the militaries of legitimate 
countries. This is not only a potential military policy but a counterterrorism policy. If the U.S. 
chooses not to supply weapons to a group of people from another country, these weapons cannot 
later down the road be used to attack America like they did in the Stingers operation. The 
Taliban also rejected monetary rewards for the return of the Stingers, just like they rejected 
rewards for the capture of President Omar. This proves again that monetary incentives are not 
enough for the Taliban to cooperate. 
 The opium trade is one of the Taliban’s main sources of revenue (“The Taliban”). This 
means that generally speaking, the United States must attack the drug trade head on in order to 
disrupt the Taliban’s finances. This isn’t a simple counterterrorism policy. For one, opium rings 
are oftentimes run by families who are unwilling to open their doors to strangers (Peters 1). This 
means that the United States would have a difficult time covertly attacking the operation. One 
way to attack is by combing forces with Afghanistan. Afghanistan has become destabilized due 
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to the drug trade, which gives them an incentive to try and stop it. The United States and 
Afghanistan must also create policies that help people not affiliated with the Taliban who are 
living in the communities that are filled with drugs. This could be economic help or assistance in 
relocating. Less people may decrease the demand of opium and affect profits. People living in 
these communities could also potentially work with the United States by giving the U.S. an 
inside look at the drug trade. The U.S. could even employ informants to lead them to dealers. 
Economic help and relocation assistance can also be given to those who are forced to work in 
Taliban controlled opium fields. Farmers aren’t necessarily members of the Taliban (Shah and 
Mashal). If they are given other options, they may be willing to abandon the opium fields and 
leave the Taliban without workers. 
 There are many other policies the U.S. can create to attack the opium trade, most of 
which deal with cooperation from counternarcotic personnel. This means that first, the U.S. 
should employ more counternarcotic personnel trained on the opium trade. Once there is an 
increase in this personnel, they can be included on military missions to Afghanistan. There, they 
could study any apparent aspect of the opium trade. If evidence is found, it can be used to track 
the trading route and be used as proof in future trials. Another simple policy the United States 
can work with Afghanistan to employ is the utilization of checkpoints on the highways. These 
checkpoints would look out for opium conveys. The United States would also need to look out 
for conveys by air, in case they aren’t utilizing the highway. Opium chemists should also be 
targeted (Peters 34). They won’t be as high-profile as Taliban leaders or the directors of the drug 
trade, so it may be easier to locate them. Without chemists, the opium cannot be made from the 
poppies. The United States must utilize a combination of these strategies in order to ensure that if 
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the Taliban was to find their way around one strategy, there would be many others in place. This 
means that the United States should create a unique opium counterterrorism plan catered to the 
Taliban.  
 The drug trade also affects the Taliban’s fighting and military patterns. First, the 
Helmand Province should be targeted by the U.S. because it is an area that produces much of the 
poppies used for opium. In this province in particular, fighting increases in winter months and 
slows during the harvesting season, which is around March and April (Shah and Mashal). The 
United States can use these fighting and harvesting seasons to plan their own attacks. There are a 
few plans the U.S. can have. One, the U.S. can attack Taliban headquarters (like Quetta) during 
the slow military season, as they are focused on the drug trade and not on their military. 
Therefore, there may be less chance of a counter attack. If there is a counter attack and the 
Taliban switches focus to the military, the U.S. can deploy troops to attack the poppy fields. If 
the poppy fields are successfully destroyed in this second plan, the Taliban will have less money 
to fund their military operations throughout the rest of the year. Another plan the U.S. can have 
is to attack the poppy fields in the winter when the Taliban’s focus is on fighting. Therefore, it 
may be more difficult for the Taliban to rebuild their fields before the next harvest because they 
are trying to advance their military. If the U.S. decides to attack poppy fields first during the 
harvest time, this may even result in the deaths of some Taliban members, since they are 
employed in the fields during harvest. The issue with this is that it is impossible to decipher 
between who is just a field worker and who is an actual Taliban member. Even though 
counterterrorism policies should focus on the opium trade and poppy fields because it is one of 
the biggest sources of Taliban funds, there are other ways the Taliban gains profit. Other ways 
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include timber trading, extortion, and mining (“The Taliban”). In case counterterrorism efforts 
against the drug trade are unsuccessful, the United States should create policies that battle the 
other ways the Taliban finances their operation. 
The targets and tactics of the Taliban also provide ramifications for counterterrorism. The 
category of tactics that was focused on in this thesis in regards to the Taliban was the ideological 
tactics used against their own members and those who are easily influenced (Soherwordi et al 
347). These ideological tactics are difficult to target using counterterrorism, since they are aimed 
at those already under the influence of the Taliban. Since it is known that the Taliban employs 
these strict regulations, one thing the United States can do is to spread messages about the 
importance of education for women, especially women in countries besides the United States. 
The promotion of education is not only seen as a positive message for every country, it can help 
counter some of the influence the Taliban has when they try and control their women. Besides 
education, a lot of the other laws enforced by the Taliban are culturally based. Therefore, if the 
United States was to share their disagreement with these laws, it could do more harm than good. 
The United States is a westernized culture who does not follow Islamic based law. Therefore, it 
could be seen as an attack on Islam if the United States was to criticize the wearing of hijabs or 
the restriction of entertainment.   
 
 The use of case-specific counterterrorism policies shaped according to the unique 
characteristics displayed by various terrorist groups shouldn’t stop at these three Islamic 
Fundamentalist groups. Each terrorist threat to the United States and their allies should have their 
own counterterrorism policy based on characteristics that set them apart from other groups. The 
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research and findings supplied in this thesis lays as a solid foundation on a topic that otherwise 
hasn’t been studied. This means this thesis provides a starting point to future research. This 
future research can be expanded to include other Islamic Fundamentalist groups or other 
religious terrorist groups. These policies should also not be limited to discussing the 4 
characteristics discussed in these case studies. Characteristics such as geography, the allies of 
each terrorist group, and size can also have counterterrorism implications that can impact future 
policies. Also, since this thesis’s purpose was to prove how characteristics in general influence 
counterterrorism policies, each specific characteristic can continue to be expanded to include 
more details. This includes other targets and tactics, different sources of finances, or a more in-
depth timeline of their history. Regardless of the characteristic or the group, the next step of this 
research is to conduct evaluative research. This thesis provided descriptive research through the 
information provided on each characteristic. It also provided explanatory research, as it 
explained how these characteristics influence counterterrorism. Evaluative research, on the other 
hand, will show how effective these policies are in real life scenarios and compared to the past 
generalized policies. Individualized policies create endless opportunities to expand 
counterterrorism knowledge and effectiveness, as they are able to get down to the specific 
weaknesses each terrorist group displays. With the growing creativeness and capabilities of 
terrorist groups, a one-size-fits-all approach to counterterrorism is outdated and ineffective. 
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